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The attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed a weakness in America’s defense—it lacked 
sufficient predictive domestic intelligence to prevent terrorism. More than a decade later, 
the American policy community continues to debate the need for an independent 
domestic intelligence service focused on counterterrorism. Debate often centers on 
whether or not the United States should create an intelligence service independent of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. It has given less attention to what characteristics are 
expected in a service if one were created. The questions of should and what are naturally 
intertwined. The former, however, often focuses on system-based factors exogenous to 
the service: administrative structures, oversight mechanisms, information-sharing bodies, 
and national legal frameworks. Generally absent from this debate is an isolated, 
systematic, evaluation of ideal characteristics endogenous to a domestic intelligence 
service. With a decade of reflection behind us, reframing the debate may help inform 
discussion on counterterrorism intelligence in America—so we may understand not only 
what we lack, but also what we should seek.    
Through an evaluation of literature on intelligence in democratic nations, and 
application of this evaluation to the post-9/11 discourse, this thesis identifies and 
analyzes characteristics deemed “ideal” in a service. It then tests these ideals in foreign 
security services often touted as models for America, in order to determine in what 
manner these characteristics exist, if at all. The study concludes by exploring lessons 
from this analysis to further inform debate, suggesting that the ideal characteristics 
expected in a domestic intelligence service are not only difficult to achieve in the modern 
counterterrorism environment, a strict pursuit of them may produce counterproductive 
results. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than a decade after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the American policy 
community continues to debate the need for an independent domestic intelligence service 
in support of countering terrorism.1 Debate has centered on whether or not the United 
States should create a service that is independent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and focused on domestic counterterrorism intelligence. It has given less attention to 
what characteristics are expected in a service if one were created. The two questions—
should and what—are naturally intertwined. The debate over should we?, however, often 
resides in evaluation of federal administrative structures, congressional oversight 
mechanisms, community information-sharing bodies, and national legal frameworks—
factors exogenous to the service. Generally absent from this deliberation is an isolated, 
systematic, evaluation of ideal characteristics endogenous to a domestic intelligence 
service. Years after the devastating events of 2001, now is an opportune time to reflect 
and reshape the debate, seeking to better define expectations for our security services and 
determine lessons for their use.  
A. FORWARD 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, (9/11) revealed a weakness in 
America’s homeland defense—it lacked predictive counterterrorism intelligence and 
needed security services better able to prevent terrorism. In the wake of 9/11, discussion 
of intelligence and security in America centered on the failure of intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies to share information, and on the lack of actionable information to  
 
 
                                                 
1 Matthew Johnson, “FBI’s Intelligence Woes Restir Debate On an American MI5,” CQ Homeland 
Security On-line, October 24, 2007 (accessed July 29, 2012) 
http://newsbuster.com/Pages/Oct07/10_24_07_fbis_intelligence.html; Art Keller, “The Handcuff 
Handicap,” Foreign Policy Magazine, September 19, 2012 (accessed October 2, 2012) 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/the_handcuff_handicap?print=yes&hidecomments=yes
&page=full; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), Chapter 12, hereafter referred to as The 9/11 Commission Report. 
 2 
help preempt attacks. In essence, the American security apparatus was presumed to have 
“failed to connect the dots,” and the “dots” that existed lacked the specificity necessary to 
facilitate interdiction of terrorists before they struck.2  
Assessments varied on how to address America’s domestic security deficiencies. 
The national discourse included calls to create a new domestic intelligence service, one 
independent of the FBI and geared toward counterterrorism. Some, like FBI Director 
Robert Mueller and the 9/11 Commission, argued that a new service was not needed; the 
FBI could fill that role with reprioritization of its operations and a shift in culture away 
from enforcing laws toward collecting preventative intelligence.3 Proponents of a new 
service, like Federal Judge William Posner and a 2002 joint Congressional inquiry, 
contended that the FBI was a reactive organization designed for the prosecution of crimes 
after they were committed; it could not easily become an intelligence agency geared to 
gather predictive counterterrorism intelligence.4 Some, such as Senator John Edwards of 
                                                 
2 The 9/11 Commission Report, 352; Robert Bryant, et. al., “America Needs More Spies,” The 
Economist, July 10, 2003 (accessed May 9, 2012) http://www.economist.com/node/1907776. Per Bryant 
“[m]uch post-attack recrimination has focused on failures of ‘communication and information 
sharing’…There certainly was a lack of dot-connecting before September 11, but more important was the 
fact that the blizzard of information available for analysis was of such poor quality. There were too few 
useful dots.”  
3 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Responds to Call for Domestic Intelligence Agency,” 
September 14, 2006 (accessed August 10, 2012) http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-
responds-to-call-for-domestic-intelligence-agency/; U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Oversight of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 30, 2011,” (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 2012); 
Amy Zegart, Spying Blind (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); The 9/11 Commission Report, 
423–424. 
4 Richard Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence (U.S.A.: Hoover Institution Press Publication, 
2005); Richard Posner, “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent,” The New York Times, August 29, 2004 (accessed 
October 2, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/29/books/the-9–11-report-a-
dissent.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Gregory F. Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: 
Assessing the Options (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2008), 2; The Advisory Panel to 
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Fourth 
Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 
2002) (accessed September 13, 2012) 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf, hereafter referred to as The 
Gilmore Commission Report. Per the Gilmore Commission, “[t]he FBI’s long standing law enforcement 
tradition and organizational culture persuade us that, even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot soon 
be transformed into an organization dedicated to detecting and preventing terrorist attacks…We 
recommend that the collection of intelligence and other information on international terrorist activities 
inside the United States, including the authorities, responsibilities and safeguards under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which are currently in the FBI, be transferred to the [National 
Counterterrorism Center],” The Gilmore Commission Report, iii–iv. 
 3 
North Carolina, went so far as to put forward official proposals for the creation of a new 
domestic intelligence service.5 Others, including Harvard professor and former National 
Commission on Terrorism member Juliette Kayyem, argued that protection of civil 
liberties, not intelligence collection, should be the paramount consideration of the debate. 
For those such as Kayyem, the FBI could fit this agenda.6  
Hoping to avoid disruption of ongoing security efforts, Washington decided to 
forgo creation of a domestic intelligence agency—provided the FBI could transform itself 
into an intelligence-centric (rather than post-crime investigation) service.7 Furthermore, 
despite the recognized need for better intelligence, post-9/11 reforms emphasized 
creation of information coordinating bodies (the National Counter Terrorism Center and 
the Department of Homeland Security, among others) and intelligence community 
oversight mechanisms (the Director of National Intelligence). Ultimately, the emphasis 
was on the administrative system that oversaw connecting of the “dots,” rather than on 
identifying characteristics specific to, and improving, the services responsible for 
collecting them.8  
                                                 
5 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress: Domestic 
Intelligence in the United Kingdom - Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by Todd Masse, 
CRS Report RL31920 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, May 13, 
2003) (accessed October 5, 2012) http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31920.pdf, 2–3. In 2003 Senator Edwards’ 
introduced a bill (S. 410 “Foreign Intelligence Collection Improvement Act of 2003”) that included 
creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency (HIA). Nested into the Department of Homeland Security, 
HIA would assume the FBI’s and National Security Agency’s domestic intelligence roles and serve as the 
primary American domestic intelligence collection service. HIA would not have arrest powers.  
6 Council on Foreign Relations, “Does the United States Need a Domestic Intelligence Service?” 
November 17, 2006 (accessed July 18, 2012) http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/does-united-states-need-
domestic-intelligence-agency/p11990. This piece includes a back-and-forth debate between Kayyem and 
Posner.  
7 Federation of American Scientists, “Final Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 
of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,” March 31, 2005 (accessed August 14, 
2012) http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmdcomm.html, hereafter referred to as the WMD Commission 
Report; Greg Miller, “FBI Gets a Broader Role in Coordinating Domestic Intelligence Activities,” The 
Washington Post On-line, June 20, 2012 (accessed October 2, 2012) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-gets-a-broader-role-in-coordinating-domestic-
intelligence-activities/2012/06/19/gJQAtmupoV_story.html; The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapters 3 and 
12; Keller, “The Handcuff Handicap.”  
8 In 2004 the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) replaced the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center (TTIC) as the central coordinating body for counterterrorism information. Gregory Treverton, The 
Next Steps in Reshaping Terrorism (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2005), 10. 
 4 
Nearly 12 years after 9/11, America continues to deliberate on the need for an 
independent domestic intelligence service in support of counterterrorism efforts.9 In 
recent years, government officials, academics, and pundits have returned to the debate 
over the need for a service apart from the FBI. Despite the lack of catastrophic attack 
since 9/11, the persistent and changing specter of terrorism (highlighted by the 2009 
“Underwear Bomber” and the attempted 2010 Times Square bombing), and lagging FBI 
reforms have reinvigorated review of America’s domestic security apparatus.10 The 
question of “what kind of service is needed for better security?” is once again at the 
forefront. As terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins noted to Congress in June 2011, 
“[t]his is an appropriate time for a review. .As al-Qaeda has evolved, so must American 
strategy.”11  
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to evaluate whether or not the United States should establish an 
independent domestic intelligence service, it is first necessary to identify and assess 
characteristics specific to an ideal service, if such a service were created. Before engaging 
in another debate over whether or not America should create a new service, the 
government must first determine if a new service would complement the existing 
                                                 
9 Per the 9/11 Commission, “[c]ountering terrorism has become, beyond any doubt, the top national 
security priority for the United States,” The 9/11 Commission Report, 361. The following highlight the 
ongoing debate: Arthur S. Hulnick, “Home Time: A New Paradigm for Domestic Intelligence,” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 22:4 (2009) (accessed August 25, 2012) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600902896902; Council on Foreign Relations, “Does the United States 
Need a Domestic Intelligence Service?”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Responds”; Johnson, 
“FBI’s Intelligence Woes Restir Debate”; Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence.  
10 On December 25, 2009, al-Qaeda affiliated and Nigerian born, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the 
“Underwear Bomber”) attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear while on a flight from 
Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. The plot failed when the bomb malfunctioned. The New York Times, 
“Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,” February 16, 2012 (accessed September 15, 2012) 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/umar_farouk_abdulmutallab/index.html?inline
=nyt-per. On May 1, 2010, Pakistan born Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times 
Square, New York City. The plot failed when nearby vendors noticed the vehicle smoking and notified the 
authorities. Chad Bray, “Times Square Plotter Gets Life Term,” Wall Street Journal On-line, October 5, 
2010 (accessed September 15, 2012) 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704469004575533902050370826.html?mod=djemalertN
Ynews. 
11 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Al Qaeda after Bin Laden,” Testimony Before the House Armed Services 
Committee, June 2011 (accessed June 4, 2012) 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT365.pdf. 
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apparatus in the manner desired. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify and 
analyze ideal characteristics that are specific to a service through a review of expert 
opinions in the post-9/11 writings, and then apply these findings to foreign case studies 
often held up as examples for America, in order to ascertain lessons for the U.S. model. 
To do so, this study will seek to answer three questions:  
1) What are the ideal characteristics of a domestic intelligence service as 
indicated by the post-9/11 American discourse? 
2) In what manner do these characteristics exist, if at all, in services often 
touted as models for a potential American service?  
3) What lessons from those cases may further debate regarding creation of a 
service in the United States?  
Through a review of the issues significant to domestic counterterrorism 
intelligence and analysis of the relevant literature, this study finds that (1) an evaluation 
of the post-9/11 American discourse on domestic intelligence reveals a desired set of 
endogenous characteristics that an service would ideally possess, and those 
characteristics include protection of civil liberties, collection of predictive intelligence 
aimed at combatting the unique threat of terrorism, and coordinating the resulting 
information across the national security community; (2) that these characteristics may be 
found in varying degrees, with varying impacts, in the two most relevant intelligence 
services frequently held up as potential models; and (3) that a qualitative evaluation of 
these cases, framed by the ideal characteristics outlined in the American discourse, offers 
lessons for re-evaluation of American domestic intelligence. 
C. KEY ISSUES IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC COUNTERTERRORISM 
INTELLIGENCE DEBATE 
As noted above, the ongoing debate over American domestic counterterrorism 
intelligence has focused on the question of “should intelligence reforms include adding 
an independent domestic intelligence service?” The debate often centers on oversight 
mechanisms, legal frameworks, and coordinating bodies. The unanswered question is—
”what characteristics would a new service possess if created?” Clarifying the what helps 
clarify the should. This study is rooted in the opinion that the debate should not only 
focus on the context in which a domestic intelligence service should operate but also on 
 6 
the service itself, and that post-9/11 discourse identifies characteristics expected in an 
ideal service. Prior to examining the relevant literature in order to extrapolate 
characteristics the authors considered ideal, however, a study of this nature must account 
for the contextual issues that frame the discourse. Therefore, this section identifies the 
problems and issues that shape evaluations of the role, and ideal characteristics, of 
security services.  
With regard to the purpose and characteristics of a domestic service, discourse on 
the future of American domestic intelligence revolves around three issues: (1) the role of 
intelligence in the democratic state and its impact on civil liberties; (2) counterterrorism 
as a unique mandate that requires a unique approach to intelligence collection; and 
(3) differences between intelligence and law enforcement cultures. 
1. Intelligence in a Democratic State and its Impact on Civil Liberties 
Scholars and practitioners generally agree on how to define intelligence and its 
purpose. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) veteran Arthur Hulnick defines intelligence 
as “information about a nation’s adversaries, enemies, or competitors or about threats to 
national security…designed to assist policy officials in formulating strategies or reaching 
decisions.”12 Intelligence theorist Loch Johnson notes that “[t]he most valued intelligence 
provides actionable information, allowing policy officials to carry out operations with 
confidence, precision, and a high likelihood of success…” and “…the most difficult 
challenge of intelligence reporting is to include actionable information.”13 In sum, the 
intelligence service may maximize its value to the state by anticipating threats, collecting 
predictive intelligence on those threats, and transmitting insight to officials capable of 
responding to the threats.14 
                                                 
12 Arthur S. Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Machine (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 5. 
13 Loch Johnson, “A Theory of Strategic Intelligence,” in Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and 
Debates, ed. Peter Gill (New York: Routledge, 2009), 47. 
14 Concepts from Erik J. Dahl, “Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security but Less Liberty?” 
Homeland Security Affairs, Vol. 7 (September 2011); Jennifer E. Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: 
Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” Intelligence Theory, ed. Peter Gill, 154; Michael Warner, “Intelligence 
as Risk Shifting,” in Intelligence Theory, ed. Peter Gill, 16–32. 
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In a democracy, intelligence services operate under the direction of elected 
representatives. American services have been directed to collect intelligence at home and 
abroad. More than foreign operations, domestic intelligence activities require the 
government to balance security with democratic norms and civil liberties; the term 
“domestic intelligence” may carry nefarious implications. As security scholar Robert 
Jervis noted, “intelligence services are vital and troublesome.”15 Intelligence requires 
secrecy, but democratic norms call for accountability and transparency. If unchecked, 
secrecy can undermine democratic institutions and threaten civil liberties.16 
Counterterrorism intelligence is of particular concern for a democracy, as Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu highlighted: 
The governments of free societies charged with fighting a rising tide of 
terrorism are thus faced with a democratic dilemma: if they do not fight 
terrorism with the means available to them, they endanger their citizenry; 
if they do, they appear to endanger the very freedoms that they are charged 
to protect.17 
Intelligence aimed at fighting terrorism may weaken democratic regimes. Per 
terrorism scholar Martha Crenshaw, the “government’s response to terrorism will 
diminish democracy more than the acts of terrorism itself.”18 In response to terrorism, 
states curtail personal liberties in return for enhanced security. Enhanced security means 
erosion of civil liberties, which in turn disrupts the free and fair functioning of 
democratic civil society and erodes the legitimacy of the democratic government. An 
                                                 
15 Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” in Reforming 
Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, eds. Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. 
Bruneau, eds. (Texas: University of Texas Press, 2007), vi. 
16 Thomas Bruneau and Chris Matei, “Intelligence in the Developing Democracies: The Quest for 
Transparency and Effectiveness,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security, ed. Loch Johnson (U.S.A.: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 757. 
17 Quoted in James Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative 
Analysis of Domestic Intelligence Agencies and their Implications for Homeland Security,” Homeland 
Security Affairs Vol. III, No. 2 (June 2007) (accessed august 29, 2012) 
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.2.2, 4.  
18 Martha Crenshaw ed., The Consequences of Counterterrorism (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2010), 2. 
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ineffective response to a threat, however, is also detrimental to the state as it calls into 
question the state’s ability to safeguard the citizenry.19  
Protection of civil liberties is fundamental to maintaining the legitimacy of the 
democratic state. Abuse of civil liberties equates to violation of democratic norms, which 
causes a loss of public trust. Loss of public trust weakens democratic institutions. 
Naturally, public acceptance of infringements is proportional to the perceived threat. The 
greater the threat, the more open the public may be to restriction of liberties. Fluctuating 
threats may equate to inconsistent acceptance of restrictions, which frustrates 
development of long-term security policies. Per Jervis, “the gathering and use of 
intelligence in democratic or democratizing countries over the long run must rest on the 
consent and indeed support of the citizenry and powerful groups in society.”20  
Given the above context, evaluation of a domestic intelligence service’s ability to 
support the democratic state should include assessment of the intelligence service’s 
ability to protect civil liberties. Abuse of civil liberties by security services, however, is 
often a result of national legal and political processes. Per legal theorist D. J. McBarnet: 
[a]ny gap between how the police should behave according to democratic 
principles and how they do is not simply a by-product of informal abuse 
and non-legal motivations among the police themselves . . . it exists in the 
law as defined in court decisions and statuses by the judicial and political 
elite of the state.21  
This last point highlights the benefit of evaluating a service’s ability to protect 
civil liberties based on internal characteristics such as public outreach programs (to 
                                                 
19 Concepts from Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within: Security 
Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, 
California: RAND Corporation, 2004) (accessed July 18, 2012) 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG100, 76; Fernando Reinares, “Democratic Regimes, Internal 
Security Policy, and the Threat of Terrorism,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 3 (1998), 
351–369. For related insight into democratic consolidation and transition, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
20 Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” xii. 
21 D.J. McBarnet, “Approaches to Intelligence and Social Science,” in The British Police, ed. S. 
Holdaway (London: Edward Arnold, 1979); quoted in Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence 
and the Liberal Democratic State (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass & Co., 1994), 62. 
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educate the public on its role and earn public trust) and internal oversight mechanisms, 
rather than solely on external factors such as national legal frameworks and congressional 
oversight. 
2. Counterterrorism: A Unique Mandate for Security Services 
Following 9/11 the top priority of the U.S. security apparatus was countering the 
threat of terrorism.22 Terrorism imposes unique burdens upon federal security services. It 
is different from the traditional Cold War-era security concerns for which the American 
intelligence enterprise was created. Terrorists, and their intentions, are harder to uncover. 
Terrorists do not offer fields of missiles or ships in port to photograph and analyze. 
Moreover, terrorist groups are clandestine, small, and insular, making penetration 
difficult.23 
Although difficult to ascertain, terrorist actions can be predicted and interdicted 
with the right intelligence. Terrorists are rational actors; they weigh their decisions, 
evaluate the costs, and seek an identified end-state. Terrorists’ primary goal is to 
influence the political system. Per Crenshaw, a perception of frustrated access to political 
mechanisms is a precondition for expression through violence.24 In addition, according to 
scholar Donatella Della Porta, terrorists create an “alternative legal system” that rejects 
the conventional cycle of negotiation and reconciliation in favor of one that justifies the 
use of extreme tactics.25 As rational actors seeking to participate in the political system 
(albeit nefariously and via an alternate system of norms), terrorists plan, prepare, and 
move toward an identified goal. As such, their activities may be interdicted with 
                                                 
22 Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 104. 
23 Erica Chenoweth and Susan E. Clarke, “All Terrorism is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and 
Governance for Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System,” Political Research Quarterly, 
Vol. 63 No. 3 (September 2010), 495–507. For his part, Judge Richard Posner argued that countering 
terrorism requires the use of specialized resources and skillsets that are beyond the reach of local and state 
governments. 
24 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” in The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, 
Causes, and Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley Jr. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 96. 
25 Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Individual Motivations in Underground Political 
Organizations” International Social Movement Research Vol. 4 (JAI Press Inc., 1992), 21. 
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appropriate intelligence on their intentions, motivations, and planned means to address 
their audience (e.g., bombings).     
As intelligence theorist Jeffrey Norwitz contends, terrorism is a human-centric 
enterprise. Therefore, counterterrorism intelligence cannot be acquired remotely.26 It 
must be acquired by human penetrations in direct contact with terrorists or their support 
network. Per Norwitz, human intelligence (HUMINT) is “unmatched in its ability to 
uncover this often private, subtle, and privileged information.”27 Intelligence specialist 
Gregory Treverton took the point further, noting, “HUMINT is most valuable in terms of 
prioritizing the target for covert surveillance and/or gaining preemptive warnings of 
actual or latent threats to internal security…” and “…recruiting and training insiders for 
the purpose of counterterrorism is a time-consuming and expensive task.”28 
In sum, terrorists are predictable and may be interdicted with the right 
intelligence. The unique, non-state and human-centric nature of terrorism dictates that 
HUMINT penetrations of terrorist networks are the most effective mechanism to acquire 
counterterrorism intelligence. Therefore, an evaluation of characteristics internal to a 
domestic security service must include assessment of the service’s ability to collect 
predictive intelligence, primarily via human penetrations of terrorist networks. 
3. Organizational Culture: Differences between Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement Cultures 
With the nation’s security mandate turned toward counterterrorism, America 




                                                 
26 Jeffrey Norwitz, “Disrupting Human Networks: Ancient Tools for Modern Challenges,” in 
Homeland Security and Intelligence, ed. Keith Gregory Logan (California: Praeger, 2012), 219–220. Per 
Norwitz, interdicting human networks requires understanding of their ideology, leadership, operational 
environment (culture, social support networks, allies, and enemies), their logistics chain, and weaknesses in 
the group. 
27 Ibid., 219. 
28 Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 35. 
 11 
reforms sought to reprioritize the FBI’s mission, placing predictive counterterrorism 
intelligence above criminal evidence collection. However, reforms may have been 
frustrated by the FBI’s law enforcement culture.29  
New Institutionalism theory outlined the importance of an institution’s origins, 
structure, and goals upon its culture: the conditions that lead to the creation of a service 
will ultimately dictate its structure and goals; structures and goals will, in turn, dictate 
incentives for its members; combined, structure, goals, and incentives determine the 
service’s culture.30 Culture is developed apart from the system of organizations and leads 
to micro-cultures within the system; micro-cultures reinforce self-protecting norms and 
incentives that isolate one service from another. In the case of the FBI, its Special Agents 
form a unique sub-culture that promotes homogeneity by incentivizing a law 
enforcement, arrest-based, culture. In turn, the Special Agent culture is isolated from the 
intelligence collector and analyst cultures. Cultural gaps exist both within and between 
security services. Gaps hinder cross-body coordination, such as historically frustrated 
communication between the CIA (intelligence culture) and the FBI (law enforcement 
culture).31 
Organizational culture—defined as the set of social, political, and bureaucratic 
norms of an institution that guide its operations—is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate 
from the structure and origin of the institution. Speaking to theories of intelligence, 
authors Glenn Hastedt and B. Douglas Skelley noted:  
To change structure without an attention to culture is to invite failure just 
as surely as is the reverse, to change culture without an attention to 
structure…Complicating any reform effort is the reality that while 
organization structural changes can be put in place through legislation or 
fiat, cultural changes cannot.32 
                                                 
29 Garret M. Graff, The Threat Matrix: the FBI at War in the Age of Terror  (New York: Little, Brown 
and Company, 2011), 496. 
30 Boraz and Bruneau, Reforming Intelligence, 3–4. 
31 Concept from Gill, Policing Politics, 239. 
32 Glenn Hastedt and B. Douglas Skelley, “Intelligence in a Turbulent World: Insights from 
Organization Theory,” in Intelligence Theory, ed. Peter Gill, 127.  
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We may conclude that reforms aimed at changing security service cultures are unlikely to 
be successful. Per Hastedt and Skelley, culture “springs spontaneously from the 
interaction of those who work in organizations,” and cannot be altered by legislative 
reform.33 Law enforcement models are often considered incommensurate with 
counterterrorism intelligence operations for three reasons. First, prosecution of crimes 
requires evidence—information is collected in response to criminal acts, not primarily for 
the prevention of future acts. Second, while terrorists conduct criminal acts, they are not 
necessarily career criminals (per Treverton, many terrorists “create only one spectacular 
crime, and then it is too late for intelligence to matter”).34 Lastly, law enforcement 
models may incentivize arrest and prosecution over exploratory investigations. This 
culture requires that officers drop a lead if it cannot support prosecution, or make an 
arrest on lesser charges in lieu of pursuing more tenuous long-term penetrations of 
terrorist groups.35  
It should be noted that some criminologists were less certain of law enforcement’s 
failings with regard to providing predictive information. For example, in their 1995 study 
of undercover police operations in Germany, scholars Heiner Busch and Albrecht Funk 
emphasized the potential “preventive crime fighting” ability of German police services 
that incorporated undercover human sources into their operations.36 Similarly, in his 
assessment of Canadian police undercover operations, author Jean-Paul Brodeur 
conceded that use of undercover police sources might lead to prevention of crimes.37 
Nonetheless, governments task their police services to collect evidence and uphold the 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 16. 
35 Henry Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, eds. 
Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 207. 
36 Heiner Busch and Albrecht Funk, “Undercover Tactics as an Element of Preventive Crime Fighting 
in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective, eds. 
Cyrille Fijnaut and Gary T Marx (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995) 61, 67; The 9/11 
Commission Report, 72. 
37 Jean-Paul Brodeur, “Undercover Policing in Canada: A Study of its Consequences,” in Undercover: 
Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective, eds. Cyrille Fijnaut and Gary T Marx (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1995), 87. 
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law by supporting criminal prosecutions. This task requires adherence to legal due 
process, which requires proof of a crime, potentially de-incentivizing exploratory 
intelligence collection.  
In sum, a law enforcement culture may stand in contrast to the intelligence-driven 
culture of services without arrest authorities. Intelligence services are tasked, structured, 
and incentivized to acquire information in support of predicting future decisions and 
actions. Therefore, evaluation of domestic intelligence services must account for their 
cultures. If not accompanied by intelligence collection-focused origins and mandates, law 
enforcement agencies risk reactive, rather than preventative, methods of operation that 
are incompatible with countering terrorism.38 
D. IDENTIFYING IDEAL CHARACTERISTICS THROUGH A REVIEW OF 
THE POST-9/11 LITERATURE 
The preceding section outlined the three key issues that frame evaluation of 
domestic intelligence services in the post-9/11 American milieu:  
1) Domestic intelligence collection is problematic for America’s 
constitutional democracy. It risks eroding civil liberties in pursuit of 
security, and infringements on liberty are weighed against public 
acceptance of the same. Evaluation of characteristics specific to a security 
service must account for its ability to earn public trust via internal 
mechanisms, rather than only account for constraints on the service from 
system functions such as legal and oversight frameworks. 
2) Counterterrorism is a unique mission for security services and predictive 
counterterrorism intelligence is often best acquired through HUMINT. 
Therefore, evaluation of a service must consider its ability to collect 
predictive intelligence, primarily via human penetration of terrorist 
networks. 
3) Predictive intelligence is best provided by a service with a culture of 
intelligence rather than law enforcement. Organizational cultures are 
difficult, if not impossible, to transform. Therefore, evaluation of a service 
should incorporate the service’s origin, structure, mandate, and resulting 
culture. 
                                                 
38 Agnes Gereben Schaefer, “The History of Domestic Intelligence in the United States: Lessons for 
Assessing the Creation of a New Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency,” in The Challenge of Domestic 
Intelligence in a Free Society: a Multidisciplinary Look at the Creation of a U.S. Domestic 
Counterterrorism Intelligence Agency, ed. Brian Jackson (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 
2009), 24.  
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With the above context in hand, the focus of the following analysis is on 
reviewing the relevant literature and identifying characteristics that the post-9/11 authors 
dictate or imply should be present in a domestic security service. In order to do so, this 
section includes review of three bodies of literature: (1) official post-9/11 discourse, to 
include the commissions and congressional hearings that drove intelligence reforms; 
(2) debate among scholars and pundits over the need for a new service; and (3) post-9/11 
studies that did not make final recommendations regarding the creation of a new service 
but offered extensive analysis of domestic intelligence services. The subsequent sections 
will exploit this analysis by isolating ideal characteristics endogenous to a domestic 
intelligence service, from which this study may evaluate services of other democratic 
nations and determine lessons for the American debate. 
1. The Official Post-9/11 Discourse (Commissions and Hearings) 
In the years following 9/11, the U.S. government established commissions and 
held hearings to determine the faults that allowed the attacks to succeed. Washington 
created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, better 
known as the 9/11 Commission, which resulted in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004. The Commission noted, “…the most serious weaknesses in 
[intelligence and security] agency capabilities were in the domestic arena.”39 The 
weakness stemmed from a failure of organizations to communicate with one another, and, 
more notably, to acquire intelligence that would have aided prevention of the attacks. In 
subsequent reforms the government focused on factors external to a service as it sought to 
interlace intelligence capabilities, enhance information sharing, and transform legal 
frameworks.40 
When official discourse turned toward factors internal to a service—particularly 
in the 2002 Fourth Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore 
                                                 
39 The 9/11 Commission Report, 352. 
40 James Burch referencing the U.S. National Security Assessment, in James Burch, “Assessing the 
Domestic Intelligence Model and Process,” in Homeland Security and Intelligence, ed. Keith Gregory 
Logan, 197. 
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Commission Report), the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, and the 2005 Final Report of the 
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD Commission Report)—official assessments highlighted the 
FBI’s law enforcement culture, and its repeated failure to transform into an intelligence-
led culture, as cause for concern. For example, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, 
the culture of the FBI did not “allow for aggregating and analyzing facts to see if they 
could provide clues to terrorist tactics more generally,” and generated a performance 
evaluation system measured in statistics of arrests, indictments, and convictions, rather 
than predictive intelligence.41 Despite concerns, Washington rejected creation of a new 
service, favoring instead preservation of the FBI as lead domestic intelligence service. 
Proponents of this plan claimed that the FBI’s law enforcement-led culture, while not 
ideal, could be reformed into an intelligence-led service that would have the added 
benefit of being bound in laws that protected civil liberties. The government ultimately 
chose to nest intelligence elements inside of the FBI and directed the Bureau to revamp 
itself into an intelligence-driven culture.42 Specifically, the 9/11, Gilmore, and WMD 
Commissions called upon the FBI to develop intelligence professionals, enhance its 
information sharing abilities, prioritize its resources toward counterterrorism intelligence, 
and cultivate “an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and 
national security.”43 As indicated by the official discourse, the ideal domestic service 
would prioritize counterterrorism while focusing on gathering predictive intelligence and 
building a culture that incentivized the same. It would also earn the public trust, promote 
oversight, and facilitate coordination of information with community counterparts.44  
                                                 
41 The 9/11 Commission Report, 74.  
42 Ibid., 423–425; Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, “Intelligence, Police and Counterterrorism: 
Assessing Post 9/11 Initiatives,” RAND Corporation, October 30, 2003, accessed February 11, 2013, 
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/.../intelinputv2.pdf. 
43 Ibid., 425–6; The Gilmore Commission Report; WMD Commission Report. 
44 White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” Washington, DC, September 
2009; The 9/11 Commission, 76, Chapter 3; The Gilmore Commission Report; U.S. Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, “Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation”; WMD Commission Report. 
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2. Debate among Scholars and Pundits Regarding the Need for a 
Domestic Intelligence Service 
The scholar and pundit debate over whether or not to create an independent 
service centered on three particular issues: (1) protection of civil liberties; (2) 
effectiveness of intelligence and law enforcement cultures for counterterrorism; and (3) 
information sharing between community counterparts. 
a. Protection of Civil Liberties 
Those in favor of a domestic service, the most vocal being Posner and 
former CIA officer Henry Crumpton, contended that the need for enhanced security 
outweighed concern over civil liberty infringements and that an intelligence service may 
be no worse at protecting liberties.45 Regardless, they contended, if the service is 
effective at preventing terrorist attacks, the potential for erosion of liberties is warranted 
and will be acceptable to the populace.46 Opponents, like Kayyem and the FBI, argued 
that law enforcement agencies are just as capable of acquiring predictive intelligence as 
intelligence agencies, and they are bound by processes and incentives to uphold the rule 
of law. They further reasoned that dressed in a cloak of secrecy, and free from rules of 
evidence, intelligence services are more likely to infringe upon civil liberties.47 This 
argument may prove incorrect. For example, in his study of security policing, Britain’s 
Peter Gill concluded that law enforcement, not intelligence agencies, were most likely to 
violate civil liberties due to their ability to manipulate the law at a tactical level.48 As 
alluded to above, assessment of characteristics must include the service’s adherence to 
laws and mandate, and its ability to protect civil liberties. 
                                                 
45 Crumpton was also the U.S. Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 
46 Henry Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); Crumpton, 
“Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” 207; Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence. In addition to other 
assignments, Crumpton served as CIA liaison to the FBI and as Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the 
U.S. Department of State. 
47 Juliette Kayyem in Council on Foreign Relations, “Does the United States Need a Domestic 
Intelligence Service?”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Responds.” 
48 Gill, Policing Politics, 240. 
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b. The Culture’s Effectiveness in Preempting Terrorist Attacks 
Proponents of an independent intelligence service argued that, more than a 
law enforcement agency, an intelligence-focused service is better able to provide 
predictive intelligence that supports America’s national mandate—to prevent terrorist 
attacks.49 Crumpton summarized the argument: “[t]he United States has developed a 
robust system of national defense. The system, however, is just that—defensive. Despite 
its strengths, a good defense cannot eliminate the source of the threat. Our domestic 
security apparatus must include an offensive mechanism. That mechanism, however, 
would not be a law enforcement entity. Rather, it should be a domestic intelligence 
organization.”50 
The above focus on intelligence is warranted. Earlier, this piece outlined 
the unique nature of terrorism and the need for counterterrorism agencies to acquire 
human sources within terrorist networks in order to uncover their intentions and prevent 
attacks. In The Economist article “America Needs More Spies,” a panel of former FBI 
and CIA seniors recommended the same: “[o]ur collective experience makes it absolutely 
clear that the only way to uncover and destroy terrorist activity is to penetrate the 
organizations engaged in it. And the best way to do this is to place spies in their 
innermost councils.”51 For the preponderance of scholars and pundits reviewed, law 
enforcement cultures are reactive, unduly territorial, and operate in a system incentivized 
to promote arrests and convictions rather than long-term penetrations of terrorist 
organizations. Posner’s position summarizes their concerns: 
A law-enforcement approach to terrorism can cause intelligence data to be 
evaluated from the too-narrow perspective of its utility in building a 
criminal case; retard the sharing of information lest full credit for a 
successful prosecution be denied the field office that began the 
investigation; and discourage the collection and retention of information.52  
                                                 
49 The 9/11 Commission Report, 361. 
50 Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” 198. 
51 Bryant, et. al., “America Needs More Spies.” 
52 Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence, 13–17. 
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Proponents of a new service viewed its primary role as preventing terrorist 
attacks. Ability to preempt attack, they claimed, is made more efficient by a culture that 
promotes, and incentivizes, intelligence collection. Opponents of an independent 
intelligence service argued that law enforcement operations require intelligence 
collection and police agencies have been running human sources—undercover officers 
and “confidential informants”—for generations. In this vein, Gill assessed that law 
enforcement models were able to deter aggression and promote security as effectively as 
intelligence models. Similarly, some authors, such as Chalk and Rosenau, noted that 
while the Bureau may have historically under-utilized HUMINT, only a few short years 
after 9/11 it had embraced “a culture of prevention” and addressed its agent operations 
accordingly.53 The counterargument is that, regardless of their HUMINT skills, law 
enforcement agencies do not run intelligence sources longer than needed to make an 
arrest. This method equates to short-term gain and long-term counterterrorism failures. 
While some objected to the idea that intelligence-led cultures produced better 
counterterrorism intelligence, the vast majority of literature examined indicated 
otherwise: a domestic intelligence service would ideally prioritize counterterrorism and 
possess a culture that valued acquisition of predictive intelligence. Assessment of ideal 
characteristics, therefore, includes evaluation of a service’s culture of intelligence. 
c. Sharing Information between Community Counterparts 
Advocates of a new, independent, domestic intelligence service held that 
traditional law enforcement models inhibit information sharing between organizations. 
Per Posner, “within the [FBI], information is stored, retrieved, and simply understood 
principally through the conceptual prism of a ‘case’—a discrete bundle of information the 
fundamental purpose of which is to prove elements of crimes against specific potential 
defendants in a court of law.”54 Opponents of an independent intelligence service 
claimed the opposite: organizations built for secrecy would be no better at sharing 
                                                 
53 Chalk and Rosenau, “Intelligence, Police and Counterterrorism: Assessing Post 9/11 Initiatives,” 
RAND Corporation, October 30, 2003, accessed February 11, 2013, 
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/.../intelinputv2.pdf, 5. 
54 Ibid., 9. 
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information than those built for public arrest and prosecution. In recommending a hybrid 
law enforcement-intelligence model, Gill suggested, “…there should be no automatic 
assumption of the need for a security intelligence agency separate from the police. There 
are arguments for separating the two, but the problem of turf wars and poor (or non-
existent) co-ordination is a strong argument for minimizing the number of different 
agencies.”55 In separating agencies, Gill found that governments inadvertently erected 
barriers to communication.  
Arguments such as Gill’s may fail to fully account for the divisions 
created by entrenched cultures. As Posner has noted, separation or combining of 
functions is irrelevant; the barriers between law enforcement and intelligence micro-
cultures exist even if both cultures are housed in the same organization.56 Per Hulnick, 
disparate organizational cultures create a natural wall between law enforcement and 
intelligence communities; nesting intelligence and law enforcement functions within the 
same organization would not enhance coordination.57 In this view, the related 
recommendations of the WMD Commission and the 9/11 Commission (placing 
intelligence sections into the FBI) were fruitless. Conversely, if we concur with Gill’s 
assessment, consolidation would indeed promote sharing.  
In sum, the discourse elucidates the desire for a service to, ideally, 
facilitate communication with counterparts in the security community. Assessment of 
characteristics particular to a service, therefore, would include internal mechanisms to 
facilitate coordination of information across the intelligence community and with foreign 
liaison partners.  
3. Studies that Made No Final Recommendation (the RAND Pieces) 
Five years after 9/11, the government tasked the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to conduct “an independent study on the feasibility of creating a 
                                                 
55 Gill, Policing Politics, 240.  
56 Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence, 32. 
57 Hulnick, Fixing the Spy Machine, 99. 
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counterterrorism intelligence agency.”58 In turn, DHS asked RAND Corporation to 
evaluate creation of a new domestic intelligence service. RAND was not tasked to offer 
summary judgment regarding policy or creation of a service. Rather, RAND sought only 
to help frame the discussion. In four lengthy pieces, RAND authors offered a 
comprehensive overview of domestic intelligence models, methods to evaluate the same, 
and valuable analysis that helps determine characteristics desired in an ideal service. 
Each of the RAND pieces took a similar look at domestic intelligence. The studies 
arrived at conclusions similar to the above official and scholarly viewpoints: the service’s 
should prioritize counterterrorism, an intelligence-led culture was preferable, the service 
needed to earn public trust and protect civil liberties, and the service’s ability to share 
information was important. Like most writers, the RAND authors paid particular 
attention to government structures such as oversight mechanisms, budget allocations, 
control measures, and existing legal frameworks. They did not entirely ignore features 
specific to a service, but offered less in this regard.59  
Three RAND studies were particularly notable for this study. In Considering the 
Creation of a Domestic Security Organization in the United States, RAND contributors 
evaluated domestic intelligence services in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom based on several “focus areas”: the service’s mission; the leadership 
source (career or outsiders); the service’s external chain of command; the service’s 
structure; external oversight mechanisms; funding; national assessments of the service’s 
performance; and examples of controversies.60 Similarly, in Reorganizing U.S. Domestic 
Intelligence: Assessing the Options, Treverton briefly assessed the above services, in 
addition to Sweden’s domestic service, in order to draw lessons for the American 
                                                 
58 Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 2. 
59 Brian Jackson ed., Considering the Creation of a Domestic Security Organization in the United 
States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
(Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2009); Jackson ed., The Challenge of Domestic 
Intelligence in a Free Society; Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within; Treverton, Reorganizing 
U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 3. Treverton strayed from the fold by noting that intelligence should be the 
organization’s primary focus, but a nested model may prove functional.  
60 Jackson ed., Considering, 10.  
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system.61 Furthermore, in Confronting the Enemy Within, Peter Chalk and William 
Rosenau looked at the Australian, British, Canadian, and French systems.   
Considering, Reorganizing, and Confronting’s identification of potential 
evaluation criteria was particularly insightful for this study. As noted above, however, 
these pieces’ thorough analysis was somewhat wanting in their robust focus on 
exogenous factors and intermingling of those factors alongside endogenous elements. In 
combining these characteristics into their final evaluation, the authors offered 
assessments that did not directly aid in isolating variables specific to a service. 
Combining service and system functions is natural as the two are deeply interlinked. Still, 
building assessments on a mix of characteristics both internal and external to a service 
makes drawing service-specific lessons and evaluating the utility of ideal characteristics 
and relevance of foreign models to the United States difficult.  
E. IDEAL CHARACTERISTICS SPECIFIC TO A SERVICE 
As reviewed above, the preponderance of the post-9/11 literature centered on 
fixing the national systems within which the services operated (legal frameworks, federal 
authorizations, congressional oversight mechanisms, and state-level resource allocations). 
Attention to these factors is certainly warranted, but it is only half of the discussion. 
Tuning the system will be ineffective if the parts themselves do not function properly. 
Conversely, services may influence their environment, but in a democracy they cannot 
dictate the national system into which they are created and operate. When the post-9/11 
literature engaged characteristics specific to the service rather than system, the discussion 
                                                 
61 In Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, Treverton reviewed the Swedish Security Service 
(Sakershetspolisen), Germany’s Bundesamt Fur Verfasungsschutz (BFV; Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution), France’s Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST; Territorial Surveillance 
Directorate), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), and the British Security Service (BSS or MI5). Treverton examined some of the 
services for the following factors, but not all services for each factor: Origin and History, Mission and 
Critical Capabilities, Leadership and Human Capital, Management and Process, Organizational Structure 
and Funding Patterns, Key Relationships with Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies, Oversight, 
Metrics for Performance, and Scandals and Abuses. In Jackson’s Considering, multiple authors assessed 
ASIO, BFV, CSIS, DST, and MI5, in their related system context, on the same factors. In Chalk and 
Rosenau’s Confronting the Enemy Within, the authors looked at ASIO, CSIS, DST, and MI5 with regard to 
countering terrorism, cooperation with law enforcement, and their susceptibility to oversight within their 
systems. Related, but outside of the RAND context, in “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United 
States?” Burch assessed ASIO, MI5, and India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) for system and service factors. 
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tended to anchor itself in presumptions about the balance of civil liberties and security as 
well as the benefits of opposing cultures.  
As noted earlier, the purpose of this study is to identify ideal characteristics 
specific to a domestic intelligence service, to evaluate the presence of these 
characteristics in foreign services often held up as potential models for America, and to 
determine lessons for the U.S. discourse.62 In furtherance of this aim, this study now 
asks, “what are the characteristics desired by the authors above, and how can they be 
assessed in a service?” Through the preceding literature review, four ideal characteristics 
endogenous to a domestic intelligence service, and the means to assess them, became 
apparent:  
1. The Service’s Mission is Focused on Counterterrorism 
The post-9/11 literature, and official U.S. mandate, prioritized counterterrorism 
operations above other tasks of a domestic security service (e.g., counterespionage, 
counterproliferation, counternarcotics). Assessing a service’s prioritizing of functions 
requires more than reviewing the mission statement. For example, a clearly articulated 
mission is essential, but evaluation of a domestic service’s mandate may also include 
review of personnel and resource allocation, counterterrorism-specific training, and 
organizational incentives that promote counterterrorism operations. Notably, an 
intelligence service’s ability to remain focused on counterterrorism above other factors is 
questionable. Counterterrorism operations naturally include “lesser” missions, such as 
counterproliferation and counternarcotics. Five key areas offer avenues for qualitative 
evaluation of a service’s focus on counterterrorism: 
a. Origin, History, and Present-day Mission 
As noted above, a service’s origin and history have a marked impact on its 
actions and focus. For instance, was the service designed to combat terrorism? If the  
 
 
                                                 
62 Concepts from Jackson ed., Considering. 
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service has a broad range of responsibilities such as countering espionage, weapons 
proliferation, and narcotics, do these missions feed into its counterterrorism mission or 
are they kept in separate departments? 
b. Counterterrorism-led Incentives 
In order to focus on counterterrorism, the service must incentivize the 
counterterrorism mission. For example, are promotions and awards based on 
counterterrorism successes or other missions? Do its leaders have counterterrorism 
experience? Does the service place a higher value on counterterrorism or other missions 
such as counterespionage?  
c. Resource Allocation within the Service 
Resource allocations offer empirical evidence of mission priorities. For 
example, are adequate resources in the form of funding and personnel given to missions 
aimed at combating terrorism? When funds, supplies, and officers are allocated, to what 
mission are they given? Is the service structured to focus on counterterrorism? 
d. Counterterrorism-centered Hiring and Training 
Each mission requires a specific skillset. Hiring and training offer 
evidence of a service’s attention to a particular skillset. For example, does the service 
recruit a diverse range of officers that are linguistically, ethnically, and academically 
equipped to target terrorist networks? Does their training include counterterrorism related 
principles (e.g., running sources inside a terrorist network, background on terrorist 
organizations and their communications)? 
e. Attention to Transnational Threats 
Terrorism may be home grown or originate abroad. An effective 
counterterrorism service must account for both scenarios and incorporate an 
understanding of transnational threats into its operations. Evidence of this understanding 
may be found in the service’s application of the term “terrorism” (for example, the FBI 
has been criticized for its bifurcation of terrorism into acts of domestic and foreign 
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origin), allocation of officers to units responsible for threats of a domestic and 
international origin, and record of addressing transnational issues.63 
2. The Service’s Primary Function and Culture is Intelligence-led 
The purpose of this study is not to assess the effectiveness of intelligence-led or 
law enforcement-led approaches, nor to determine if the two are fundamentally disparate 
and incompatible functions. Rather, it seeks to make assessments based on the post-9/11 
discourse’s expectations for a domestic intelligence service. According to the literature, 
in order to facilitate a mission of counterterrorism, the service should foster a culture that 
incentivizes collection of predictive intelligence. Being intelligence led means services, 
regardless of their policing role, would not evaluate officers primarily on their support to 
arrests and prosecutions, nor would law enforcement activities be held up as the standard 
bearer for the service’s culture. Rather, the service must prioritize HUMINT (in this case, 
for counterterrorism), incentivize predictive intelligence production, value and allow for 
long-term operations, as well as direct hiring, training, and funding toward intelligence-
specific tasks. Four areas offer avenues for qualitative evaluation of a service’s 
intelligence-led culture:  
a. The Genesis and History of the Service 
As outlined above, the organization’s origins help determine its culture. 
Therefore, a review of service beginnings and history should aid in assessment of its 
intelligence-driven culture.  
b. Intelligence-centered Hiring and Training 
Similar to assessment of the service’s counterterrorism focus, evidence of 
a service’s emphasis on predictive intelligence will include assessment of the service’s 
                                                 
63 Speaking to the systemic problems that led to 9/11, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
noted, “[t]he problem, however, was not the absence of effort to counter the threat…One of its primary 
causes was the seam that existed between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ intelligence.” Codoleezza Rice, No 
Higher Honor: a Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 67–68. 
According to the FBI’s definition, “[d]omestic terrorism is . . . entirely within the United States” and 
“without foreign direction.” Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Terrorism: 2002–2005,” (accessed May 11, 
2012) http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002–2005 ; Zegart, Spying Blind, 121. 
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hiring of officers with traits commensurate with a predictive, intelligence-led, mission 
(e.g., analytical abilities, ethnically diverse, linguistic abilities in key languages). It will 
also include evaluation of service training programs. For example, is intelligence 
collection the primary emphasis of instruction during new recruit training? 
c. Emphasis on HUMINT 
As noted earlier, predictive counterterrorism intelligence often relies upon 
HUMINT. Therefore, evaluation of a service’s intelligence-led culture should also 
include assessment of the service’s focus on HUMINT. For example, do service training, 
officer selection, resources, and official statements reflect an emphasis on HUMINT 
operations? 
d. Intelligence-led Incentives 
Hand-in-hand with its counterterrorism mission, the ideal service would 
incentivize intelligence collection. For example, does service leadership incentivize 
predictive intelligence? Is intelligence collected in support of long-term operations or 
does it do so in support of short-term gain for law enforcement operations? Are officers 
rewarded more for long-term intelligence missions or for support to criminal 
prosecutions?  
3. The Service Seeks to Acquire and Maintain Public Trust as a 
Mechanism to Support Protection of Civil Liberties 
The literature, in particular the academic and pundit debates, indicated that 
services should help protect civil liberties. Protection of civil liberties, however, is a 
complicated matter that is difficult to measure and is often dictated by external factors 
such as national legal frameworks. As noted above, the public will ultimately determine 
what is acceptable with regard to limits on liberty. Therefore, qualitative evaluation of 
service characteristics may focus on the service’s adherence to lawful mandate and the 
mechanisms it employs to earn public trust for its agenda and activities. For example, 
assessment of this characteristic may include evaluation of service outreach efforts (such 
as advertising of mission and role), internal control mechanisms (such as ethics boards), 
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as well as abuse scandals and responses to the same. Five areas offer avenues for 
qualitative evaluation of a service’s ability to acquire and maintain the public trust: 
a. Openness Policies and Public Outreach Efforts 
Engaging the public is essential to earn their trust for the service’s agenda, 
tactics, and intentions. For example, does the service have a public affairs office? Does 
the service advertise its mission, tactics, budget, and use of resources? Are its seniors 
responsive to inquiries from the public, academia, and the press?64 
b. Hiring Practices 
In order to earn public trust, a service must represent its citizenry. For 
example, are the service’s hiring practices considered fair and open? Does the service 
hire minorities in a manner commensurate with the larger population, which may enhance 
public trust by binding the service to the constituency (avoiding an “us versus them” 
mentality)?65  
c. Support to Oversight and Control Mechanisms 
Protection of civil liberties is often measured in the broader system as 
mechanisms of control and oversight by the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. 
These measurements, however, are all external to the service, and most often reactive 
(oversight may not come into play until after a violation). As defined by Naval 
Postgraduate School professor Thomas Bruneau, internal control is “the internal 
oversight mechanisms such as inspector generals, general counsels, ethics boards, and the 
like, but also the professionalization of those who work in the intelligence activity.”66 
                                                 
64 Exposure of the organization’s budget to public scrutiny serves to enhance public trust by allowing 
for enhanced transparency and meaningful debate. That said, the amount of detail provided to the public 
may be determined by the government, not the service. Aidan Wills, “Financial Oversight of Intelligence 
Services,” in Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Toolkit, eds. Hans Born and Aidan Wills (Geneva, 
Switzerland: DCAF, 2012), 151–180. 
65 Concept from Gill, Policing Politics. 
66 Concept and quote from Thomas Bruneau, “Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies” in 
Strategic Intelligence: Windows Into a Secret World, eds. Loch Johnson and James Wirtz (Los Angeles: 
Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004), 448–449; Thomas Bruneau, “Control of Intelligence Activities in the 
United States” (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School), unpublished, 16. 
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Therefore, this study will assess the service’s internal activities that support oversight and 
control. For instance, does the service have an internal auditor? Does the service provide 
regular reports to an external oversight panel? Does it support development of oversight 
mechanisms? 
d. Actions that Violated Mandate and Impacted Public Trust 
Although the broader intelligence apparatus and legal framework confine 
the service’s actions through laws, directives, and mandate, the service has an obligation 
to carry out its mission within established parameters. Operations conducted outside of 
the explicit or implicit limits prescribed by the system damage the service’s ability to 
hold the faith and trust of the public. Measuring the service’s violation of mandate and 
actions that impact public trust may include review of the service’s actions, official and 
media criticism of the service, and the service’s formal and informal policies with regard 
to statutes and mandates.  
e. Public Opinion of the Service 
Public opinion of the service will impact its ability to earn and maintain 
the public trust. Accurately measuring public opinion is difficult, but may be partially 
conducted by a review of public opinion polls, media coverage, and notable 
repercussions—such as the service’s ability to hire key demographics—that reflect public 
opinion of the service.67 
The Service Shares Information and Collaborates with its Community 
Counterparts 
All of the literature reviewed held that a domestic intelligence service must share 
information and coordinate with intelligence community partners (local, federal, and 
international). Assessment of a service’s ability to share information and coordinate 
                                                 
67 Concept from Genevive Lester, “Societal Acceptability of Domestic Intelligence,” in The Challenge 
of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society, ed. Brian Jackson, 97. Public opinion polls have limitations. The 
response to polling inquiry depends heavily on how the question is framed and who is asked. Furthermore, 
the public response may vary markedly as dictated by the proximity to, or perception of, the threat. For 
example, immediately following 9/11 more people were willing to have their liberties restricted than they 
are 10 years later. 
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operations may include evaluation of the service’s detailing of officers to counterparts for 
liaison duties, establishment of offices responsible for coordination, and use of 
administrative systems that facilitate dissemination of intelligence across agencies.68 
Four areas offer avenues for qualitative evaluation of a service’s ability and willingness 
to share information and collaborate with its community partners: 
f. Work with Community Partners 
To be effective a domestic counterterrorism intelligence service should 
work closely with its intelligence and law enforcement partners. Evaluation may include 
a review of the service’s engagement with foreign liaison as well as national partners 
through assessment of the service’s operational history, public statements, resource 
allocation, and officer priorities. 
g. Secondments and Regional Offices  
In order to better coordinate counterterrorism operations, a service may 
assign its officers to sister services and allow its counterparts the same opportunity within 
its ranks. It may also establish offices outside of its main headquarters as a means to 
directly engage local law enforcement and foreign counterparts.69  
h. Support to Coordinating Bodies 
Similar to secondments and regional offices, a service will likely be called 
upon to support or host counterterrorism and intelligence coordination bodies. For 
example, does the service have an office responsible for coordination? Does the service 
support or host an element responsible for coordinating information?  
i. The Service’s Missteps 
Evaluation of a service’s collaboration and information sharing efforts 
should include areas where the service failed, or had difficulty, completing this portion of 
                                                 
68 Concepts from Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 46. 
69 On communication, Secretary of State during 9/11, Condoleezza Rice, said one fault of the FBI was 
that it, “…was very decentralized with less-than-optimal communication between the powerful field offices 
and national-level officials” (Rice, No Higher Honor, 68). 
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its mission. A key component of this variable is the value the service places on 
coordination and cooperative behavior. Per Treverton, this value includes incentivizing 
information sharing and cooperative actions, and linking these to the success of the 
organization.70 For example, is coordination within and outside of the service valued by 
the organization, or does the service value secrecy over cooperation? Does the service 
dedicate adequate personnel, supplies (e.g., computer systems), and funding to 
coordination efforts? Where has the service failed to coordinate or enhance its 
relationships with counterparts?  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored literature relevant to the debate over creation of a 
domestic intelligence service in America after 9/11 and identified characteristics 
desirable in a domestic service. According to this post-9/11 discourse, a service would 
ideally focus on counterterrorism, be intelligence driven, acquire and maintain the public 
trust, and coordinate with its national security counterparts. These service-specific 
characteristics can overlap and intertwine, and they may appear in varying degrees of 
influence; hence, they lend themselves to qualitative rather than quantitative assessment. 
Through the methodology and structure presented below, this study will qualitatively 
evaluate these characteristics within two services consistently cited as exemplars for the 
United States, in search of lessons for the American debate. 
1. Methodology for Evaluation of Case Studies 
As already outlined, this thesis explores the idea that any determination of the 
need for an American domestic intelligence service must include an isolated assessment 
of the characteristics endogenous to a service. The study began by hypothesizing that an 
evaluation of the post-9/11 American discourse on domestic intelligence would reveal a 
set of ideal characteristics specific to a domestic service (i.e., isolated from the broader 
system in which the service would sit). Drawing on primary and secondary sources, the 
above sections endeavored to answer the study’s first research question: what are the 
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essential, endogenous, characteristics of an ideal domestic intelligence service as 
indicated by the post-9/11 American discourse? The four ideal characteristics detailed 
above now serve as the yardstick for an assessment of case studies in order to extract 
lessons to further the American conversation on domestic intelligence. Table 1 depicts 
the format for evaluation. 
Table 1.   Format for Evaluation of the Case Studies. 
CHARACTERISTIC AREAS OF EVALUATION 
1 Counterterrorism as the 







Origin, history, and mission 
Counterterrorism-led incentives 
Resource allocation within the service 
Counterterrorism-centered hiring and training 
Attention to transnational threats 
2 The Intelligence 






Genesis and history of the service 
Intelligence-centered hiring and training 
Emphasis on HUMINT 
Intelligence-led incentives 
3 The Service’s Ability to 







Openness policies and public outreach efforts 
Hiring practices 
Support to oversight and control mechanisms 
Actions that violated mandate and impacted 
public trust 
Public opinion of the service 









Work with community partners 
Secondments and regional offices 
Support to coordinating bodies 
The service’s missteps 
 
With the preceding context and criteria in hand, the rest of this study will address 
the two remaining questions:  
1) In what manner do these characteristics exist, if at all, in services often 
touted as potential models for the United States?  
2) What lessons from those cases are relevant to, and may further, discourse 
regarding creation of a new service in the United States?  
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The study hypothesizes that a qualitative evaluation of these cases, based on the ideal 
characteristic identified, offers valuable lessons for continued debate. Again using official 
and secondary-source literature, the remainder of this study addresses these questions by 
examining the presence of the ideal characteristics in select foreign services, and 
subsequently seeks to extrapolate lessons.   
The two case studies chosen for evaluation are the long-established domestic 
intelligence services of the United Kingdom—the British Security Service (BSS; 
commonly known as Military Intelligence Section-5, or MI5)—and of Australia—the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO). These services offer the best 
opportunity to evaluate the above characteristics and draw lessons based in the context of 
the post-9/11 “wish list.” MI5 and ASIO are valuable to this study for four key reasons: 
(1) their frequent mention as models for an American service; (2) applicability of their 
social and political contexts; (3) similar struggles against terrorism; and (4) the 
opportunity to offer contrast to the FBI given their lack of policing powers.  
First, along with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), MI5 and 
ASIO were most frequently offered as models for a new domestic service in America in 
the post 9–11 discourse. Alongside these services, the leading authors on the topic also 
examined Germany’s Bundesamt Fur Verfasungsschutz (BFV; Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution) and France’s Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire 
(DST; Territorial Surveillance Directorate).71 Much less common were evaluations of the 
Swedish Security Service (SSS; Sakershetspolisen)72 and India’s Intelligence Bureau 
(IB).73 Important for this study, security and intelligence scholars James Burch, Brian 
Jackson, Chalk, Rosenau, and Treverton all focused on MI5 and ASIO. Similarly, when 
pundits such as Posner and Kayyem explored the matter, the Australian, British, and 
                                                 
71 Jackson ed., Considering; Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence. 
72 Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence. Of the authors reviewed, only Treverton 
considered the SSS. 
73 Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States?” Of the authors reviewed, only 
Burch considered the IB. 
 32 
Canadian systems framed the discussion.74 The U.S. government also considered MI5 as 
a potential model. For instance, the Gilmore Commission noted MI5 as the alternative 
model contemplated by the Executive Branch during post-9/11 deliberations,75 and a 
Congressional Research Service study focused specifically on the applicability of MI5 to 
the U.S. security apparatus.76 Even when the government rejected consideration of new 
models, an assessment of MI5—dubbed a “weak analogy” by the 9/11 Commission—was 
at the forefront.77  
Second, there are large similarities in the electoral and legal systems, as well as 
culture, in Australia, Britain, and the United States. While no foreign context will 
constitute a perfect replica, restricting the study to services operating in contexts similar 
to the American milieu helps mitigate the impact that significantly different political and 
social factors may have on the services themselves.78 In contrast, the context in which the 
German BFV, Indian IB, and French DST operate makes them less useful for the limited 
scope of this study. At its inception, the BFV’s powers were sharply limited by a society 
fearful of a return to Nazism. As such, the BFV’s function is unique and an assessment of 
                                                 
74 These authors independently evaluated a myriad of different services—but all looked at MI5 and 
ASIO. Posner claimed that the CSIS was a better potential model for America. Burch, “A Domestic 
Intelligence Agency for the United States?”; Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within; Council 
on Foreign Relations, “Does the United States Need a Domestic Intelligence Service?”; Jackson, ed., 
Considering; Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence; Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic 
Intelligence; See also Dahl, “Domestic Intelligence Today: More Security but Less Liberty?”  
75 The Gilmore Commission Report, 46. 
76 Masse, Report for Congress: Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom. 
77 9/11 Commission Report, 423. Similarly, in recommending FBI reforms and advocating nesting of 
an intelligence service within the FBI, the intelligence and law enforcement professionals that authored 
“America Needs More Spies” noted, “[t]he oft-discussed model of MI5 in Britain does not offer an 
appropriate American solution to our critical domestic intelligence-collection problem—not for now, at 
least” (Bryant, et. al., “America Needs More Spies.”, 6). In 2005 the FBI created a nested intelligence 
element, the National Security Bureau (NSB) in response to presidential directive (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, “National Security Branch,” (accessed February 9, 2013) http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb). 
Many authors and pundits, however, disagreed with the 9/11 Commission’s dismissive stance toward the 
MI5 model, citing MI5’s domestic primacy (in addition to the “worldwide” arena of Northern Ireland) and 
its lack of policing powers as justification for consideration of MI5 and similar services (e.g., ASIO and 
CSIS) as a model. For debate on this matter, see Council on Foreign Relations, “Does the United States 
Need a Domestic Intelligence Service?”  
78 For example, an authoritarian government’s lack of attention to civil liberties in states where 
political corruption drives intelligence operations. See Roberta D’A Henderson, Brassey’s International 
Intelligence Yearbook 2003 Edition (United States: Brassey’s Inc. 2003), 9–16, 109–116, 207–217, for 
brief discussion of the Australian, Canadian, and British services. 
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the service would require excessive focus on system-wide matters such as BFV’s 
significant administrative role in facilitating coordination between multiple domestic 
agencies.79 For different reasons, politics and social norms make the IB unsuitable. In 
addition to rarely being mentioned as a model to replace the FBI, India’s IB works in a 
society sharply divided by ethnicity and economics, with a political culture mired in 
corruption.80 In France, it is the security system that sharply limits DST’s benefit to a 
study focused on service-specific matters. France has a long history of militarized 
domestic security, changing the service-system dynamic in a manner incommensurate 
with the American system. Furthermore, subsequent to the RAND author’s assessments 
of DST, in 2008 the service was joined with the Direction Centrale des Renseignements 
Généraux (DCRG; Central Directorate of General Intelligence), to form the new 
Direction Centrale du Reseignement Intérieur (DCRI; Central Directorate of General 
Intelligence).81 Prior to the merger DST and DCRG shared a complex relationship. In 
addition to the merger, this relationship makes siphoning service-specific matters from 
system context exceedingly difficult.82 
                                                 
79 Richard Warnes, “Chapter Five: Germany,” in Considering, ed. Brian Jackson, 93–114. 
80 For additional context see Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States?” 6.  
81 Reuters, “Corrected-Mali Crisis Paving Way for Militant Attacks on France-Judge,” January 7, 
2013, (accessed January 29, 2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/07/mali-crisis-france-
idUSL5E9C616X20130107; Richard Warnes, “Chapter Four: France,” in Considering, ed. Brian Jackson, 
65–92. DCRG is often referred to by its police title, the Renseignements Généraux (RG). RG was the 
French Police’s intelligence arm.  
82 Warnes, “Chapter Four: France,” 65. For an insightful examination of French intelligence, see 
Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  
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It is important to recognize that differences between nations mean that a foreign 
model cannot be simply transplanted into the American framework.83 However, a service 
that operates in a similar structural, political, legal, and social context provides a much 
clearer opportunity for assessment of applicability to the U.S. context. In this regard, 
along with the Canadian and Swedish, the Australian and British models seem most 
applicable to the United States. Undoubtedly there are disparities, but these nations share 
a long tradition of open society, liberal democratic practices and institutions, as well as 
concern for threats to national security, civil liberties, and state legitimacy.84 
Third, Australia and Britain are driven by the same counterterrorism impetus as 
the United States; both have suffered significant attacks on, and persistent threats to, their 
citizens and infrastructure. In contrast, Canada, although a key partner in the U.S. “War 
on Terrorism,” is less a target than a facilitator of U.S. endeavors. Although the risk to 
Canada as a result of its relationship with, and proximity to, America is not lost on the 
Canadians, it has yet to manifest in serious or sustained attack. Similarly, in addition to 
its small size, the limited threat of terrorism also reduces Sweden’s applicability as a 
model from which to assess characteristics and draw lessons. This lack of significant 
threat changes the political calculations in both countries. France—cited by author 
Richard Warnes as having the “most experience in using intelligence to counter both 
insurgency and terrorism”—Germany, and India have suffered immediate and sustained 
terrorism threats, but for the reasons noted above the DST, BFV, and IB remain 
incongruous for this study. In short, unlike Canada and Sweden, and more akin to 
                                                 
83 Concepts from Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within, 55–56. Chalk and Rosenau aptly 
summarized the value of using these models in their justification for doing the same in their study: “[t]o be 
sure, significant differences exist between the United States on the one hand and the United Kingdom, 
France, Canada, and Australia on the other…These dichotomies necessarily mean that intelligence 
institutions cannot, and indeed should not, simply be replicated from one national context to the next—
irrespective of their relative efficacy in their original setting. This being said, the United Kingdom, France, 
Canada, and Australia do share important defining characteristics with the United States, including, 
notably, (1) liberal democratic traditions and institutions, (2) a common concern with stemming threats to 
domestic stability through the institution of robust internal security infrastructures, and (3) acceptance of 
the need to balance operational effectiveness in the fight against terrorism with the concomitant need to 
respect fundamental norms integral to the effective functioning of an open society…[the] case studies 
highlight practical operational and organizational lessons that would be extremely valuable, and perhaps 
even necessary, in the event that a decision is made to create a dedicated domestic intelligence bureau in 
the United States.” 
84 Concepts from Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within, 9–10. 
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America, Australia and Britain have experienced repeated, lethal, threats from radical 
Islamist terrorists that have shaped their security priorities. Given the emphasis in the 
post-9–11 discourse on counterterrorism as a primary mission, MI5 and ASIO provide 
the most relevant opportunity for assessment in this regard.  
Last, post-9/11 dialogue asked for services that are focused on intelligence rather 
than policing, and both ASIO and MI5 formally lack law enforcement powers. The 
differences between law enforcement and intelligence cultures occasionally dominated 
the post-9/11 discourse, with many authors and officials concluding that an intelligence-
led culture was better for counterterrorism. Some argued that the FBI’s law enforcement 
culture inhibited its counterterrorism intelligence work.85 Summarizing the primary 
concern, U.S. National Security Advisor during 9/11, Condoleezza Rice, alluded to the 
necessity of preventative intelligence and its lack of primacy within a reactive law 
enforcement model: “[t]he FBI treated the international terrorism problem as a law 
enforcement matter, not an intelligence mission…Prevention was secondary to punishing 
terrorists after they were caught committing a crime.”86 Correct or incorrect, the 
discourse viewed intelligence collection and law enforcement as distinct functions, 
valued an intelligence culture over a law enforcement culture (for counterterrorism), and 
saw the FBI as embodying the latter. Therefore, in order to respond to the discourse, and 




lack police powers. Nonetheless, the point may be moot. Of the services covered by the 
domestic intelligence debate, only the Swedish Security Service held formal, sweeping, 
                                                 
85 For example, despite its claims that maintaining the pre-9/11 FBI-led model was necessary to 
protect liberties, the 9/11 Commission recommend the FBI incorporate a “…culture imbued with a deep 
expertise in intelligence,” albeit one laden with restrictions of legal due process and rule of evidence. 9/11 
Commission Report, 423–424, 72, Chapter 3; Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of 
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Ch. 10 (Mar. 31, 2005), referenced in Posner 
Remaking Domestic Intelligence; WMD Commission Report; White House, “The National Security 
Strategy of the United States.” 
86 Rice, No Higher Honor, 68. 
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police powers. DST had some arrest authority in particular cases that included 
counterterrorism and counterespionage, but it was formally hedged off from policing 
powers, and when it did execute police authorities it did so primarily in conjunction with 
DCRG.87 For these reasons, and those already outlined above, the Swedish and French 
services do not provide the most relevant opportunity for assessment. Table 2 offers a 
graphic representation of the above considerations.88 
  
                                                 
87 Warnes, “Chapter Four: France,” 65; Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence,” 72, 76. 
88 Hulnick aptly noted, “[t]he key characteristic of these agencies is their empowerment to collect and 
analyze domestic security threats, but without the power of arrest. Instead, when they determine that a 
threat exists and can pinpoint the sources, they turn to the police to arrest the culprits. None of these 
countries has the restrictions contained in the U.S. Constitution that prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures, although they do have laws to prevent abuse.” Hulnick, “Home Time,” 578. 
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Table 2.   Factors Influencing Applicability to the United States 
 
Sources: The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving  
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the  
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2002) (accessed September 13, 2012) 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/nsrd/terrpanel/terror4.pdf; James Burch, “A 
Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative Analysis of Domestic Intelligence 
Agencies and their Implications for Homeland Security,” Homeland Security Affairs Vol. III, No. 2 (June 
2007) (accessed august 29, 2012) http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=3.2.2; Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, 
Confronting the Enemy Within: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four 
Democracies, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2004) (accessed July 18, 
2012) http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG100; Brian Jackson ed., Considering the Creation of a 
Domestic Security Organization in the United States: Lessons from the Experiences of Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2009); 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2004); U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress: 
Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom - Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States, by 
Todd Masse, CRS Report RL31920 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, May 13, 2003) (accessed October 5, 2012) http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31920.pdf; Gregory F. 
Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options (Santa Monica, California: 
RAND Corporation, 2008).  
Evaluation of MI5 and ASIO therefore provides an opportunity to assess the post-
9/11 “wish list” against models that officials and pundits have asserted as exemplars of 
domestic intelligence and that allow better isolation of service-specific characteristics 
from the broader political, societal, and system context. The two services also best meet 
the needs of this study given the primacy of their nation’s fight against terrorism, and 
their contrast with the FBI in their lack of law enforcement powers. As such, if the two 
services fully possess all of the characteristics the American discourse deems ideal, then 
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lessons from this study may reasonably support arguments that a new, independent, 
intelligence-only service may help address concerns regarding the present model. 
Conversely, if the characteristics are not present, or are found to have serious deficits 
within these two services, this may indicate that the desired characteristics and 
expectations for a service are misplaced, or that the FBI may have it right, which would 
warrant a reassessment of the post-9/11 conversation on intelligence and security.  
Before continuing it is important to highlight that service-specific assessment 
offers only a partial answer, and this study does not portend to offer final 
recommendation regarding creation of a new American intelligence service. As noted in 
the introduction, the legal, social, and political system in which the service operates has 
as much, if not more, impact on the service’s (and nation’s) ability to meet the security 
intelligence expectations of the government and its citizenry. Furthermore, in its use of 
publicly available information, the above study may present an incomplete, and hence 
unduly negative, vision of MI5 and ASIO. In his assessment of New Zealand’s 
intelligence services, Willem de Lint aptly summarized the academic injustice of 
evaluating intelligence services on unclassified information alone:  
The story of any security service is bound to be partial and incomplete. On 
one hand, we have an official record of released documents providing a 
bureaucratic record of figures and data and of statutory requirements. On 
the other hand is a tale jig-sawed together piecemeal from the scooping of 
unauthorized leaks and hectoring on failed oversight, scandal, and glaring 
omissions of office…the story of security and intelligence…is a mosaic of 
both accounts.89 
Where able, this study will endeavor to account for the above by offering a balanced 
assessment that gives equal weight, when due, to official documents as media accounts.  
2. Structure of the Study 
This study consists of four chapters. This introductory chapter canvassed the need 
for further study of a domestic intelligence service in the United States. It discussed key 
                                                 
89 Willem de Lint, “New Zealand,” in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National 
Approaches: Volume One (The Americas and Asia), eds. Stuart Farson et. al. (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger Security International, 2008), 183. 
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considerations framing the discourse, before identifying ideal characteristics endogenous 
to a service, as specified or implied by the post-9/11 literature. The chapter concluded by 
outlining the methodology for approaching relevant case studies—MI5 and ASIO. 
Chapters II and III of this study will evaluate the British and Australian services, 
respectively. These chapters will focus on identifying the presence or absence of the ideal 
characteristics from Chapter I, and assessing their impact on the services. The final, 
fourth, chapter will conclude the study by extrapolating lessons from the case studies that 
may prove relevant to continued discourse regarding the creation of an independent 
American domestic intelligence service. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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II. THE BRITISH SECURITY SERVICE 
When the American debate turns to domestic counterterrorism intelligence 
alternatives, the British Security Service—more commonly known as MI5—is often 
offered as a potential model to replace the FBI-led apparatus.90 As Hulnick noted, “[t]he 
preferred model for those who think the present system is not working is Great Britain’s 
internal security service, MI-5.”91 The proposal seems natural. The nations share 
historical ties, similar cultures, and a democratic imperative to uphold civil liberties. Both 
have struggled, often in concert, against Cold War threats and terrorism. Britain has 
considerable experience from its centuries-long fight against Irish Republican terrorism 
and, more recently, Islamic extremism. For these reasons MI5 provides a useful model to 
test the characteristics desired in an American service. 92   
Using official documents, authorized accounts, and unofficial pieces both 
supportive and critical of the Security Service, this chapter will assess the presence of the 
post-9/11 discourse’s ideal characteristics in MI5—a well-established domestic 
intelligence service, created over a century ago. To do so, after an overview of the 
service, this chapter will explore MI5’s emphasis on counterterrorism, intelligence-led 
culture, effort to secure the public trust, and collaboration with community counterparts, 
before offering a summary conclusion.93   
                                                 
90 For examination of MI5 as a model for the United States, see: The 9/11 Commission Report; Burch, 
“A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States?”; Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The United Kingdom,” in 
Considering, ed. Brian Jackson, 495–507; Posner, Remaking Domestic Intelligence; Treverton, 
Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, and the WMD Commission Report, among others. 
91 Hulnick, “Home Time.” 
92 “Security Service,” “the Service,” and “MI5” are used interchangeably in this study. “MI5” stands 
for Military Intelligence Section 5. Please also note that where appropriate, such as in the case of direct 
quotes or official titles, this study will use Britain’s Queen’s English spelling.  
93 The authorized history of MI5 is Christopher Andrew’s Defend the Realm: the Authorized History 
of MI5 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009). Unauthorized works include those published by former MI5 
officers such as David Shayler. Shayler has written separately on his own, but the best assessment of his 
comments, were recorded in Nick Fielding and Mark Hollingsworth’s Defending the Realm: Inside MI5 
and the War on Terrorism (London, England: Andre Deutsch, 2003). 
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A. OVERVIEW OF THE SERVICE 
The United Kingdom’s national intelligence apparatus consists of an external 
collection service (the Secret Intelligence Service; SIS, or MI6), a signals intelligence 
service (the Government Communications Headquarters; GCHQ), and MI5, the domestic 
service.94 In addition to MI6 and GCHQ, MI5 works closely with the central, London-
based, Metropolitan Police and regional police forces. Each of the services provides 
intelligence and analysis to cabinet ministers via the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). 
Separately, through the MI5-led national Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC), the 
services provide counterterrorism-specific assessments to government ministries and 
private companies.95  
MI5 traces its roots to 1909 and the establishment of the Security Service Bureau. 
Designed to uncover German spies and saboteurs, during World War I the Bureau split 
into two independent arms—MI5 and MI6.96 Now fully a civilian agency, MI5’s mission 
is to predict and help counter threats that manifest inside the United Kingdom. MI5’s 
primary focus has evolved over the years to meet the most prevalent threat of the 
moment, but its overarching role of detecting and countering covert threats—”defending 
the realm”—has remained unchanged since 1909.97  
MI5 operates under the cabinet-level authority of the British Home Office. The 
Home Secretary selects the Service’s Director General (DG).98 The DG and two deputies 
oversee the JTAC and seven operational and support branches. Figure 1 depicts MI5’s 
chain of command and Figure 2 illustrates MI5’s branch structure. 
                                                 
94 D’a Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook, 207–209. 
95 Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within, 10. MI5 provides intelligence and the police act 
upon MI5 information by opening and investigation and conducting arrests where warranted. 
96 MI5 and MI6 have their respective fields of primary responsibility, but they operate across 
geographic areas in support of one another. In 1992 MI5 took over responsibility for Irish Republican 
counterterrorism inside mainland Britain. In 2006–2007 it assumed responsibility for counterterrorism in 
Northern Ireland from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).  
97 Masse, Report for Congress: Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom, 4–5.  
98 Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States?” 6. The Home Office is responsible 
for U.K. immigration, security, as well as law and order. 
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Figure 1.  British Security Service (MI5) Command Structure 
From: MI5—The Security Service, “Who We Are,” (accessed October 17, 2012) 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/organisation.html. 
 
Figure 2.  British Security Service (MI5) Branches99 
After: Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2009), Appendix 3. 
The Service’s official mandate rests in the Security Services Act of 1989 (SSA 
1989), which provided statutory authority for MI5 and officially recognized its existence 
for the first time. SSA 1989 formally outlined MI5’s responsibilities:  
                                                 
99 D Branch includes the former branches known as F (Counter-subversion, folded into C Branch in 
1988), C (Protective Security and Counter-subversion, folded into D Branch in 1994), and K 
(Counterespionage, folded into D Branch in 1994). International terrorism is the responsibility of G 
Branch; it is responsible for counterproliferation, threat assessments, and terrorism from the Indian 
subcontinent, Libya, Palestine, Iran, and Islamic Extremists. T Branch is responsible for terrorism related to 
Northern Ireland. Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5. 
DG DDG (x2) Legal Advisor 
H Branch Overseas Liaison, Admin. 
A Branch Intelligence resources and operations 
B Branch Personnel, Security, and Training 
D Branch Protective Security, Counter-espionage 
G Branch International Counter-terrorism 
T Branch Domestic and  Irish Counter-terrorism 
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The protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against 
threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of 
agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or 
undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent 
means. It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the 
economic well-being of the [United Kingdom] against threats posed by the 
actions or intentions of persons outside the [United Kingdom].100 
In 1996 the government amended the SSA, extending MI5’s mandate to include 
support for police anti-organized crime efforts.101 Similarly, the Intelligence Services Act 
of 1994 (ISA 1994) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA 2000) 
provided additional statutory guidance and established oversight parameters for MI5.102 
As of 2012, MI5 listed its priorities as preventing terrorism, foreign espionage, and 
weapons proliferation in addition to protecting sensitive information and reducing serious 
crime “through assistance to law enforcement agencies.”103 MI5 does not have full 
policing powers; it cannot initiate nor close investigations, and its officers generally lack 
arrest authority. Policing responsibilities rest with the United Kingdom’s 56 police forces 
including regional offices, the Metropolitan Police Service (often referred to as Scotland 
Yard)—which has Special Branches (MPSB) that collect information for the prosecution 
of crimes, including terrorism—and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), 
formerly the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).104  
                                                 
100 Quoted in Clutterbuck, “The United Kingdom,” 122.  
101 Center for Democracy and Technology, “Domestic Intelligence Agencies: the Mixed Record of 
the U.K.’s MI5,” January 27, 2003 (accessed October 9, 2012) 
https://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/030127mi5.pdf, 6. 
102 Masse, Report for Congress: Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom, 4. ISA 1994 
established a parliamentary committee to oversee budget and legal issue. RIPA 2000 established tribunals 
to review warrants for entry operations, electronic eavesdropping, and mail intercepts as well as to 
investigate complaints against Britain’s intelligence services. 
103 MI5—The Security Service, “What We Do,” (accessed October 18, 2012) 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/objectives-and-values.html. 
104 Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States?” 6; Center for Democracy and 
Technology, “Domestic Intelligence Agencies,” 6–7; Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within, 
12; D’a Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook, 6. 
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B. COUNTERTERRORISM AS THE SERVICE’S MISSION 
As outlined previously, the post-9/11 discourse indicated a desire for intelligence 
services to emphasize counterterrorism as their top priority. This prioritization may 
require a service to revamp its mission, institutional incentives, resource allocations, and 
hiring practices. Effective counterterrorism also requires a service to recognize and 
address threats with domestic and international origins. Despite its counterespionage and 
counter-subversion beginnings, by 2012 MI5’s mission was squarely oriented on 
counterterrorism and it maintained a focus on transnational and domestic terrorism. In 
one critical area—hiring for counterterrorism—MI5 found it harder to achieve full 
success. 
1. MI5’s Origin, History, and Mission 
From 1909 through the end of the Cold War the Service focused the 
preponderance of its energy toward counterespionage and counter-subversion.105 German 
spies and political revolutionaries garnered MI5’s attention through WWII. The rise of 
Soviet bloc espionage and Communist expansion after WWII kept subversion and 
espionage at the forefront until the decline of the Cold War. MI5, however, was no 
stranger to counterterrorism. Following WWI, the Service was involved in efforts to 
counter what would become the Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorist group; during the 
1960s-1980s MI5 worked with security partners against Northern Ireland-related 
terrorism and transnational groups. Prior to 1990, however, London treated terrorism as a 
criminal matter to be dealt with by the police.106 
Undoubtedly, there was a national security impetus for MI5’s transition to 
counterterrorism; in the 1980s and 1990s Libyan, Iranian, and Palestinian terrorists were 
of concern, and by 1991 IRA-related violence on the British mainland had reached its 
                                                 
105 Fielding and Hollingsworth, Defending the Realm, 26. In 1931 MI5 assumed authority for 
assessing broader national security threats (other than anarchists and Irish terrorists, which were the 
responsibility of the RUC and Scotland Yard). 
106 Ibid., 5; Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 771. In 2007 MI5 would 
assume lead responsibility for terrorism in Northern Ireland. 
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highest level since 1975.107 Inside MI5, however, the aggressive shift toward 
counterterrorism was triggered more by the specter of budget cuts than by security need. 
The decline of the Soviet threat meant a drastic reduction in MI5’s traditional operations. 
Concurrently, the Service suffered from reports that it had violated civil liberties while 
executing its anti-Communist mission. By the late 1980s, MI5 appeared to be a sinking 
ship.108  
MI5’s Director General at the time, Antony Duff, viewed counterterrorism as the 
key to refloating the Service. In 1986, Duff used MI5’s role in thwarting the attempted 
bombing of an El Al Flight from Heathrow Airport as evidence of the Service’s 
effectiveness. In 1991, Stella Rimington took the helm of MI5 and continued to prioritize 
counterterrorism. In February 1991, an IRA mortar attack on 10 Downing Street offered 
the catalyst for MI5 to wrestle the IRA-related counterterrorism mission from MPSB; in 
1992 MI5 formally assumed the lead for counterterrorism intelligence collection on the 
British mainland.109  
With the September 2001 attacks in the United States, MI5 aggressively turned its 
focus to transnational terrorism and Islamic extremism. Sadly, Britain would suffer 
similar violence. On July 7, 2005, British Muslim radicals proclaiming alliance with al-
Qaeda conducted suicide attacks against the London underground train system and a 
passenger bus. The attacks, known as “7/7,” killed 52 innocent civilians and solidified 
MI5’s attention to counterterrorism—in particular Islamic extremism born on U.K. 
soil.110    
MI5’s institutional adjustments from counterespionage to counterterrorism were 
not simply rhetoric. For example, it adjusted its branch structure in support of the new 
                                                 
107 Fielding and Hollingsworth, Defending the Realm, 136. 
108 Mark Urban, UK Eyes Alpha: the Inside Story of British Intelligence (London, England: Faber and 
Faber Limited, 1996), 44. 
109 Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, 43. 10 Downing Street is the official residence and office of the Prime 
Minister. In 1986 U.K. courts convicted Jordanian citizen Nizar Hindawi of attempting to bomb an El Al 
Airlines flight out of Heathrow Airport. MI5 had played a role in thwarting the bombing and the operation 
was considered an intelligence success (albeit largely due to GCHQ efforts).  
110 Clutterbuck, “The United Kingdom,” 120. Four suicide bombers killed 52 innocent victims in the 
7/7 attack.  
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mission. As outlined above, as of 2012 MI5 dedicated two operational branches to 
counterterrorism. More recently, MI5 shifted resources toward emerging cyber threats 
and has expanded its definition of terrorism to include “serious interference with or 
disruption to an electronic system.”111  
The path to its current form, however, indicates that the Service’s focus may be 
driven by political survival as much as national security need. As evidence, shortly after 
MI5 assumed responsibility for counterterrorism inside Britain, violence declined and in 
1994 the PIRA agreed to a ceasefire. In the terrorism lull, MI5 quickly sought to expand 
its mission—this time into combating organized crime. In a reversal of her earlier 
position, DG Rimington sought to involve MI5 in criminal investigations; she claimed 
that the SSA 1989 unduly limited MI5’s mandate.112 When terrorism again rose in 
political importance, however, MI5 receded from its support to countering crime and 
reenergized its counterterrorism branches.113 
2. MI5’s Counterterrorism-led Incentives 
The prioritization of counterterrorism since the 1980s was evident in MI5’s 
selection of its leadership and its intelligence reporting streams. Although the Home 
Secretary appoints the DG, throughout its history the DG was most often groomed by the 
Service and appointed in accordance with the recommendation of the incumbent. Since 
1988 and the departure of Duff (himself a counterterrorism-minded DG), MI5 DG’s have  
 
all come from counterterrorism backgrounds. For MI5 officers the message seemed clear: 
                                                 
111 MI5—The Security Service, “Terrorism,” (accessed October 11, 2012) 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism.html; BBC News, “MI5 Boss Jonathan Evans Warns 
Over Cyber Threat,” BBC News Online, June 26, 2012 (accessed October 11, 2012) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18590209. 
112 Fielding and Hollingsworth, Defending the Realm, 309; Clutterbuck, “The United Kingdom,” 115. 
In the SSA Amendment of 1996 the government extended MI5’s mandate to include direct support to 
police organized crime investigations. This authority was lessened in 2007 when MI5’s branch of 
government, the Home Office, lost most of its criminal justice responsibilities to the newly created Ministry 
of Justice. 
113 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th Edition (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2012), 346; Center for Democracy and Technology, “Domestic Intelligence Agencies,” 6; 
Clutterbuck, “The United Kingdom,” 120–121. MI5 maintained its support to organized crime until 2006 
when responsibility moved to the newly formed Ministry of Justice.  
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counterterrorism branches produced top leadership. This emphasis would naturally draw 
officers to G and T Branch.114 
Transition from a service that was built upon a traditional, analytical, approach to 
intelligence, however, was a slow and incomplete process. According to critics such as 
former MI5 officer David Shayler, despite the new masthead and promotions at the top, 
by the mid-1990s, the Service had failed to fully incentivize counterterrorism. MI5 
management continued to uphold a culture that valued formal briefings and assessments 
designed toward counterespionage investigations over counterterrorism operations.115 If 
judged by allocation of resources, however, by the 2000s MI5 proved Shayler’s criticism 
premature. 116  
3. MI5’s Allocation of Resources 
Where MI5’s shifting of incentives may have stuttered, its realignment of 
resources toward counterterrorism was purposeful and aggressive. Despite the continued 
need to combat espionage, MI5 cannibalized its counterespionage and counter-subversion 
operations in order to bolster its counterterrorism work. Movement of resources focused 
on two areas: personnel and funding.117 
                                                 
114 Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 84 and 197. Of MI5 DGs since Duff, 
Patrick Walker (1988–1992) was the first director of G Branch (international counterterrorism); Stella 
Rimington (1992–1996) also led G Branch; Stephen Lander (1996–2002) was the former director of T 
Branch (domestic and Northern Ireland-related terrorism); Eliza Manningham-Buller (2002–2007) was a 
career counterterrorism officer, the head of T Branch, and the first head of T Branch’s unit dedicated to 
countering mainland IRA-related terrorism (Section T2); and the current head of MI5, Jonathan Evans 
(2007 to present), previously led the unit responsible for Middle East-related terrorism (Section G9, in G 
Branch) as well as T Branch. 
115 Fielding and Hollingsworth, Defending the Realm, 142. 
116 Of note, MI5 staff also pursued counterterrorism reporting with increased zeal as MI5’s focus 
shifted. In 1986–1987 MI5 produced 750 counterterrorism reports. The following year reporting increased 
to 1,100. Although the increase could correlate to increased terrorist activity, terrorist incidents did not 
escalate by a factor comparable to that of the increased reporting. Andrew, Defend the Realm: the 
Authorized History of MI5, 745. 
117 MI5’s most notable operations immediately following 9/11 were in the area of counterespionage. 
In particular, it investigated a British Aerospace guard and a BAE Systems contractor for their attempts to 
pass sensitive information to the Russians. Per the 2001–2002 MI5 Annual Report to the Home Office, 
“work against international terrorism post 11 September was achieved at a cost to the Service’s counter-
espionage work. Coverage was reduced effectively to four potentially hostile states and lower priority 
casework was suspended.” Quoted in Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 813–14. 
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The personnel shift took root under the leadership of DG Rimington in 1991. 
Rimington was known as a terrorism specialist and made expansion of MI5’s 
counterterrorism operations her priority, moving resources and people into two branches 
responsible for terrorism. In the late 1990s, with the emerging threat of Islamic 
extremism and resurgence of Northern Ireland-related terrorism, MI5 received additional 
funding and used it to increase the number of counterterrorism officers. These 
recruitment surges, along with creation of new elements and director-level positions 
within the counterterrorism branches, indicated a strong emphasis on counterterrorism.118 
Figure 3 shows the sharp rise in terrorism-related allocations, and the associated decline 
in counterespionage resources. 
  
                                                 
118 Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 794; Frank Gregory, “An Assessment 
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ed. Paul Wilkinson (New York: Routledge, 2007), 189. T Branch was created in 1990 in order to better use 
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Figure 3.  British Security Service Counterterrorism Resource Allocations  
(Percentage of Overall Budget Dedicated) 
Source: U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee, “Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Reports,” 
Cabinet Office (accessed October 17, 2012) http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/intelligence-
and-security-committee-isc-annual-reports; MI5—The Security Service, “Major Areas of Work,” (accessed 
September 29, 2012) https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/major-areas-of-work.html; 
Hewitt, The British War on Terror (London, England: Continuum Books, 2008), 94. See Appendix A for a 
detailed year-by-year breakdown.119 
MI5 also began aggressively reallocating funding toward counterterrorism in the 
early 1990s, moving resources from branches responsible for political subversion 
(F Branch) and counterespionage (K Branch) to G and T Branches.120 By the mid-1990s, 
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counterterrorism consumed near 25 percent.121 The attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 cemented the 
resource shift; as of March 2011, 87 percent of MI5’s resources were dedicated to 
counterterrorism.122  
4. MI5’s Counterterrorism-centered Hiring and Training 
In response to the increasing workload as a result of counterterrorism 
investigations, MI5 planned to double its workforce from 2,000 in 2001 to 4,000 in 
2011.123 More, however, is not always better. Counterterrorism requires a diverse group 
of officers with the skills and personal background to identify and recruit penetrations of 
terrorist networks. Recognizing such, the Service sought to change its image as an upper-
class boys club. In this vein, Rimington became the first woman to lead an intelligence 
service in any Western nation, and the first to be publicly named in Britain.124 In 
addition, by 1998 MI5 recruiters sought officers from the British Muslim population and 
in 2000 it advertised positions in newspapers known for their ethnically diverse 
readership.125 MI5 acquired additional resources to recruit officers for counterterrorism. 
According to authors Nick Fielding and Mark Hollingsworth, in 2002 the U.K. Treasury 
provided MI5 with funds seven percent over its budget and “the main focus [was] hiring  
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124 Fielding and Hollingsworth, Defending the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 131. 
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fast-track graduate trainees with a grounding in languages and understanding of suspect 
rogue states.” 126 One area of emphasis was Arabic and South Asian Languages.127 
Intent, however, does not always equal success. According to reporting from the 
U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), MI5 had difficulty attracting officers 
with linguistic and technical skills.128 Moreover, in 2008, counterterrorism scholar Steve 
Hewitt assessed that a lack of penetrations of British-based Islamic networks was the 
result of “the fact that the agencies doing the infiltrating lacked diversity…Only six 
percent of [MI5’s] members were drawn from ethnic minorities at the end of 2006…”129 
Furthermore, MI5’s hiring changes may have come too late. While lauding the intent, 
scholars such as Hewitt questioned why, despite the apparent threat and additional 
funding, MI5 could not “explain the slowness in initiating other important 2004 reforms 
that would prove of even greater relevance” on July 7, 2005.130   
5. MI5’s Attention to Transnational Threats 
MI5 divides terrorism between domestic and international origins. For the 
Service, domestic terrorism includes threats that originate from U.K.-based actors in 
pursuit of domestic causes other than the status of Northern Ireland (which has its own 
category). In contrast, MI5 defines international terrorism as “linked to” ideologies, 
individuals, or groups originating outside of the U.K. 131  
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MI5’s attention to transnational terrorism came late. Per security scholar Frank 
Gregory, this reflected “both an understandable pre-occupation with Irish terrorism and 
an initial scaling down of counter-espionage operations post 1989…”132 In the 1990s, 
MI5 struggled to get a handle on transnational Islamic terrorism; in 1995 G Branch had 
only one desk officer dedicated to Islamic extremism and it was not until 1998 that MI5’s 
annual report acknowledged the potential for Britain-based Islamic radicalism. When al-
Qaeda attacked U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998, by its own admission, MI5 had little 
information on al-Qaeda, its leader Osama Bin Laden, and transnational Islamic-
extremist networks.133 
MI5’s expansion into transnational arenas was driven more by need than foresight 
and may have come too late. For example, despite world terrorism events, by 7/7 MI5 
had not yet addressed the potential threat from British extremists tied to Pakistan. 
Although it took attacks inside Britain to draw MI5’s full attention outward, by 2012 the 
Service appeared to have made a substantial shift. To this end, MI5’s noted concern over 
the 2011–2012 “Arab Spring” uprisings for the permissive environment they presented 
for extremists, demonstrated the service’s focus on transnational terrorism.134 
C. THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION AND CULTURE OF THE SERVICE 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the post-9/11 discourse held that, in order to 
facilitate a mission of counterterrorism, a domestic intelligence service must foster a 
culture that promotes predictive intelligence over reactive, law enforcement-centric 
operations. To this end, the service must employ its resources, hiring methodology, and 
training practices in a manner that supports long-range operations. Furthermore, these 
operations should prioritize HUMINT as the primary mode of acquiring intelligence on 
terrorist activity. A review of MI5 in light of these expectations indicates that the Service 
has an intelligence-led culture that promotes predictive intelligence. That said, MI5’s 
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recent emphasis on counterterrorism has caused its methods and incentives to move 
toward those of a law enforcement organization. 
1. MI5’s Genesis and History 
MI5 began as an intelligence service. Created specifically to combat foreign 
espionage, MI5 organized itself around provision of intelligence analysis and predictive 
information, from which other government agencies could take action.135 DG Rimington 
summarized MI5’s function as “assessing likely new threats but before an investigation 
can be mounted…”136 MI5 has maintained this emphasis on predictive intelligence 
through 2012 as it continued to collect intelligence in support of Britain’s “prevent, 
pursue, protect, and prepare” approach to counterterrorism (known as CONTEST).137 
2. MI5’s Intelligence-centered Hiring and Training 
Although not always successful, MI5’s hiring efforts mirrored its intelligence-
centric mission and intention to provide predictive intelligence; the Service sought 
officers with personalities and skills commensurate with the mission of acquiring 
predictive intelligence.138 In 1976 MI5 moved away from the nepotistic hiring practices 
of its early years and began administering tests to assess applicant potential.139 Years 
later, in the 1990s, MI5 job advertisements emphasized a wider variety of intelligence-led 
traits: MI5 was “keen to recruit people from ethnic minorities” and sought applicants 
with “analytical abilities” and “flexibility” from “a wide range of backgrounds.”140 
Language skills also increasingly came to the forefront, in particular a desire for South 
Asian and Arabic language speakers.141 Despite ISC annual reporting indicating that 
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MI5’s goal of hiring more ethnically diverse officers with language skills remained 
elusive, there was indication that MI5’s diversity programs had some positive impact.142 
According to former DG Eliza Manningham-Buller, “[i]n [the 1960s and 1970s] the 
intelligence cadre was almost entirely male, with many ex-military or Colonial Service 
officers in their middle years. Now…[h]alf of the directors are under 50 and over 40% of 
the intelligence officers are women.”143 
MI5 training appeared to be less systematic than its hiring practices. Through the 
1950s MI5 relied upon on-the-job training over formal intelligence courses. As the Cold 
War bloomed, MI5 adjusted its training to deal with Soviet bloc spies. In 1975 MI5 
began a formal agent-running course and in 1977 added a basic management course. By 
most accounts, MI5 continued to maintain a formal training program that included 
intelligence collection, information analysis, and agent operations.144   
Despite its history and maneuvers to remain an intelligence-led culture, MI5’s 
move into counterterrorism had a potentially negative impact. Counterterrorism has a 
public side that becomes easily politicized and often plays out in the courts. As lead 
counterterrorism agency for actions in Britain after 1992, MI5 officers began to replace 
MPSB officers under the political and judicial microscopes. As DG Rimington stated, by 
the early 1990s MI5 felt the impact of its new role: 
 The new breed of MI5 officer was comfortable in Whitehall, sitting on 
committees and discussing issues with ministers and their advisors. As 
more and more counterterrorist operations were successful and ended with 
the arrest and trial of suspects, giving evidence in court became more 
common. Those who were able to meet these new requirements thrived 
and advanced, those who couldn’t either left or became back room 
players.145 
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An MI5 officer in the modern age of counterterrorism was asked to serve as a conduit 
between the service and the system. Increasingly removed from the shadows, MI5 risked 
becoming less a master of clandestine operations and more a hybrid politician-lawyer-
spy. 
3. MI5’s Emphasis on HUMINT 
As outlined in earlier chapters, counterterrorism intelligence requires 
prioritization of HUMINT. MI5, however, was not known for its HUMINT operations. 
MI5 was a service that relied on analytical skills to uncover Soviet spies. Even in an era 
of counterterrorism, the Service relied heavily on phone taps and prioritized analytical 
assessments over long-term agent operations designed to interdict terrorist networks.146 
Former MI5 officer and notorious whistleblower Shayler commented that “[t]he great 
difference between MI5 and most of the intelligence services is that the people are not 
routinely taught how to run agents…[it is] very bad at recruiting agents.”147 Contrary to 
these criticisms, MI5 leadership placed a premium on human agents in support of 
counterterrorism. DG Rimington was known to tout the value of recruiting and assigned 
specialist officers to run long-term agents.148 Unfortunately, the value of this practice 
was thwarted by a concurrent policy of rotating postings, replacing old officers with new 
on a regular basis.149 Despite these efforts, comments by senior national security officers 
indicated that as of 2007, MI5 continued to have a difficult time acquiring agents within 
Muslim extremist networks.150 
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4. MI5’s Intelligence-led Incentives 
MI5’s increasingly public role in U.K. counterterrorism efforts after 1991—in 
particular its support to criminal prosecutions—caused an incremental drift toward law 
enforcement-based incentives within the service (such as valuing prosecutions over long-
term operations); MI5 sought predictive intelligence, but progressively adopted law 
enforcement-like incentives and practices such as pursuit of near-term leads in support of 
investigations geared toward arrest and trial.151 To its credit, MI5 fought to maintain an 
emphasis on long-term, predictive, operations. In her pitch for MI5 primacy over IRA-
related terrorism on the mainland, Rimington focused on the value of intelligence 
“agents” over police “informers.”152 Her successor, DG Stephen Lander, similarly noted 
that the MPSB’s efforts to counter PIRA terrorism were harmed by a “wish to pursue 
criminals rather than to obtain information…the police should leave [MI5] to do the 
intelligence work while they…do what they are internationally respected for, the after-
crime investigations.”153 When MI5 sought to move into anti-organized crime endeavors, 
its legal advisors justified MI5’s role, stating, “whereas law enforcement intelligence is 
good over ordinary crime because of its short-term dynamic, in organized crime the 
relationships are more long term, as with espionage.” 154 Critics of MI5’s move into 
criminal investigations and prosecutions noted that, without serious changes, MI5 was 
equipped to run intelligence operations, not conduct investigations to prosecute 
crimes.155  
Concern over MI5’s direct involvement to criminal proceedings was not 
unfounded. Despite recognizing the value of predictive, long-term, operations, MI5 
increasingly drifted toward becoming a service that, in practice, incentivized short-
term—politically palatable—arrests rather than long-term penetration operations. 
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Interestingly, whereas most of the post-9/11 American discourse called for an 
intelligence-led culture imbued with operational patience, critics chided MI5 for being 
too long-term focused. When MI5 assumed a broader counterterrorism role, detractors 
contended that its approach was too risk-averse, mistakenly valuing analysis over action; 
early arrests, they argued, would save more lives than long-term intelligence 
collection.156 In time, MI5’s approach would mollify this criticism. 
Although secrecy prohibits accurate assessment of MI5’s operations, media and 
government accounts lend to the assessment that MI5’s drift toward law enforcement 
responsibilities was not without cost. For example, MI5 experienced a marked increase in 
demand on its resources due to the increased responsibility to support judicial review and 
police-like investigations.157 Additionally, the drift may have unduly shortened the 
operational capacity of several cases in the early 2000s. In 2004, for example, Operation 
RHYME thwarted extremist Dhiren Barot’s plan to detonate bombs in the London 
underground. Although Barot reportedly had ties to al-Qaeda leadership, MI5 appears to 
have sought the quick arrest of Borat rather than running agents into his network.158  
Similarly, in 2008 a MI5 operation led to the capture and conviction of Parviz Khan, an 
Islamic extremist who, along with four co-conspirators, planned to kidnap and behead a 
British Muslim Soldier. Although the government called the operation a success, from an 
intelligence standpoint it yielded less-than-desirable results, including an apparent failure 
to infiltrate Khan’s higher network.159 
These incidents may prove anecdotal and are partially indicative of MI5’s 
reaction to system pressures, but they also foreshadow MI5’s drift toward bird-in-the-
hand incentives, which risks curtailing MI5’s intelligence operations in lieu of near-term 
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police actions. Furthermore, there is evidence that new MI5 leadership has incentivized 
prosecutions as a measure of success: during a public interview in 2009, DG Jonathan 
Evans praised MI5’s support to a significant number of arrests and held up terrorism-
related prosecutions as a measure of MI5’s success, claiming the arrests “had a chilling 
effect on the enthusiasm of the networks.”160  
D. THE SERVICE’S ABILITY TO ACQUIRE AND MAINTAIN PUBLIC 
TRUST 
As outlined previously, in order to achieve its mission an intelligence service 
must do its part to ensure protection of civil liberties. The service’s ability to protect civil 
liberties is, in part, determined by the service’s adherence to law mandate and reflected in 
the level of trust the citizenry have for the service’s intentions and capabilities while 
acting on their behalf. The service can take measures to help secure and maintain public 
trust (e.g., openness, diverse hiring and promotion practices, and support to oversight 
systems). In addition, a service’s record of civil liberty infringements and operational 
“failures” (as perceived by the public) will negatively impact its ability to acquire public 
trust. Hence, a survey of the service’s reputation (as indicated by incidents and public 
polling) aids in assessing MI5’s ability to acquire public trust.  
1. MI5’s Openness Policies and Public Outreach Efforts 
For most of its history, MI5 operated operate under a blanket of secrecy. It did not 
declassify reports for public consumption, nor did the government formally acknowledge 
that it existed. The official lack of acknowledgement did not help MI5 win trust. Rather it 
subjected it to conspiracy theories, cynicism, and suspicion.  
Like its move into counterterrorism, MI5’s move out of the shadows was driven 
in part by existential need. With the end of the Cold War, MI5 found itself staring down 
large cuts to its workforce and budget. Compounding matters, during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s the Service suffered from a series of leaks and tell-all books by former 
officers who alleged wrongdoing by MI5. As described by author Richard Thurlow, 
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MI5’s “coming out” allowed it to justify its mission and become more accountable to the 
public.161 Following SSA 1989, MI5 advertised for positions under its own name (rather 
than non-descript “government office” taglines), published an informational pamphlet, 
and launched a website (www.MI5.co.uk) in an effort to better advertise its mission and 
acquire public support.162 Perhaps the greatest step toward securing public trust was 
MI5’s facilitation of access to the DG. MI5 leaders regularly recognized the importance 
of the media’s role as liaison with the public and sought to cultivate the relationship. MI5 
also chose to release older case files in an effort to advertise its activities to the public, 
and on the event of its centennial anniversary MI5 hired historian Christopher Andrew to 
write its official history.163 Notably, Andrew’s authorized account incorporated events up 
to 2009, including multiple chapters on MI5’s ongoing fight against Islamic terrorism. In 
offering an authorized interpretation of recent operations, MI5 helped distance itself from 
the negative stigma attached to its earlier counter-subversion efforts, focusing attention 
on its more popular counterterrorism mission.164  
MI5’s efforts to enhance public trust via increased openness, however, were not 
without hiccups. Absent facts and full disclosure, U.K. media was prone to embellish. For 
example, in the early 1990s The Times’ former editor published a story claiming that MI5 
had once bugged the phones of the Royal Family,165 and in 2012 The Daily Mail Online 
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ran an outdated story claiming that MI5 once sought to “destroy” the Rolling Stones.166 
DG Rimington noted the risk-vs.-gain: “[s]illy press speculation can never be removed 
entirely, but the Service’s continuing, controlled contact with senior editors and others is 
helping to shape a better informed and more considered attitude to the Service.”167  
2. MI5’s Hiring Practices 
Once known as a service for privileged white males, the above-described 
endeavor by MI5 to increase representation of minorities in its ranks and shed secretive 
hiring practices for more meritocratic procedures had mixed results.168 The public 
perception of MI5 in the 1990s became that of a service open to most citizens, and in 
particular one that promoted gender equality; a 2012 MI5 recruitment video went so far 
as to tout a diverse workforce representative of those it protects.169 Still, MI5 had 
difficulty attracting the ethnically-diverse workforce needed to acquire the trust of 
Britain’s minority populations. For example, it took until 1994 for MI5 to hire its first 
black officer, and by 1999 only 3.2 percent of officers claimed “black” as their ethnicity 
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and annual reports cited a need for the security services to hire more minorities.170 
Furthermore, as of 2012 a potential gender bias was visible in its leadership, where only 
21 percent were women (compared to 40 percent in all grades).171  
3. MI5’s Support to Oversight and Control Mechanisms 
Until 1989 MI5 was subject to little internal or external oversight. To its credit, as 
early as 1985, MI5 leadership pressured Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to place the 
Service on statutory footing.172 U.K. leadership initially declined, but when the SSA was 
raised anew two years later, a persistent MI5 helped draft the Act.173 The adoption of 
SSA 1989 helped calm civil libertarians who now felt that MI5’s operations had finally 
been placed on a legal basis provided by elected representatives and offered a formal 
mechanism for citizen complaints against the service—the Security Service Tribunal.174  
Initial oversight shortcomings were not limited to the national framework. Into the 
late 1980s MI5 lacked strong internal review mechanisms and suffered from an 
atmosphere of right-wing bias and nepotism. MI5 leadership did not welcome dissenting 
opinions and preferred to squash complaints rather than address them.175 Hence, MI5 
established an “ethical counselor” post, responsible for hearing employee grievances. By 
self-design, then, and with the support of Parliament, as of 2012 MI5 houses two formal 
review bodies in addition to a legal counselor working with the DG.  
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4. MI5’s Actions that Violated Mandate and Impacted Public Trust 
With regard to public image, MI5 has had two faces: the controversial and 
ridiculed perpetrators of the anti-Leftist, anti-Communist, agendas of the 1960s-1980s 
and the modern, largely trusted, executors of Britain’s domestic counterterrorism 
mission. Prior to its turn toward counterterrorism in the late 1980s, MI5 was heavily 
involved in unpopular efforts to counter Communist influences and elements deemed 
subversive to the government.176 Critics held that MI5 applied its anti-subversion efforts 
in a recklessly broad manner that undermined democratic norms. Coupled with official 
secrecy regarding MI5’s existence and agenda, the public relied upon whistleblower 
accounts and media controversies to judge MI5. Their concerns were not without basis: 
media and former officers claimed that MI5 kept files on children suspected to be 
Communist sympathizers after they wrote to the Communist Party in the 1960s and 
1970s177; and in the 1980s, MI5 targeted the National Union of Mineworkers, the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the National Council for Civil Liberties (now 
called Liberty),178 in violation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).179 In 
1988, former Home Secretary, Roy Hattersley, called MI5 “one of the worst and most 
ridiculed security services in the Western alliance.”180 
Scandal did not limit itself to MI5’s hunting of Communists. In 1988 it was 
infamously involved in an operation that resulted in the shooting of IRA operatives in 
Gibraltar, Spain. Although evidence indicated that the event was a tragedy of 
circumstances (and that the IRA members planned to detonate a car bomb), media 
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speculation that MI5 operated under a “shoot-to-kill” policy damaged its public 
reputation.181 MI5’s appearance of impartiality was further damaged by accusations that 
it aided Protestant Loyalist terrorists and covered up evidence of their crimes.182 
Although MI5 made an effort to right its reputation, leaks and tell-all books continued to 
filter out. MI5’s new generation was repeatedly tried for the sins of its predecessors.183  
After 1989, MI5 partially unveiled its operations and the public was more easily 
able to judge the Service’s actions. Furthermore, the Service benefited from the broader 
popularity of its counterterrorism mission; unlike counter-subversion and 
counterespionage, the threat of terrorism—and need for MI5—was more apparent 
(particularly after 9/11 and 7/7). Buoying the Service, in the early to mid-2000s it was 
credited with foiling several terrorist plots, and in 2007 it won primacy over all U.K. 
counterterrorism intelligence (now including Northern Ireland).184  
Despite rising public trust, MI5 bore the brunt of criticism after the 7/7 attacks. 
Two matters drew pointed criticism: (1) only days before the 7/7 attack, DG 
Manningham-Buller told a gathering of Parliament members that there was no imminent 
threat to London185; and, (2) prior to the attack, in a separate operation MI5 monitored, 
and discounted as potential threats, two of the bombers—Mohammad Sidique Khan and 
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Shezad Tanweer. A government review placed the blame on “resource constraints” rather 
than MI5 error, but damage to MI5’s reputation had been done.186   
5. Public Opinion of MI5 
According to a sampling of public opinion polls, MI5’s openness policies and 
counterterrorism activities helped acquire the trust of many British citizens. In a July 
2010 survey, 40 percent of respondents expressed “complete” or “a lot of” confidence in 
the ability of MI5 to “avert a terrorist attack.”  By comparison, the U.K. police enjoyed 
lower confidence ratings.187 Where MI5 may have earned broad public trust for its 
counterterrorism capabilities, it suffered in a key demographic—British Muslims. 
Following 7/7, MI5 intensified its focus on the British Muslim community.188 The 
approach included canvasing Muslim communities to monitor extremist sympathizers. 
Known as “Project Rich Picture,” MI5 categorized 8,000 people as potentially 
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among Muslim communities and eroded trust. Notably, a 2007 poll of British Muslims 
indicated that 52 percent of respondents believed the security services falsified evidence 
in order to acquire convictions of 7/7 suspects.190 
This distrust was not without consequence. MI5 had difficulty recruiting minority 
officers,191 and there was also indication that MI5 had failed to acquire agents within 
Muslim extremist networks. Although secrecy limits collection of data on HUMINT 
penetrations, it may be indicative of a shortfall that in 2007 both the Deputy Assistant 
Police Commissioner and (then former) DG Manningham-Buller noted a need to increase 
agent networks in the Muslim community.192 As noted by Hewitt, MI5 failed to acquire 
Muslim recruits because it failed to win the trust of the Muslim community.193  
E. THE SERVICE’S COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING 
WITH COMMUNITY COUNTERPARTS 
As outlined earlier, in order to carry out its counterterrorism mission a service 
must collaborate and share information with its national security counterparts. MI5 was 
known for working closely with its partners. A general review of MI5’s relationship with 
its cohorts, its secondment of officers, regional coordination efforts, and support to 
coordinating bodies demonstrates the veracity of that claim. MI5’s coordination efforts, 
however, were not perfect. It struggled to update its information sharing systems and 
suffered from a lasting culture of secrecy.  
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1. MI5’s Work with Community Partners 
Lacking in the executive powers of arrest, and responsible for U.K. domestic 
counterterrorism intelligence, MI5 is forced to work closely with Britain’s 56 law 
enforcement services.194 In the early 1970s, the rise of transnational and domestic 
terrorism gave impetus to greater cooperation between the police and intelligence 
agencies. Unlike counterespionage where the police were needed primarily at the end of 
an investigation (the arrest phase), counterterrorism as applied in the United Kingdom 
called for immediate and in-depth cooperation.195  
After 9/11 and 7/7, the impetus for collaboration rose. MI5 claimed to track over 
200 extremist groups and more than 1,600 people in the years since 7/7. This high 
number necessitated a robust inter-agency coordination process.196 There are many 
examples of this positive cooperation domestically. In 1997 MI5 worked closely with 
Metropolitan Police’s Anti-Terrorism Branch to combat an IRA bombing campaign, and 
an April 2000 MI5 Staff Opinion Survey indicated that collaboration with MI6 was the 
best it had been since the Service’s creation in 1909.197 
Terrorism’s causes were not unique to England and MI5 adjusted to coordinate 
with international partners. Several examples stand out. For example, in the 1980s-1990s, 
per Andrew, “[f]or the Security Service, [the IRA’s] largely unsuccessful continental 
campaign had the great advantage of strengthening its collaboration with other European 
security and intelligence services.”198 Similarly, the Service worked closely with 
American FBI in support of anti-IRA arms trafficking operations, and after al-Qaeda’s 
                                                 
194 Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States?” 6; Chalk and Rosenau, 
Confronting the Enemy Within, 12; Masse, Report for Congress: Domestic Intelligence in the United 
Kingdom, 6. 
195 Clutterbuck, “The United Kingdom,” 119–120. 
196 Burch, “A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States?” 6. 
197 Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 808; Hewitt, The British War on 
Terror, 90; U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee, “2007–2008 Intelligence and Security Committee 
Annual Report,” 22. The 2007–2008 ISC report called the SIS-MI5 bilateral relationship “very good,” and 
noted that it was good long before 9/11. The Anti-Terrorism Branch was often referred to by its official 
designator, SO13. 
198 Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 748, 772. Operations with French DST 
in the early 1990s led to the capture of IRA arms caches and disruption of IRA operations in France. 
 67 
attack on U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998 MI5 worked with American services against 
Osama Bin Laden and his network.199 Coordination was a necessity to combat the threat 
of terrorism and the Service made notable efforts of its own accord, including moving 
internal resources to better support inter-agency operations.200  
2. MI5’s Secondments and Regional Offices 
Perhaps most indicative of the Service’s ability to share information and 
coordinate operations is its cross-pollination with sister services. MI5 regularly allowed 
secondments to its ranks. In 1998 at least 100 officers from outside MI5 worked on 
assignment to the organization, and when MI5 took over responsibility for Irish-terrorism 
on the mainland, MI5 brought in MPSB officers on secondment.201  Of further note, by 
2006 MI6 officers made up 10 percent of MI5 counterterrorism teams.202 
In addition to bringing outside officers into its midst, MI5 made an effort to push 
its officers out into the community. In response to its expanding counterterrorism role, in 
2002 MI5 began to open regional offices outside of London—expressly to improve 
communication and coordination with local police. One police officer commented that 
the new regional offices “will definitely increase our ability to respond to the intelligence 
generated by the Security Service.” 203  
3. MI5’s Support to Coordinating Bodies 
In addition to reaching outward, MI5 allocated resources toward internal 
mechanisms responsible for cross-agency coordination. Most notable, in 2003 MI5 
became the responsible party for the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center. The JTAC 
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included representatives from 12 agencies and was responsible for coordinating across 
agencies in support of joint-CT endeavors.204 Along with JTAC, MI5 hosted the Center 
for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI),205 the National Security Advice 
Center (NSAC), a multi-agency staffed organization that coordinates counterterrorism 
security advice to the business and private sector community,206 and the National 
Infrastructure Security Coordination Center (NISCC), responsible for coordination of 
cyber- and communications-related informative pieces.  
4. MI5’s Missteps 
While MI5 had notable successes in sharing information and coordinating with 
counterparts, in order to communicate and share information, an intelligence service must 
possess an adequate information technology (IT) infrastructure. On this matter MI5 fell 
short. For example, MI5’s counterterrorism database, known as “Durbar,” was unable to 
deal with the volume of counterterrorism intelligence fed into the system and may have 
led to dangerous miscommunications regarding terrorist suspects.207 
MI5’s shortcomings were not limited to its IT systems. Despite MI5’s new focus 
on terrorism and the need for coordination, it was still a secretive organization. Critics 
maligned MI5 for valuing secrecy over cooperation, compartmentalization over sharing 
of information. In 1992, a RUC police officer summarized the issue: “MI5’s agenda is 
built around counter-espionage: a slow process, keeping information for themselves long 
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“Shoe Bomber” Richard Reid and 9/11 hijacking suspect Zacharias Moussaoui. When 
such came to light, detractors maligned MI5’s failure to warn MPSB Police about Reid’s 
connections.209  
MI5’s flex toward counterterrorism, in particular its assumption of responsibility 
for Northern Ireland-related counterterrorism, created its closest and most strained 
relationships. MI5 necessarily increased communication with the RUC/PSNI and MPSB 
given its limited ability to run operations in Northern Ireland. Absent experience and 
agent networks, MI5 looked to its police partners. Whitehall leadership often highlighted 
MI5’s relationship with the police as a success, but some frustrations remained at the 
working level; predictably, there were police/intelligence jurisdictional and cultural rifts. 
In 2003 a report from the Chief Constable of the PSNI claimed that the police-MI5 
relationship was strained by “mismatches of expectations [of responsibilities] on both 
sides.”210 The police also accused MI5 officers of looking down upon their “blue collar” 
counterparts and as glory hounds who appeared on the scene when it suited their political 
purposes.211   
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter assessed in MI5 the four characteristics commensurate with those of 
an ideal domestic counterterrorism intelligence service as dictated by the post-9/11 
discourse. First, although it did not begin as a counterterrorism service, MI5 was able to 
transform itself into one. From 1986 through 2012 MI5 made a concerted, and arguably 
successful, effort to redirect its operational focus through a shift in hiring practices, 
reorganization of operational branches to better focus on terrorism in domestic and 
transnational forms, enhanced communication with counterterrorism partners, and 
aggressive reorientation of the resources provided by the government. That said, and 
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acknowledging MI5’s successes after 9/11, its efforts did not allow it to fully predict and 
prevent the rise of Islam extremists within its borders, including the attacks of 7/7. 212   
Second, MI5 demonstrated the characteristics of an intelligence-led culture in its 
history, hiring and training programs, and incentives through the 1980s. That said, its 
more recent record with HUMINT was decidedly mixed. Despite its efforts, the 
mechanisms employed by MI5 did not appear to yield sources in Islamic extremist 
communities. Terrorist recruitments are notoriously difficult and secrecy forbids drawing 
a firm conclusion on the matter. Notably, after the 1980s, the grip of its counterterrorism 
mission pulled MI5 into the U.K. court system and by 2012 it appeared that the Service 
was drifting away from predictive intelligence and long-term operations toward law 
enforcement-minded incentives such as arrest and prosecution.  
Third, with regard to securing the public trust, MI5 had a less-than-effective 
result. Although it implemented mechanisms to put itself on statutory footing, 
“demystified” the service, and incorporated internal oversight bodies, as evidenced by its 
hiring and agent recruiting frustrations, the Service was unable to secure the trust of key 
minority communities. MI5’s frustrated efforts, however, were limited more by a legacy 
of reputed civil liberty infringements, and seemingly indiscriminate surveillance of the 
British Muslim community after 7/7, than the inherent efficacy of its mechanisms.  
Lastly, MI5’s sharing of information and collaboration with national security 
partners may be assessed as excellent. Driven by operational need, MI5 enhanced 
existing communication channels and exchanged officers, as well as hosted and 
developed elements (e.g., regional offices) to enhance coordination at all levels. MI5’s 
greatest shortfall was its inability to upgrade and standardize its computer infrastructure 
in accordance with required government standards. This study will now turn toward the 
other potential model for the United States, the Australian Security and Intelligence 
Organization. 
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III. THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 
ORGANISATION  
Along with MI5, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is often 
mentioned as a potential model for an American domestic intelligence service.213 
Australia and the United States share democratic ideals, cultural norms, and a history of 
security policy cooperation. As part of a federal parliamentary democracy, ASIO is faced 
with similar challenges regarding civil liberties and jurisdiction as services in the United 
States.214 Furthermore, together with services in America and Britain, the Organisation 
spent much of its formative years interdicting Cold War foes. More recently, following 
the 2002 attacks in Bali, Indonesia, Australia became directly embroiled in the fight 
against international Islamic extremism. Additionally, its support of U.S. operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, intervention in East Timor, and counterterrorism efforts in 
Southeast Asia increased the threat of terrorism to Australia. For these reasons, ASIO 
presents a useful and applicable case study.215 
Like the previous chapter, the following evaluation calls upon official documents 
and secondary-source literature to assess the presence of ideal characteristics in the 
Organisation, a well-established domestic intelligence service. This chapter too will 
provide an overview of the service, before evaluating ASIO’s counterterrorism focus, 
intelligence-led culture, effort to secure the public trust, and collaboration with 
community counterparts. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE SERVICE 
Australia’s national intelligence collection apparatus consists of a civilian external 
collection service (the Australian Secret Intelligence Service; ASIS), an imagery service 
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(Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation), a signals intelligence service (the 
Defence Signals Directorate; DSD), and ASIO, the domestic security service. These 
services provide raw intelligence and analysis to community counterparts and the 
government via the National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC), and the Office of 
National Assessments (ONA; a policy-level office that collates assessments and 
determines collection priorities).216 In addition to its intelligence counterparts, ASIO 
works closely with police from each of Australia’s six states, two mainland territories, 
and seven offshore areas, in addition to the Australian Federal Police (AFP).217  
ASIO operates with Parliamentary authority, under the general supervision of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS). The Organisation is 
directly under the control of the Director General of Security (DG). The DG is appointed 
by the Prime Minister, but is immediately responsible to the Attorney General. The 
Attorney General issues guidelines and approves warrants for the service. The DG, 
however, has the power to determine ASIO’s operational priorities and methods. ASIO’s 
staff is divided into eleven divisions.218 Figure 4 depicts ASIO’s full organizational 
structure. Figure 5 depicts its intelligence assessment and collection divisions. 
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Figure 4.  Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Structure 







Figure 5.  Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Operational Branches 
After: Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “About ASIO—Organisational Structure,” (accessed 
November 6, 2012) http://www.asio.gov.au/About-ASIO/Overview.html. 
Preceded by a string of ad hoc wartime services, the Organisation is Australia’s 
oldest security service. ASIO was established by the Charter of the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organization of 1949 and given statutory footing in the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation Act of 1956. Formed in response to British and American 
concern over post-WWII Soviet espionage—in particular a spy ring operating out of 
Canberra and worry about the security of Alliance information. The government charged 
ASIO with “the defence of the Commonwealth and its territories from external and 
internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, and from actions of 
persons and organisations, whether directed from within or without the country which 
may be judged to be subversive of the security of Australia.”219 Tasked generally to 
address external and internal threats, ASIO directed operations inward. As legal scholar 
Jenny Hocking noted, “[w]ithin five years of its tenuous inauguration, [ASIO] was 
concentrated strongly on domestic security rather than on foreign espionage 
operations.”220  
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The foundation of ASIO’s modern mandate is the Australian Security Intelligence 
Act of 1979 (ASIO Act of 1979), which expanded its mission to include counterterrorism 
as well as preventing sabotage and foreign subversion.221 In 1986, Parliament amended 
the Act, giving ASIO the power to collect foreign intelligence regarding external threats 
and providing advice on infrastructure, personnel, and information security.222 As of 
2012, ASIO defined its mandate as “protection of Australia and Australians from 
espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence, promotion of communal violence, 
attacks on Australia’s defence systems, and foreign interference; and of Australia’s 
territorial and border integrity from serious threats.”223 
To fulfill its mission ASIO collects and assesses intelligence (from both human 
and technical sources), engages foreign liaison, provides security advice to government 
and businesses, investigates security threats, maintains a tactical and analytical 
counterterrorism capability, and provides security assessments regarding visitor and 
immigrant visas.224 Like MI5, ASIO generally lacks policing powers; the ASIO Act of 
1979 forbids ASIO to carry out policing duties.225 That said, beginning with expansion of 
its powers in 2001, ASIO has acquired limited ability to detain and question terrorism 
suspects (with a warrant and support of the police) and works hand-in-hand with the 
AFP, which has related and overlapping counterterrorism functions.226  
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B. COUNTERTERRORISM AS THE SERVICE’S MISSION 
ASIO began as a counterespionage service that viewed security in broad terms to 
include counter-subversion, counter-sabotage and, later, counterterrorism. Although 
within its mandate since 1979, ASIO’s focus on counterterrorism was subordinate to 
traditional intelligence targets such as espionage. That changed in 2002 when Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) terrorists targeted Australians in Indonesia, with devastating impact. 
ASIO’s gaze now centers on terrorism, for which it has a transnational appreciation. 
ASIO’s turn toward counterterrorism was not without complication. It incentivized a 
culture of addressing terrorist targets in a manner that raised concern among civil liberty 
advocates and, like MI5, a diverse work force remained an elusive goal.227   
1. ASIO’s Origin, History, and Mission 
Counterterrorism is relatively new to ASIO. From 1949 until the decline of the 
Soviet Union, counterespionage and the countering of Communist and leftist-Socialist 
influences took center stage.228 While early government commissions acknowledged the 
threat of politically motivated violence, it was not until the late 1970s that ASIO had 
immediate cause to remold its focus.229 In 1978 a protest movement tied to a sect of the 
Indian religious group Ananda Marga targeted the first Australian Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Regional Meeting, detonating a bomb outside of the Sydney Hilton Hotel 
that killed three people. The attack reinforced recommendations made by the 1977 Royal 
Commission on Intelligence and Security (RCIS)—that the security services needed to 
better recognize and address the rising threat of terrorism. Subsequently, the ASIO Act of 
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1979 extended the Organisation’s mandate to include counterterrorism, “whether directed 
from, or committed within, Australia or not.”230  
Despite the extended mandate, the Organisation did not prioritize terrorism over 
other threats and maintained a cornucopia of tasks. Notwithstanding the politicized 
response to the Hilton bombing, ASIO still had little cause to direct resources at 
terrorism; internal political unrest and Soviet spies seemed a much greater threat, while 
terrorism was limited to a handful of infrequent incidents that consisted mostly of foreign 
actors attacking non-Australian targets.231 With retraction of the Soviet threat in the early 
1990s ASIO struggled to justify its utility. In 1992 the Prime Minister ordered a review of 
Australia’s intelligence apparatus. The review found that ASIO’s role remained valid, but 
a decline in espionage threats meant that its resources could be sharply reduced.232 
During much of the 1990s ASIO focused on information security, counterespionage, and 
support to immigration authorities. That changed in 2000 when Australia hosted the 
Olympics, during which ASIO made delegation security and preventing terrorism its top 
priority. Consequently, when the 9/11 attacks on America occurred, ASIO was already 
looking at terrorism. In 2001 ASIO acquired the authority to participate in secret 
detentions and enhanced interrogations. By the end the year, ASIO had become the lead 
agency for Australian counterterrorism intelligence.233  
ASIO had little time to adjust to its new role. In October of 2002 Australia was 
thrust into the global terrorism fray when explosions on the island of Bali, Indonesia, 
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killed 88 Australians and wounded many more.234 Following the attacks, Australia 
transferred power to legislate counterterrorism measures from the states to Canberra, and 
the Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act of 2002 centralized counterterrorism under 
federal authority—ASIO stood at the center.235 After Bali 2002 ASIO went on the 
counterterrorism offensive. It investigated JI and al-Qaeda associates in Australia and 
conducted a series of raids during the subsequent month. ASIO’s focus since has often 
been on Islamic extremists and related terrorist threats at home and abroad, and with due 
cause: as highlighted by ASIO in a 2005 Annual Report, the period of 2000–2005 
brought at least one attack each year against Australian interests.236 
ASIO’s work, however, bled into areas only peripherally associated with 
terrorism. Moreover, the further it got from the attacks of 2002, the more the 
Organisation broadened its applied definition of terrorism, pulling issues of immigration 
and counter-subversion into the counterterrorism orbit, in what critics assessed was an 
inappropriate and ineffectual manner.237 For example, the service increasingly involved 
itself in marginally terrorism-related security screening for intending immigrants and 
used its counterterrorism authorities to expand its monitoring of a “persistent but small 
sub-culture of racist and nationalist extremists in Australia” as well as political activist 
groups.238 Notably, in 2012 ASIO was accused by environmental groups of unduly 
investigating their members and surveiling peaceful environmental protests. Although 
justified by some as warranted for national security reasons, this expansion drew 
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criticism from others who raised concern over protection of civil liberties.239 It also 
highlights the potential for ASIO’s counterterrorism efforts (and its definition of what 
constitutes terrorism) to become too diverse, and its cause for targeting too diluted, to be 
considered focused and effective. 
2. ASIO’s Counterterrorism-led Incentives 
ASIO’s counterterrorism-driven incentives are demonstrated in its reporting, 
efforts to expand its authorities, and official messages. For example, in its 2011–2012 
report to Parliament, ASIO cited terrorism “as the most immediate threat to the security 
of Australians and Australian interests.”240 In addition, ASIO’s assessments in 2011–
2012 were overwhelmingly focused on counterterrorism: it produced 153,644 
counterterrorism security assessments compared to 27,801 personnel assessments and 
24,097 terrorism-related visa assessments (a 40 percent increase in terrorism reporting 
from the previous year).241 Furthermore, the Organisation incorporated missions such as 
border security and counter-proliferation under the counterterrorism umbrella, and sought 
the expansion of its counterterrorism powers.242 Namely, during 2001–2005 DG Dennis 
Richardson (1996–2005) sought authority for computer hacking and the tracking of 
international money transfers, and in 2011–2012 DG David Irvine (2009-present) 
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requested enhanced powers of intercept in support of counterterrorism.243 These 
measures indicated a service that incentivized and prioritized counterterrorism. 
Incentives, however, are not easily institutionalized. They require a cultural 
foundation built over time. ASIO’s original incentives were cemented in 
counterespionage and counter-subversion, hindering efforts to incentivize 
counterterrorism. For example, according to unofficial ASIO historian Frank Cain, when 
former DG Peter Barbour (1970–1975) attempted to turn ASIO away from old threats 
toward the new, he met “heavy resentment by a staff still stuck in the essential values of 
the Cold War and the ‘communist menace.’”244 As intelligence and security scholars 
David Martin Jones and Carl Ungerer suggested, “prior to September 2001, the 
Australian intelligence community considered political or religiously motivated 
violence…to be largely a nuisance activity akin to piracy or people smuggling and one 
that required a police response rather than a strategic solution.”245 In a 2005 speech DG 
Paul O’Sullivan (2005–2009) acknowledged that the Organisation had been naïve 
regarding extremist Islam when he described ASIO’s pre-9/11 incentives as directed 
toward “what could loosely be termed ‘traditional targets’…that could be identified and 
investigated using tried and proven methods.”246  
An attempt at rapid shift in incentives and priorities produced an environment 
where ASIO officers hastily leapt at new goals rather than systematically building lawful 
and cooperative bridges to accomplish their mission. As Cain observed, “illegal actions 
of the ASIO agents and AFP officers, as in the [terrorist suspect Izhar] ul-Haque case, 
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were understandable…These intelligence officers were young men and women keen to 
build some sort of career in the intelligence agencies and the AFP.”247  Shifts or blending 
of cultural incentives can also cause mission confusion. In the 2011–2012 report 
terrorism was ASIO’s “most immediate” concern.248 In the same report, however, ASIO 
counted espionage as “an enduring and first-order threat to Australia’s security.”249 While 
ASIO may well be correct to diversify its portfolio, the Organisation’s reactive and 
fluctuating message presents an array of “primary” incentives.  
3. ASIO’s Allocation of Resources 
ASIO’s turn toward counterterrorism was evident in its resource allocation. In  
a decade, ASIO’s budget grew 471 percent, from AUD $69 million (equivalent USD 
$72.5 million) to AUD $400 million (equivalent USD $420 million) in 2001.250 It may be 
naturally presumed that ASIO earmarked the funds for counterterrorism, but its internal 
funding allocations are classified. ASIO’s activities, restructuring, and statements, 
however, help confirm the presumption that the service thrust the preponderance of its 
resources at counterterrorism. Specifically, some, such as Chalk, estimated that since the 
turn of the century ASIO has dedicated approximately 80 percent of its resources to 
counterterrorism work.251  
Increased funding allowed ASIO to alter its organizational structure to emphasize 
counterterrorism. Still, ASIO was slow to adjust. In 2005 the Australian government 
commissioned the Allan Taylor Review, which concluded that ASIO was not wholly 
                                                 
247 Cain, Terrorism and Intelligence in Australia, 277. 
248 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “Publications—Report to Parliament 2011–12,” 2. 
249 Ibid., 5. 
250 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “Publications—Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security Review of Administration and Expenditure No. 7: 2007–2008,” (accessed 
November 28, 2012) http://www.asio.gov.au/Publications/Speeches-and-Statements/2009.html; Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation “Publications—Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security: Review of Administration and Expenditure No. 8: 2008–09, ASIO Submission,” (accessed 
November 28, 2012) http://www.asio.gov.au/Publications/Speeches-and-Statements/2010.html; Tom 
Hyland, “Terror Fight Costs 30 Billion,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 11, 2011 (accessed 
November 29, 2012) http://www.smh.com.au/national/terror-fight-costs-30-billion-20110910–1k3ez.html; 
Grono, “Australia’s Response to Terrorism”; Jones and Ungerer, “Australia,” 176. 
251 Chalk, “Australia,” 15–16; Grono, “Australia’s Response to Terrorism.” 
 83 
prepared to meet threats such as international terrorism, and recommended further shifts 
in ASIO’s resources.252 It was not until 2006 that ASIO created a Collection Division 
focused on terrorism, prioritized staffing and legal resources for the division, and 
separately created two units dedicated to “utilising intelligence in legal proceedings.”253 
These new units, the Executive and Legal Division and the Counter-Terrorism Litigation 
Advice Branch, met the increasing need for support to criminal prosecutions. ASIO 
further isolated counterterrorism from other topics when it moved espionage and “foreign 
interference” into a new Counter-Espionage and Interference Division. The Organisation 
also helped establish a national-level, joint, counterterrorism coordination unit within 
ASIO.254   
A turn toward terrorism gave the Organisation a chance to recover from resource 
decline following the end of the Cold War. In 1996, ASIO had to cut 50 of its 
520 positions, by 1998 it was reduced to historically low staffing, and by 2002 
resignations had jumped to a high 11.5 percent.255 Counterterrorism offered the service 
opportunity to reverse this trend. In 2005 ASIO highlighted significant terror attacks, 
such as 7/7, as cause for strengthening its numbers and its focus on counterterrorism.256 
ASIO’s website now touts its “lower than average attrition figures.”257 
As of 2012, ASIO reported that its “resources [were] directed primarily to 
countering terrorism but counter-espionage, foreign interference and counter-proliferation 
[were] also priorities.”258 ASIO’s focus on counterterrorism operations, however, may 
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have a detrimental impact on other priorities. For instance, a 2011 review by the 
Australian Human Rights Commission found that delays in completing personal security 
assessments left many asylum seekers and immigrants detained and in legal limbo 
indefinitely. The Commission also noted that ASIO failed to allocate adequate resources 
to immigration assessments.259 
4. ASIO’s Counterterrorism-centered Hiring and Training 
ASIO was slow to recruit the diverse cadre needed for counterterrorism. It was 
not until after the 2005 Taylor Review that the Organisation appears to have fully 
prioritized recruitment for counterterrorism, seeking to nearly double its force by adding 
900 officers. ASIO used diverse media and events to reach non-English speakers and 
minorities.260 Despite concerted effort, ASIO had limited success recruiting foreign 
language speaking officers, and as of June 2012 only five percent of ASIO’s workforce 
was of non-English speaking, minority, heritage.261 In 2005, ASIO contracted outside 
expertise to help “ensure [it] did not disadvantage applicants from non-English speaking 
backgrounds.”262 In contrast to these initiatives, however, ASIO admitted that while 
hiring people with Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian backgrounds was important, it 
was not ASIO’s first priority; the service prioritized investigative and analytical skills 
over ethnic diversification.263 A lack of minority officers of the demographic targeted by 
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ASIO’s counterterrorism units may have forced the service to rely on means other than 
HUMINT. According to media reporting, ASIO’s most notable success since 9/11—a 
2004–2006 operation known as Pendennis in which ASIO and the AFP tracked and 
arrested 16 suspected terrorists—began with a citizen tip-off and then extensively used 
technical intercepts to build a case.264   
If it could not hire a diverse workforce, the Organisation could still train its 
officers to work with diverse communities. By 2007, training for select ASIO officers 
included full time language instruction with in-country immersion.265 The Organisation 
also saw a need for its officers to become more culturally sensitive to their targets, noting 
that “[w]hile relevant language skills can add to the repertoire…of greater importance is 
the need for Intelligence Officers involved in collection work to be culturally aware and 
sensitive.”266 After 9/11 ASIO added courses on Islam and international terrorism, and 
indoctrination training for counterterrorism specialists included specialized training 
exercises in Australia and Thailand.267 ASIO’s attention was not limited to operations. 
Recognizing the increased exposure to the judicial system related to counterterrorism, in 
2006–2007 ASIO developed courses to train its officers on how their information may be 
used in court proceedings.268 ASIO officers, however, remained unprepared for the 
courtroom. They lacked the detailed legal knowledge, such as handling of evidence and 
admissibility of suspects’ statements, necessary for successful prosecutions.269 
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5. ASIO’s Attention to Transnational Threats 
Throughout its modern history, Australia has been outwardly focused.270 ASIO is 
no different, and its website notes that “security is not limited geographically”271 and that 
threats to Australia “may be directed by, influenced or otherwise linked to factors outside 
Australia...”272 ASIO has consistently recognized and emphasized this reality. In its most 
recent report to Parliament, ASIO highlighted that “[i]ndividuals who seek to engage in 
violence in Australia or attempt to travel overseas to train and fight are priorities for 
ASIO…”273 The report also stressed the importance of maintaining an eye on distant 
threats such as the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria. As outlined further below, 
ASIO translates this focus into robust international liaison relationships.274 
C. THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION AND CULTURE OF THE SERVICE  
ASIO presents itself as an intelligence service dedicated to clandestine collection 
of intelligence that helps prevent terrorist attacks. In message, recruitment, and training, 
the Organisation holds true to this line. In action, however, and although it is formally 
prevented from policing, ASIO has blended police-like activities with intelligence 
collection. The service parlays “intelligence investigation” of committed and planned 
offenses into a methodology that promotes “security” as a unitary agenda, combining law 
enforcement and intelligence practices. Moreover, ASIO’s counterterrorism operations 
and intimate involvement with terrorism prosecutions has begun to erase the line between 
policing and intelligence; its repertoire and culture now include tools and incentives 
traditionally attached to law enforcement organizations.   
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1. ASIO’s Genesis and History 
Designed after the British service, ASIO began as a security service with 
intelligence duties (as a purpose apart from defense or policing), but history would find it 
blending law enforcement-like investigations with forward-looking intelligence. As 
intelligence scholar Nicholas Grono noted, ASIO was intended as part of a system that 
isolated it from policing: “[t]he separation between intelligence and law enforcement in 
Australia is a reflection of the Australian intelligence community’s British heritage… 
ASIO was modeled on MI5 and the British practice of separating intelligence and law 
enforcement functions.”275 To this end, ASIO’s charter prohibited it from policing.276 
ASIO’s primary objectives, however, put it in an awkward position—countering 
subversive groups and foreign espionage was traditionally a police matter.277 As Cain 
noted: “[r]adical political groups have always provided the targets for intelligence 
collection and surveillance…but such operations were conducted by the police forces of 
the several Australian states.”278 Intensifying the blurring of roles and cultures, terrorism 
in the early 2000s brought an extension of ASIO’s powers that were more police-like 
than intelligence oriented (such as detention, search, and questioning). The modern 
Organisation has noted its attention to law enforcement-style investigations: “ASIO’s 
work necessarily has a strong focus on ‘investigation’ because it has to resolve security 
intelligence questions such as the relevance to security of particular activities, the threat 
posed by the activities of persons and groups of security concern, and harm done to 
national security interests through those activities.”279 Cain highlighted the exacerbated  
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shift in culture when he noted, “a battery of anti-terrorist legislation and the conversion of 
ASIO into a form of secret police, as the means for thwarting a possible terrorist 
attack.”280  
2. ASIO’s Intelligence-centered Hiring and Training 
ASIO attempted to hire officers for intelligence-oriented positions, prioritizing 
analytical skills. ASIO, however, found it difficult to attract the right personnel.281 Due 
in part to a large number of new positions to fill, the program fell short and, as of 2007, 
ASIO was unable to attract enough qualified analysts. To reduce the hiring gap, the 
Organisation turned toward “targeted advertising” and financial incentives to attract new 
recruits, but recruitment still lagged.282  
Where its recruitment efforts missed, the Organisation’s training was on the mark. 
ASIO maintained a specialized training program for its intelligence collection officers 
and took a long view of the training process, acknowledging, “it takes several years to 
recruit and train staff to be effective in the role of intelligence collection.”283 ASIO’s 
program began with a one-year “traineeship” that included formal instruction and 
rotations to Collection Offices. Recognizing the difficulty of outsourcing specialized 
intelligence training, the Organisation then relied upon on-the-job and advanced training 
for its intelligence collection officers.284  
3. ASIO’s Emphasis on HUMINT 
ASIO’s relationship with HUMINT is complicated. The Organisation’s 
statements and officer training appear to prioritize HUMINT collection. According to a 
media interview with a 2002 ASIO trainee, ASIO’s collection officer training included 
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human source operations.285 Emphasis on HUMINT was similarly shown in ASIO’s 
2011–2012 Annual Report, which mentioned the ability of technical collection to 
“compliment” HUMINT reporting.286 Furthermore, in his assessment of Australian 
intelligence, Chalk asserted that ASIO acquired much of its covert information from 
human sources.287 
ASIO’s HUMINT endeavors, however, do not necessarily rely on long-term 
penetrations of terrorist networks. Rather, ASIO has relied on informants drawn from 
post-arrest plea bargains, detainee interrogations, local police information, and 
community-based networks. ASIO ran an extensive civic outreach program, known as the 
Community Contact Program, and participated in the National Security (phone) Hotline, 
as a means to enhance its HUMINT reporting.288 Hence, while ASIO used human 
sources, and productively capitalized on all HUMINT means available to it, this study’s 
review of open-source materials offered few examples of counterterrorism successes 
derived from traditional agent penetrations of terrorist cells.289 This matter is not without 
consequence. As noted in previous chapters, and by the post-9/11 discourse, there is a 
significant difference between long-term agent penetrations of terrorist networks and law 
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Gereben Schaefer, Posner, Crumpton, and alluded to by the 9/11 Commission, the latter 
may lead to short-term assets that support reactive and near-term actions rather than 
predictive, long-term, operations. 290  
Furthermore, it is of note that ASIO relies heavily on technical intercepts to build 
its case and collect evidence, as would a police service.291 For instance, in 2011–2012 
ASIO sought enhanced authority to intercept phone and e-mail traffic, justified by DG 
Irvine as “critically important” to ASIO. 292 While the request made operational sense, it 
highlighted the Organisation’s heavy reliance on technical means; a reliance that 
appears—based on unclassified reporting—to not simply “complement,” but perhaps 
equal, reliance on HUMINT.  
4. ASIO’s Intelligence-led Incentives 
ASIO recognizes the need for an intelligence-led culture. DG Irvine outlined his 
thinking in 2012:  
First and foremost, preventative action requires intelligence. In this sense, 
the counterterrorism function, with its focus on prediction and prevention 
of threat differs qualitatively from much of the work conducted by law 
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enforcement authorities with their emphasis on the investigation and 
collection of evidence in respect of crimes already committed.293  
On paper, the service maintains these cultural values and incentives. Additionally, its 
senior ranks are pulled from the intelligence corps, in particular its intelligence analysts. 
As of 2009, ASIO promoted officers with backgrounds in security studies, international 
relations, and foreign language fluency.294 Additionally, at least two of ASIO’s 12 DG’s 
have had a significant intelligence background: DG Irvine is the former head of ASIS, 
and former ASIO DG Harvey Barnett (1981–1985), was an ASIS officer.295  
ASIO’s turn toward counterterrorism, however, has drawn the Organisation 
increasingly toward law enforcement incentives, such as preparation of evidence and 
successful prosecution, and as aptly noted by Jones and Ungerer, “…new ASIO 
legislation moved the organization into the arena of preemptive policing.”296 Prior to 
2003, the Australian criminal code blandly referred to “politically motivated violence” as 
a means to avoid legitimizing terrorism’s proponents. After new legislation was 
introduced in 2003, however, terrorism became a codified criminal offense and ASIO’s 
boss, the Attorney General, now determines whether or not a group should be proscribed 
under terrorism laws. As the counterterrorism arm of the Attorney General, ASIO became 
part-and-parcel of the justice apparatus. ASIO’s internal incentives followed, shifting 
toward successful prosecutions wherein related operations, such as surveillance, require 
warrants based on evidence of a crime.297 
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While ASIO considers its counterterrorism work as the “investigation” of threats 
that can include “referrals to law enforcement partners,”298 often the service became a de 
facto police force, conducting law enforcement-driven investigations, handing over the 
reigns in the final moments.299 As such, incentives shifted toward a law enforcement 
culture and reactive operations. In a 2002 interview, an ASIO trainee inadvertently 
highlighted the problem—speaking to the legal threshold required to meet civil liberty 
safeguards, she noted, “[y]ou have to almost prove your case (against someone) before 
you can do it.”300 Notably, as part of its evaluation of the service’s performance, and that 
of its officers, ASIO now formally assesses “support to prosecutions.”301 
Shifting incentives toward supporting judicial process has been problematic for 
the Organisation and the Australian courts. For example, in the 2006 trial of Faheem 
Lodhi on charges of plotting to conduct bombing attacks in Sydney, the trial judge noted 
that ASIO, “for all its skill in intelligence gathering, is perhaps not well equipped to 
gather evidence for a criminal trial; and its individual agents are not well tutored in the 
intricacies of the criminal law relating to procedure and evidence.”302 
These weaknesses were evident in the trials of terrorism suspects Izhar ul-Haque 
and Mohammed Haneef. In 2004, the case against ul-Haque fell apart when the court 
determined that ASIO’s loose interview practices and mishandling of a search warrant 
made ul-Haque’s prior admissions to ASIO officers inadmissible. Subsequently, in 2007, 
perfunctory ASIO information indicating a potential tie to the 2007 Glasgow Airport, 
Scotland, bombing led to the 12-day detention of Indian doctor Mohamed Haneef, but 
confusion within police and border control elements over how to handle ASIO’s 
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intelligence led to Haneef’s release. An inquiry into handling of the matter revealed a 
conflict of methods between ASIO and law enforcement agencies. As legal scholar Kent 
Roach noted, “[t]he changing relationship between intelligence and evidence means that 
in many cases, intelligence investigations will overlap with criminal investigations. 
Police forces will have to deal with the ambiguities of intelligence, and intelligence 
agencies will have to deal with the evidential demands of criminal law.”303  
D. THE SERVICE’S ABILITY TO ACQUIRE AND MAINTAIN PUBLIC 
TRUST 
ASIO’s reputation is a victim of history. During the 1950s-1980s, extreme 
secrecy, allegations that it withheld information from elected officials, and aggressive use 
of its loosely defined mandate—drawing accusations that it occasionally violated its 
authorities—soiled ASIO’s reputation. More recently, public acceptance of civil liberty 
curtailments in pursuit of safety from terrorism helped abate pre-9/11 public suspicion; as 
ASIO’s mission turned toward counterterrorism its actions were more widely accepted. 
That said, ASIO remained isolated from its constituency and, in a business where 
diversity aids operational success, it failed to recruit minorities and foreign language 
specialists in significant numbers. 
1. ASIO’s Openness Policies and Public Outreach Efforts 
ASIO has a long history of extreme secrecy.304 Per Cain, “[s]ecrecy was to be 
ASIO’s hallmark of operation.”305 In the early 1900s, ASIO’s predecessor organizations 
operated under confidentiality policies so strict that opposition party leaders were not 
informed of their existence. For example, in 1947 the head of Australia’s Department of 
External Affairs, John Burton, was surprised to find that a small cabal known as the 
“Gnomes of Melbourne” was almost solely responsible for generating Australian  
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intelligence policy. One member of the group, the Director of Military Intelligence, went 
so far as to ask Burton to swear an oath to keep secret from his elected superiors 
information he received from the group.306  
In addition to a culture of self-imposed censorship, through the 1990s ASIO had 
limited engagement with the press. When ASIO engaged the media, it may have done so 
with impropriety. For example, in the 1970s the Organisation’s, now disbanded, Special 
Project Section sought to build press relationships as means to acquire and manipulate 
information. The 1977 RCIS called these relationships “improper in the extreme.” 307 In 
partial response to the criticisms, in 1985 ASIO created the position of Media Liaison 
Officer as a mechanism to normalize media relations, and from the 1990s implemented 
initiatives—such as a website (www.ASIO.gov.au)—to acquire public support for its 
mission and activities.308 
ASIO’s newfound openness extended into the 2000s. In commemoration of its 
60th Anniversary in 2009, ASIO commissioned a historian from the Australian National 
University to write “an independent and scholarly history of ASIO” during the period of 
1949–1989. Additionally, in the same year ASIO began releasing records through 1979; 
the Australian Archives Act of 1983 made it possible for ASIO to release documents 
more than 30 years old.309 Although these efforts signified enhanced openness, stopping 
information flow at 1989 hides the Organisation’s present work (in contrast to MI5’s 
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needs, in limiting the release ASIO may divert publicity for its more widely accepted 
counterterrorism work to its more controversial counter-subversion efforts of the 1950s-
1970s.310  
The Organisation’s openness includes its senior officials.311 ASIO now has two 
publicly identified figures: DG Irvine and the Deputy DG of Corporate Strategy, Kerri 
Hartland.312 Both give speeches and, in a marked shift from years past, sit for media 
interviews. In 2012, Irvine outlined ASIO’s policy on openness: “ASIO seeks to make 
available as much information as possible about the work of the Organisation within 
national security constraints…I am committed to continuing this focus on increased 
public engagement.”313 Irvine kept true to his word. In the Fall of 2012, when the media 
questioned ASIO’s request for additional technical surveillance powers, Irvine went 
before the press to explain ASIO’s position.314 
2. ASIO’s Hiring Practices 
Despite efforts to increase minority hiring, ASIO has been a service 
predominantly comprised of white, Christian, men and women with limited language 
skills. The Organisation’s efforts to increase minority hiring, however, are hampered by 
Australian demographics. As of the 2006 census, half of the nation was female, 
92 percent were white, 1.7 percent claimed to be Muslim, and only 21.5 percent of the 
population claimed to speak a language other than English.315 Hence, ASIO is reflective 
of its community: of its 1,812 staff in June 2012, 44 percent were women and five 
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percent were of “non-English speaking background.”316 Despite this statistical 
disadvantage, ASIO tried to hire from minority communities. As evidence, its 2005–2006 
hiring advertisements prominently showed minorities (e.g., an Asian female).317 ASIO’s 
public face—the DG—however, has not necessarily enhanced an image of minority 
equality. Despite traditionally filling the position from outside ASIO to avoid perceptions 
of nepotism, all of its 12 directors have been white, upper-class, males. This gender bias 
may extend to ASIO’s senior ranks, which as of 2011 was filled by 33 percent women 
(compared to 44 percent across all grades).318 
3. ASIO’s Support to Oversight and Control 
ASIO’s charter placed it under civilian control as a measure to secure, per then 
Attorney General Herbert V. Evatt, “public confidence in the reasonable protection of 
civil rights and liberty.”319 Despite its origins, however, habitual secrecy and 
manipulation of legislation allowed ASIO to define the extent of government control over 
its activities. For example, drafted with heavy ASIO input, the ASIO Act of 1956 was 
intended to make the Organisation less vulnerable to government power shifts. Fearing 
change in the ruling party would mean the end of ASIO, DG Charles Spry (1950–1970) 
helped tailor the ASIO Act of 1956, which moved ASIO from a contractual charter to a 
statutory basis. Spry’s 1956 Act also provided him power to conduct operations largely 
free of oversight.320 
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ASIO’s independence was emboldened through the 1970s.321 Although the 
Attorney General was formally responsible for the Organisation’s operations, the ASIO 
Act of 1979 placed ASIO operations under the control of the DG, intending to ensure 
communication across partisan aisles. The 1979 Act, however, also reduced the Attorney 
General’s ability to override the DG’s decisions.322 As highlighted by Hocking, “ASIO 
emerged in the 1980s not only intact, but with greatly expanded powers and a diminution 
of ministerial accountability in key areas.”323 ASIO kept relatively hidden from 
government oversight until the 1986 Amendment to the ASIO Act of 1979 enhanced the 
ability of the elected government to oversee operations. The Amendment moved approval 
authority for ASIO’s operating guidelines up from the DG to the Attorney General and 
created the PJCIS. Shortly thereafter, the government created the independent office of 
the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) to oversee intelligence 
operations. By many accounts, ASIO respected IGIS’ authority.324 
ASIO of 2012 was a different creature than before 1986.325 A service that once 
hid from oversight now touted the importance of oversight mechanisms. In a February 
2012 speech, DG Irvine alluded to ASIO’s support: “…I continue to believe that the 
majority of Australians expect their governments to take all necessary action to protect 
the community and…strike an appropriate balance between the civil rights of the 
community and those of the individual—and put in place an effective accountability 
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regime.”326 ASIO now has an in-house legal team and responds to IGIS inquiries. 
Additionally, once every three months ASIO section chiefs submit a performance review 
to the DG. These reports, along with a semiannual assessment and a year-end report to 
Parliament, serve as a means to assess ASIO’s adherence to guidelines. Also, as required 
by Section 21 of the ASIO Act 1979, the DG regularly briefs the opposition party Leader 
on security matters. Furthermore, ASIO has introduced mechanisms to train its new 
officers on accountability and control.327   
4. ASIO’s Actions that Violated Mandate and Impacted Public Trust 
According to Chalk, “[w]hile by no means blemish free, [ASIO’s] overall track 
record has been largely devoid of major controversies and scandals…”328 Some critics 
were not so kind. Prominent Australian Barrister Ian Barker Q.C. once commented that 
anyone linked to a trial involving the Organisation would know “that its agents habitually 
act outside their powers and routinely abuse them, always in secret.”329 ASIO’s 
“blemishes” have had a negative impact on public trust. That impact, however, may be 
bifurcated into the pre- and post-counterterrorism eras. Previously, ASIO was labeled a 
politicized force that viewed its mandate with a sweeping eye and defined lawful dissent 
as subversive. More recently, ASIO’s counterterrorism mission has garnered less 
cynicism. Infrequent missteps and efforts to expand its powers, however, have also raised 
concern over the Organisation’s effectiveness and the lengths it is willing to go to support 
its definition of security. 
Like many Western services, ASIO spent its post-WWII years eyeing Communist 
subversives, and until 1979 when its mandate was better defined, ASIO’s interpretation 
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of the term “subversive” received heavy criticism. ASIO’s activities indicated a definition 
so broad it ensnared individuals acting in accordance with dissenting public opinions, and 
in 1977 a government commission criticized ASIO for equating left-wing or liberal with 
subversive.330 In the early 1970s, news stories broke that the state police had collected 
information for ASIO on political dissidents, union leaders, and opposition party 
members, for political rather than security reasons. In contrast to its charter, which noted 
it “essential that the security service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias 
or influence. . .,” ASIO allegedly operated to protect the conservative ruling party. Critic 
of ASIO and journalist Jeff Sparrow claimed “…ASIO had been largely unaccountable 
and had been used as a political tool during the long reign of the Liberal-Country Party 
coalition from 1949 to 1972.”331   
Examples of ASIO’s alleged political agenda and violation of mandate are 
abundant. In 1974, for instance, an ASIO investigation into Deputy Prime Minister Jim 
Cairns came to light, highlighting the Organisation’s apparent politicization. Per media 
and government reporting, ASIO investigated Cairns because he expressed political 
positions and supported protests in-line with socialist principals touted by the Communist 
Party of Australia.332 Similarly, following Croatian separatists’ bombings of Yugoslavian 
offices in Australia during 1971–1972, ASIO reported to the left-leaning Labour Party 
that the Croatian threat was isolated and would not expand.333After hearing that a 
contradictory classified report existed, believing that his party had been purposefully 
misled, Attorney-General designate and Labour Party Senator Lionel Murphy went to 
ASIO headquarters and demanded to review files on the matter. Murphy claimed the files 
revealed a more serious threat than he was led to believe—including terrorist training 
camps in Australia—and that ASIO intended to withhold from the new Labour 
government information that contradicted the former government’s positions.334 
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Notable for this study, as critics and government commissions indicated, left 
without formal ministerial guidance for most of its existence, by the mid-1970s ASIO 
was not fully responsible to the elected representatives of government—nor had it made 
an apparent effort to be so. As ASIO’s aggressive interpretation of its mandate came to 
light, however, the government shortened its leash. The ASIO Act of 1979 prohibited 
interference with lawful political expression and outlined the DG’s responsibilities as “to 
keep the Organisation free from any influences or considerations, including political, not 
relevant to its functions.” 335 Furthermore, in 1984, the Royal Commission on Australian 
Security and Intelligence Agencies (RCASIA) recommended that Australian services be 
made more accountable than in previous years.336 Years of operations perceived as 
politicized had permanently tarnished ASIO’s reputation. Hocking aptly noted, “ASIO’s 
operations were seen as being based in considerations other than security. The allegation 
that still demands consideration today—that ASIO acted as the political police of the 
Liberal-Country Party Government.”337 
When counterterrorism took a front seat and its powers expanded, increasing risk 
of public worry over civil liberties and potential for abuse, modern ASIO leadership 
made an effort to adhere to mandate and to advise the public of its powers and agenda. 
For example, in 2002 a bill put before Parliament sought to extend the Organisation’s 
authority to include hostile interrogations and detention of individuals—including 
children 14 to 18 years old—for questioning. Noting these controversial provisions, 
ASIO contributed to a report critical of the bill.338 Additionally, when it assessed a need 
for expanded powers to combat terrorism, ASIO publically requested these special 
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authorities.339 ASIO appears to have used its powers sparingly: between 2003 and 2007 
ASIO executed only 15 questioning warrants and, as of 2007, ASIO claimed it had not 
used its detention powers.340 
Despite this, two recent incidents raise concern over ASIO’s willingness to violate 
its authority. First, in 2007 when the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, 
dismissed charges against ul-Haque, it also found that ASIO officers had illegally 
kidnapped and falsely imprisoned ul-Haque.341 Second, in 2011, the IGIS investigated 
ASIO for actions related to the 2001–2005 detention of Australian citizen Mamdouh 
Habib.342 Despite indications of gross exaggeration by Habib regarding claims of torture, 
and the IGIS’ finding that ASIO should have warned the government of Habib’s transfer 
to Egypt but that it did not have a role in Habib’s detention or hostile interrogation, 
ASIO’s reputation took a hit. 343  
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Much of the recent criticism levied against ASIO, however, has not come from its 
counterterrorism work. Rather, it has been criticized for incidents related to its 
assessments in support of immigration security.344 For example, in October 2012, 
Australia’s High Court declared that the indefinite detention of Sri Lankan asylum 
seekers—based on ASIO’s derogatory security assessment—was illegal.345 ASIO is 
aware of the need to isolate itself from legal determinations that exceed its mandate (to 
provide intelligence assessments, not serve as an immigration court). For example, in 
2012, when IGIS recommended that ASIO provide advice regarding the detention of 
persons for whom it has provided adverse security assessments, ASIO sought to avoid 
doing by noting that advising on these matters lay outside its authority.346 
5. Public Opinion of ASIO 
As noted above, ASIO has a mixed reputation. The Australian news outlet The 
Age summarized: “[f]or much of its 51-year history, ASIO has been divisive. The left saw 
it as full of trench-coated right-wingers serving their masters…Now, ASIO finds itself in 
the novel position of being embraced as a key protector of Australian lives.”347 ASIO 
was aware of its tenuous reputation. In its 2011–2012 Annual Report, ASIO noted that 
“[a]n enduring concern—but unfortunate reality—is the often unfounded speculation and 
commentary about ASIO’s activities.”348 Despite the salvation of reputation brought by 
its counterterrorism mission, however, ASIO occasionally gave its critics cause to gloat. 
For example, after decades aggressively fighting Communist influences, in 1993 the AFP 
arrested an ASIO officer, George Sadil, on charges that he had spied for the Soviet Union 
for more than a decade.349 More recently, in 2001, ASIO mistakenly raided the home of  
Australian Bilal Daye—its warrant was for a grocery store down the road. Added to 
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which, the 2007 muddled arrest and release of doctor Haneef only exacerbated a 
perception of ASIO folly.350 
Despite these examples, supporters make the valid point that ASIO has not 
received due credit for its successes—successes such as Operation Pendennis,351 the 
2006 conviction of terrorism plotter Abu Hamza (aka Faheem Khalid Lodhi), and the 
deportation and arrest in France of his associate Willie Brigitte.352 More recently, in 2012 
ASIO received a “98 percent-positive” feedback rating on its reporting and an 
independent review indicated that ASIO’s efforts had contributed to the worldwide 
security effort.353 ASIO’s good work has not gone entirely unnoticed by the public. One 
indication of positive public opinion was the rise in applications to ASIO, which tripled 
from 500 in 2000 to 1500 in 2002.354 Although ASIO’s counterterrorism-related powers 
to detain, question, and intercept technical communications raise natural concerns, there 
is broad indication that Australians accept ASIO’s tactics. A 2005 Age-Poll survey of 
Australians indicated support for aggressive counterterrorism security methods that may 
                                                 
350  Tom Allard, “ASIO Settles Out of Court Over Botched Raid Case,” Sydney Morning Herald, 
November 2, 2005 (accessed November 28, 2012) http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/asio-settles-out-
of-court-over-botched-raid-case/2005/11/01/1130823210697.html; Amnesty International, “Dr. 
Mohammed Haneef’s Case,” September 11, 2011 (accessed November 29, 2012) 
http://www.amnesty.org.au/hrs/comments/dr_mohamed_haneef/; Jamie Walker, “Mohamed Haneef 
Returns to Australia for Compensation Claim,” The Australian, December 17, 2010 (accessed November 
29, 2012) http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/mohamed-haneef-returns-to-australia-for-
compensation-claim/story-fn59niix-1225972636367; Cain, Terrorism and Intelligence in Australia, 214–5; 
Chalk, “Australia,” 41.   
351 Kissane, “Tip-off”; Miller, “National Security.” 
352 Miller, “National Security.” Hamza and Brigitte were suspected of planning to attack Sydney’s 
electricity grid, among other Australian targets. 
353 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “Publications—Report to Parliament 2011–12,” viii, 
17. 
354 The Age, “Why it’s ‘Really Cool’ to be a Spy.” 
 104 
cause civil liberty infringements.355 In a 2007 study, 76 percent of respondents supported 
phone intercepts and 56 percent supported indefinite detention for terrorism suspects.356 
The swell of recruits, however, has not included Muslim Australians or those with 
non-English speaking backgrounds, demographics essential to emphasizing ASIO’s role 
as equal protector.357 ASIO’s role in proscribing groups as threats may have harmed 
efforts to win support of minority populations. A 2006 Security Legislative Review 
committee noted that nearly all of the groups proscribed (many based on ASIO 
assessments) were Muslim, causing a rift with Australian Muslims.358 
E. THE SERVICE’S COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION SHARING 
WITH COMMUNITY COUNTERPARTS 
Through mandate and proactive endeavor, ASIO works closely with its 
community counterparts. Although ASIO suffered the usual police/intelligence rivalries, 
a review of ASIO’s community partnerships, officer secondments, regional and 
transnational coordination efforts, and support to coordinating bodies indicates a service 
that has a reputation for working across agencies and across countries. If ASIO projected 
one particular fault, it was the Organisation’s tendency to hide information from its own 
government during its pre-counterterrorism years.  
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1. ASIO’s Work with Community Partners 
Due largely to operational necessity, ASIO is known for working with the 
Australian intelligence community and, in particular, Australian state and national police. 
This positive state of cooperation, however, was not always ASIO’s trademark. As noted 
above, in its early years ASIO purposefully kept tight reigns on its information—to 
include withholding information from its own government.359 The ASIO Act of 1956 
dictated that ASIO cooperate with government departments, but cooperation levels were 
determined by ASIO, not the government.360 In 1979, the atmosphere within ASIO began 
to shift and it came to view communication as beneficial. The result of ASIO’s legislative 
stewardship and independent inquiries, the ASIO Act of 1979 tasked ASIO to work with 
its intelligence counterparts, law enforcement entities, and foreign partners.361  
ASIO appears to have held true to the spirit of the 1979 Act. According to its 
website, as of June 2009 ASIO maintained liaison relationships with “316 authorities in 
122 countries.” 362 In support of these relationships ASIO places its representatives 
abroad and allows representatives of foreign services to take up office in Australia.363 
ASIO has personnel and information exchanges with the FBI, MI5, Canada’s CSIS, and 
the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.364 ASIO’s 2011–2012 Annual Report, 
however, revealed that new budget constraints have forced it to stem the growth of its 
overseas liaison offices.365 
ASIO’s cooperation with Australian counterparts is now considerable and 
enduring. A 2012 ASIO report highlights “the establishment of agreements and protocols 
with our close law enforcement and intelligence partners which aim to put in place 
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arrangements to more effectively share information and coordinate our efforts.”366 
ASIO’s closest working relationship is with the police. Per Chalk, “[i]n many ways, 
ASIO-AFP interaction is a product of trust and personal relationships that have evolved 
overt time and that reflect the relatively small size of the Australian intelligence and law 
enforcement communities.”367 
The ASIO-police relationship has deep roots. During the 1970s, in reaction to 
political demonstrations and industrial labor disputes, ASIO participated in a unified 
training and financing structure with the police. ASIO also used the police to acquire 
information from Australian states and territories.368 Although the operational focus 
changed through the years, the relationships remained. As recent as 2004, ASIO trained 
in intelligence operations and tactical response with the Army and the AFP as well as 
with state police.369 The ASIO-AFP’s most heralded cooperative effort came with 
Operation Pendennis, in which ASIO worked for over a year with the police.370 In 2005, 
ASIO announced that, in response to Taylor Review recommendations, it would expand 
coordination with its law enforcement and intelligence partners. As part of this endeavor, 
ASIO made it a managerial requirement “to encourage and reinforce cooperation and 
regular engagement at the working level.”371  
Despite its generally positive nature, the ASIO-AFP relationship is not without 
the normal police/intelligence tensions. In their study of ASIO, Chalk and William 
Rosenau commented on the matter:  
While ASIO frequently does coordinate its tactical and intelligence 
operations with the AFP, it is not obliged to do so and has, on occasion, 
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deliberately withheld information on the basis of its own idiosyncratic 
calculation of the national interest. This caveat to bilateral working ties 
has caused some disquiet within the law enforcement community, eliciting 
a view that the ASIO-AFP relationship is neither two-way or, indeed, 
mutually beneficial.”  
Chalk and Rosenau went on to note that the ASIO-AFP relationship since Bali 2002 may 
have deteriorated, largely due to disagreements over jurisdiction.372 
ASIO’s cooperative efforts are not limited to government agencies. ASIO’s 
Business Liaison Unit works closely with the private sector regarding concerns such as 
espionage and information security. ASIO established the Unit in 2005 as a measure to 
facilitate information flow between the security apparatus to private businesses. 
Additionally, ASIO participates in the Trusted Information Sharing Network, which 
provides relevant, sensitive, information to the business and scientific communities.373  
2. ASIO’s Secondments and Regional Offices 
ASIO uses secondments as a means to train its officers and enhance inter-agency 
cooperation. An officer is expected to serve on secondment to ASIS or the AFP at some 
point in their career. Reverse secondments are also a regular occurrence. 374 As host to 
the NTAC, ASIO opens its doors to officers from the AFP, ASIS, DSD, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, New South Wales Police, and Defense, among others.375 
ASIO’s secondments are not limited to Australian counterparts. In support of its overseas 
work and liaison relationships, ASIO offers exchange opportunities for close allies.376 
Also, as a means to enhance interoperability, ASIO provides briefers and participants to 
joint-intelligence community courses.377 It has also sought to enhance connectivity with 
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customers throughout Australia by opening regional offices in each of the six Australian 
States, in addition to the Northern and Capital Territories.378  
3. ASIO’s Support to Coordinating Bodies 
Following 9/11 and the Bali bombings of 2002, a string of new counterterrorism-
related bodies sprang up throughout the intelligence community. As the primary 
counterterrorism intelligence service, the Organisation provides intelligence to, and 
works closely with, post-9/11 coordination elements such as the Australian National 
Intelligence Coordination Committee. Moreover, since 2010, ASIO has played host to the 
Counter-Terrorism Control Centre and the NTAC.379 The Organisation has also provided 
representatives to the nation’s Joint Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit to enhance 
communication with the police,380 and as of at least 2007 it managed the Technical 
Support Unit (TSU), which provides specialized technical counterterrorism support to 
police and the Australian Defence Forces.381 Furthermore, in order to enhance its 
cooperation with police and coordinating bodies, ASIO utilizes a nationalized computer 
system.382 
4. ASIO’s Missteps  
ASIO was not often criticized for a lack of communication with its counterparts. 
Although the standard police/intelligence and federal/local tensions over primacy and 
jurisdiction occurred, they were not out of the norm nor have they had a marked impact 
on operations. One incident, however, highlights the Organisation’s potential to misstep. 
After the 2002 Bali bombings, ASIO was criticized because it failed to share appropriate 
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information with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the body 
responsible for issuing travel warnings to Australians overseas. When the post-bombing 
inquiry found a lack of communication between ASIO and DFAT, ASIO admitted to 
over-compartmentalization of its information. The problem of undue secrecy, however, 
appears to have been largely relegated to the counter-subversive era of the 1950s-1970s. 
As author Michael Wesley noted, there was little concern over further missteps: 
“…beyond this isolated problem, there was a degree of confidence in the [Australian 
intelligence community] that the same scale of communication and responsibility failure 
would not occur [inside] Australia…”383 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter evaluated ASIO against the four characteristics desired in a potential 
American domestic service. First, with regard to the primacy of the counterterrorism 
mission, it is clear that ASIO began as a counterespionage and counter-subversion 
organization.384 Some, such as Hocking, viewed the late 1970s as “the arrival of 
terrorism in Australia,” and “the impetus for transformation of ASIO’s mission toward 
counterterrorism.”385 It is true that in response to the Hilton bombing counterterrorism 
was formally added to the Organisation’s mandate in the ASIO Act of 1979. Nonetheless, 
“terrorism” was so broadly defined, and remained tied in application to political 
subversion, that it encompassed disruptive protest and active dissent as well as targeted 
violence.386 Furthermore, ASIO maintained a diverse set of non-counterterrorism 
priorities into the early 2000s. Hence, although the national political system may have 
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turned its attention toward terrorism, the Organisation arguably could not be considered a 
counterterrorism-centered service in the modern sense until the events of 9/11 and Bali 
2002 dictated change; when it proactively adjusted its organizational structure, recruiting 
methods, and training in a manner that aimed its mission and resources directly at 
terrorism. That said, although it advertises counterterrorism as its primary mission, and 
has dedicated a preponderance of its resources in support of such, ASIO remains 
dedicated to an exhaustive breadth of missions that have at times reduced its ability to 
service all needs (for example immigration assessment gaps). Moreover, despite its 
attention to transnational threats—and although foreign environments are principally the 
realm of ASIS and the Foreign Ministry—the persistent threat of terrorism surprised the 
Organisation when Australian facilities and citizens were violently attacked overseas in 
2002, 2004, 2005, and 2009.387 
Second, with regard to having an intelligence-led focus and culture, ASIO 
projects itself as a service dedicated to predictive intelligence collection and demonstrates 
this in its resource allocation, hiring efforts, and training programs. Since 2001–2002, 
however, in its HUMINT operations, acquisition of police-like authorities, and 
involvement in criminal prosecutions, ASIO has drifted from its intelligence moorings.388 
Like MI5, with the criminalization of terrorism and an increased role in prosecutions, the 
Organisation found itself directly engaged with the judicial system. Incentives began to 
shift and by 2005 “support to prosecutions” and “preemptive investigations” (that relied 
on evidence of a crime) had begun to dictate cultural values. ASIO now appears to be a 
hybrid; a “preventative-policing” service that uses intelligence.  
Third, ASIO has been reasonably effective at earning and sustaining the public 
trust—in recent years. The Organisation has done so through a proactive public outreach 
program and, since 9/11, active support of oversight and control mechanisms. 
Additionally, although the service has had difficulty hiring minorities, its workforce is 
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gender-diverse and ethnically representative of a highly homogenous population. 
Admittedly, prior to the turn of the century ASIO’s ability to earn public trust was eroded 
by its excessive secrecy and political bias, but since its turn toward counterterrorism, the 
Organisation’s reputation has improved. ASIO has its detractors, but skepticism as to its 
motives is usually rooted in ASIO’s past than its current endeavors. As illustration, recent 
criticism of ASIO’s occasional investigative folly or the overstepping of legal authority 
have been chalked up to confusion within the shifting legal framework or from officers 
being too aggressive in execution of their popularly-supported mission. Public distrust 
over the expansion of ASIO’s counterterrorism authorities (intercept, detention, and 
questioning) revolved more around the legislation and related potential for civil liberty 
infringements than distrust of ASIO. This has been helped by ASIO’s efforts to advertise 
its mission and mechanisms, coupled with the lack of a domestic attack and multiple 
operational “successes.”  
Lastly, ASIO’s sharing of information and collaboration with its counterparts has 
been excellent. Given operational need and mandate, ASIO maintained a robust 
relationship with Australian national, territorial, and state police. These relationships 
included information and personnel exchanges as well as significant cooperation during 
lengthy investigations. In support of its role as lead-counterterrorism agency, ASIO 
created, housed, supported, and seconded officers to regional offices and national-level 
intelligence fusion elements. Additionally, ASIO has traditionally paid close attention to 
its international liaison relationships, relationships that will pay dividends in the fight 
against transnational terrorism. 
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IV. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT AND LESSONS 
This study endeavors to contribute to the debate over the need for a new domestic 
intelligence service in America, identifying service-specific characteristics desired in a 
post-9/11 service and isolating them from existing system-dependent evaluations. Chapter 
I identified the endogenous characteristics deemed ideal in a domestic intelligence 
service by policymakers, pundits, and academics during the post-9/11 discourse:  
1) Counterterrorism should be the service’s primary mission.  
2) The service’s function should be predictive intelligence gathering and its 
culture intelligence led.  
3) The service should support the protection of civil liberties and earn the 
trust of the populace.  
4) The service should collaborate and share information with its security 
community partners.   
The study used these characteristics as a lens through which to evaluate two foreign 
services relevant to the debate—Britain’s MI5 and Australia’s ASIO. Chapters II and III 
assessed that, although MI5 and ASIO have storied and successful histories, the 
characteristics desired in the post-9/11 discourse were difficult to achieve in the modern 
counterterrorism context and did not fully manifest in “ideal” form in either service. In 
concluding the study, this chapter will synthesize key observations from the above 
qualitative assessments and offer lessons drawn from these assessments that may further 
debate in the United States.   
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR MI5 AND ASIO 
First, with regard to counterterrorism as the primary mission, both MI5 and ASIO 
began as counterespionage services focused on thwarting foreign and domestic efforts to 
sabotage national interests and influence politics. By 2012 they had transformed into 
services driven by counterterrorism missions, but to varying degrees. Motivated by a 
persistent and immediate threat, and despite difficulty hiring officers with a background 
necessary for counterterrorism, MI5 was nearer the “ideal,” strongly focused on fighting  
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terrorism since at least the late 1980s. Preoccupation with IRA terrorism, however, 
delayed MI5’s proactive shift toward the looming threat of transnational Islamic 
terrorism.  
ASIO too was focused on terrorism. Contrary to its mandate and separate authors’ 
assessments that ASIO was counterterrorism-led by the end of the 1970s, this study found 
that, while Australian officials may have been acknowledged the threat, ASIO did not 
make a full transition until the attacks of 2001–2002, hence failing to reach the ideal.389 
This late transition was partly due to external factors such as a lack of persistent and 
immediate threat to the homeland and shifting definitions of counterterrorism. Moreover, 
it was also largely the result of internal issues, including maintenance of an exhaustive set 
of mission priorities beyond counterterrorism that diluted ASIO’s counterterrorism focus 
and corrupted related incentives.  
Second, in training, mission statement, and rhetoric, both services historically had 
an intelligence-driven mission and espoused a desire to focus on, and incentivize, the 
collection of predictive intelligence, but both fell short of the prescribed ideal. The rise of 
transnational and Islamic terrorism served to draw both services into sustained 
engagement with terrorism-related judicial processes, and a previously recognizable lean 
toward predictive intelligence collection faded for MI5 and ASIO. The inclination to 
conduct long-term, HUMINT-propelled operations was ceded to shorter-ranging 
operations in support of apprehension and prosecution on the public stage. More heavily 
focused on preventative intelligence through the 1980s, MI5 was better able to sustain the 
remnants of an intelligence-led culture, resulting in a more “neutral” adherence to the 
ideal. In contrast, ASIO’s more involved history of security-related investigative work, in 
particular against political subversives, produced a service more akin to a preventive 
policing organization with intelligence duties.390 Consequently, when the tide of  
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intelligence-based terrorism prosecutions washed over the service after 2002, it was 
easily swept toward methods and incentives that appeared more law enforcement-led than 
intelligence-led. 
Third, with regard to civil liberties and the public trust, both services benefited 
from the popularity of counterterrorism endeavors, generally adhered to their 
counterterrorism mandate, and were reasonably successful at securing the public trust. 
Despite this success, neither service was able to fully divorce itself from the controversial 
counter-subversion and counterespionage operations of their past. MI5’s work to enhance 
openness, increase public engagement, and improve hiring opportunities for minorities 
was a notable improvement over its secretive and nepotistic past. Its reputation for having 
a politicized history, failure to stop the attacks of 7/7, and civil liberty infringements 
during decades fighting IRA terrorism, however, left MI5’s reputation stained—calling 
into question its motivations and harming hiring efforts, leaving it short of the ideal.391  
Similarly, ASIO was unable to overtake its legacy. ASIO’s politically controversial and 
secretive past made overcoming public distrust and cynicism difficult, in particular given 
the service’s broad application of anti-terrorism measures to include monitoring peaceful 
protest and influencing immigration practices.392   
Last, regarding collaboration and information sharing, with the exception of 
jurisdictional jealousies that naturally arise between intelligence and police peers, both 
MI5 and ASIO met the ideal. Counterterrorism necessitated day-to-day integration with 
the security counterparts, and both services took active measures to ensure effective 
collaboration and information sharing. In operational intent and resource administration, 
MI5 and ASIO became interlaced with—and often hosted—local and national law 
enforcement organizations, counterterrorism intelligence coordinating bodies, and foreign 
liaison. Table 3 depicts the qualitative assessment above. 
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Table 3.   Summary Qualitative Assessment of MI5 and ASIO 
DESIRED CHARACTERISTIC MI5 ASIO 
1 Counterterrorism as the Service’s Mission +2 +1 
2 The Intelligence Function and Culture of the Service 0 -1 
3 The Service’s Ability to Acquire and Maintain Public Trust 0 0 
4 The Service’s Collaboration and Information Sharing with Community Counterparts +2 +2 
 Summary Qualitative Assessment  +1 0 
 
Key: “+2” indicates near-ideal traits in the service; “+1” indicates traits akin to, but not, ideal, or with sharp 
limitations; “0” indicates qualitative neutrality (the service did not exhibit the ideal characteristics in a 
positive or markedly negative manner);  “-1” indicates that the service exhibited traits tending toward 
contradiction of the ideal; and “-2” (not used) would indicate traits in strong contradiction to the ideal.  
In summary, neither MI5 nor ASIO fully exhibited the four principal endogenous 
characteristics in an ideal manner as prescribed by the post-9/11 discourse. MI5 perhaps 
came closest given its near-ideal counterterrorism focus and interagency cooperation. Its 
weakness in supporting the protection of civil liberties as well as a declining culture of 
intelligence, however, raise concerns as to its value as a model to replace the FBI. 
Furthermore, this study indicates that an independent intelligence-only model—if 
evaluated on service-specific characteristics alone, and for reasons tied to execution of 
the modern-day counterterrorism mission—may not meet the expectations of the post-
9/11 discourse or offer significant contrast to a law enforcement model, regardless of the 
model’s counterterrorism effectiveness. Although this study has not found MI5 or ASIO 
ideal models for emulation, the above assessment offered several lessons to consider 
during debate over the American domestic counterterrorism intelligence apparatus. 
B. LESSONS THAT MAY FURTHER THE AMERICAN DEBATE  
Through the preceding evaluation several lessons came to light. These lessons are 
by no means exhaustive. They do not fully capture the political difficulties inherent in 
developing and deploying a national counterterrorism apparatus. Nor do the following 
points fully account for the system-derived constraints on a service and its government. 
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Nonetheless, focused assessment of ideal, endogenous, characteristics in the two services 
deemed most relevant models for a new American service provided several valuable 
lessons that may further the debate over domestic counterterrorism intelligence: 
1. In the modern political and judicial environment, an “intelligence-
only” culture and focus is an ideal that can be difficult to achieve and maintain over 
the long term. Although persistent, intelligence-led cultures and their respective 
missions become diluted and mixed over time when soaked in counterterrorism’s 
political and judicial context. An intelligence service cannot conduct its counterterrorism 
mission in a vacuum. Rather, it is influenced by, and in turn influences, community 
partners, coordinating bodies, policy, judicial processes, and politicization of terrorism as 
a mission. Despite culture and intentions, these influences steer intelligence services 
engaged in counterterrorism toward law enforcement methods, thereby both frustrating 
efforts to conform to a policing model and eroding the benefits of a culture of 
intelligence. MI5 demonstrated this issue when it became an increasingly integral part of 
U.K. terrorism trials and investigations, and subsequently lost some of its intelligence-led 
incentives.393 As MI5 became increasingly, officially, responsible for the outcome of the 
nation’s counterterrorism operations, arrests and prosecutions became a measure of 
success. The more MI5 leadership touted its support to successful prosecutions, the more 
it adopted a law enforcement-like culture.394 Per Chapter I, and as evidenced by recent 
U.K. counterterrorism operations, it follows that MI5 officers will eventually be 
incentivized to seek out short-term gains rather than devote time to recruiting a long-term 
penetration of a terrorist network.  
The cost of this shift in focus was not negligible. Pressure to support 
counterterrorism trials, in part, led to a reduced focus on long-term operations in favor of 
more immediate gains such as rounding up a local network rather than fully investigating 
their associates (e.g., MI5 missed 7/7 bombers Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shezad 
                                                 
393 Concept also in Clutterbuck, "The United Kingdom," 141. 
394 It is worth noting that MI5 may never have been far from a law enforcement role. Since its 
beginning the Service has worked closely with Scotland Yard, with the latter often serving as MI5’s 
enforcement arm. Although MI5 preaches predictive intelligence, its proximity to the “arresting end” of the 
operation brings into question its distance from executive authorities. 
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Tanweer during a previous operation, and made no apparent headway to penetrate 
attacker Parviz Khan’s higher contacts). Granted, engagement of intelligence officers in 
the courts and the subsequent development of a culture of preventive policing (one that 
includes intelligence collection, like in the ASIO model) may ultimately serve the state’s 
purposes. This study indicates, however, that a government cannot involve its intelligence 
services in the courtroom and concurrently maintain a strong and viable culture of 
forward reaching, long-term, counterterrorism operations. Penetrations will become more 
police-like (HUMINT in the form of criminal informants and community outreach) and 
operations will become near-term and defensive in nature.   
2. Judicial processes that directly involve intelligence services may 
reduce long-range predictive intelligence collection and increase police-intelligence 
service overlap. As intelligence services increasingly become integral to the process of 
anti-terrorism criminal prosecutions—and the necessarily legal processes of evidence, 
interview, and detention—it must be expected that the intelligence service will tend 
toward protection of its reputation, its officers, and its prosecution success rate. This 
protection will be achieved by adjustment of procedures toward collection of evidence in 
a manner that relies less upon assessment and prediction of future threats and more on 
removal of reasonable doubt. Given this adjustment, it is likely that police and 
intelligence services will increasingly overlap or become redundant—in particular as 
intelligence services transform their collection and information dissemination processes 
to better support enforcement of the criminal code—and service incentives will begin to 
shift. In time, a predictive intelligence organization that accepts operational failure as a 
necessary part of the process of pursuing future threats will be traded for an organization 
that is less risk adverse and seeks a preponderance of information to indicate that a crime 
has been, or will be, committed in a manner that warrants immediate legal action. 
3. Close interaction between law enforcement and intelligence services 
may also produce law enforcement-based incentives in the intelligence service. As 
services coordinate across cultures they begin to adjust their respective procedures and 
operations in a manner that shifts incentives toward a unitary methodology. For example, 
in order to acquire local-level intelligence and support counterterrorism investigations 
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geared toward prosecutions, ASIO involves the police early and intimately in 
investigations that appear to have a criminal lean with potential for arrest. According to 
the Organisation, this methodology allows it to “maximize the opportunity for law 
enforcement agencies to collect evidence.”395 While this is undoubtedly true, focusing on 
early cooperation with law enforcement agencies may have the additional consequence of 
fostering law enforcement incentives and methodologies within the intelligence agency. 
Given premature and regular interaction with law enforcement, intelligence officers may 
increasingly seek out criminal evidence to the detriment of pursuing more nebulous 
predictive intelligence. For instance, knowing that their cases are intended primarily to 
support law enforcement operations and related prosecutions—or that they themselves 
may be called to testify in court—intelligence officers may tend toward risk aversion in 
their operations; they may focus on career-enhancing “success” in the form of arrests and 
convictions rather than on more uncertain long-term operations.  
4. Despite the above, in an age of counterterrorism the gap between a 
domestic intelligence role and law enforcement responsibilities is narrow, and at 
times arbitrary. Given the immediacy of the threat and the desired end-state of arrest, 
clearly demarcating intelligence from law enforcement creates a division between 
missions that is at best narrow, and at worst non-existent. Chalk and Roseau noted, 
“…divesting the intelligence function from law enforcement has necessarily meant that 
MI5, ASIO, CSIS, and the DST have had to operate in close tandem with their respective 
national police forces in terms of terrorist arrest, detention, and general threat 
mitigation.”396 In the case of both MI5 and ASIO, the services worked so closely with 
their police counterparts as to seem one unit (in fact, their close cooperation was heralded 
by the government and incentivized within the services; e.g., Operation Pendennis). As a 
result, the police may stand merely as an extension of the intelligence service; they 
become the intelligence service’s gun and handcuffs. This reality weakens, or at least 
                                                 
395 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “Publications—Submission to the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security,” 27. 
396 Chalk and Rosenau, Confronting the Enemy Within, xiv. Treverton noted the same: “ASIO’s 
intrusive measures…generally are undertaken in conjunction with the [AFP]…” (Treverton, Reorganizing 
U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 62). 
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alters, the value of the debate outlined in Chapter I regarding the differences between 
culture—in particular the ability of police services and intelligence agencies to protect 
civil liberties by upholding due process.397  In short, system pressures may trump service 
design and responsibilities. 
5. Counterterrorism ties the service to politics. In contrast to the more 
secretive mission of counterespionage, counterterrorism may play out in the public eye 
and serve as a political lever. Given physical and immediate threat to their constituency, 
political officials are keen to appear strong on terrorism, in particular when 
counterterrorism plays out in the courts. Consequently, operational outcomes become 
political outcomes, and to capitalize politically successes must be made public. For 
instance, prosecutions are obvious measures of success. The secrecy associated with 
long-term intelligence operations that build from one source or network to the next, 
however, offers limited political reward.  
6. There are hidden advantages to intelligence-led cultures that may 
outweigh arrest and prosecution. Arrest and prosecution offer tactical but not 
necessarily strategic victory. For example, bringing an end to terrorism may require 
negotiation, or at least engagement, with terrorist leadership.398 In this vein, an advantage 
of an intelligence service having the lead in countering IRA terrorism was the ability of 
an intelligence service rather than a prosecution-oriented law enforcement service to 
broker secret negotiations between the IRA and the government. In one instance, in 
February 1993 the IRA reached out to British Prime Minister John Major via an 
intelligence service conduit. That communication sparked the series of negotiations that 
                                                 
397 See Chapter I for commentary on this debate. Council on Foreign Relations, “Does the United 
States Need a Domestic Intelligence Service?”; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Responds to Call for 
Domestic Intelligence Agency.” 
398 See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009) and Mitchell B. Reiss, Negotiating with Evil (New York: Open 
Road, 2010), for a detailed discussion of state efforts to engage and negotiate with terrorists.  
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would lead to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.399 While law enforcement services 
may very well have been capable of such an intelligence coup, given their mandate 
(arrest and prosecute) they would not likely have been the IRA’s preferred choice of 
conduit, lest IRA members become instantly subject to entrapment and arrest. 
7. Highlighting the counterterrorism mission brings public support, but 
the process of criminalizing terrorism can erode the reputation of an intelligence 
service. Counterterrorism is more popular with the public than counter-subversion or 
counterespionage. It draws new recruits and enhances asset pools. Both MI5 and ASIO 
enjoyed higher applications for employment and public support after their shift to 
counterterrorism. That said, for all of the potential strategic and legal benefits of 
criminalizing terrorism, intelligence efforts become muddled with policing when 
terrorism is treated as a distinct legal offense (rather than as an umbrella term for a 
strategy or tactic that includes separate, previously criminal, activities such as arms 
possession or conspiracy to commit murder). For example, after the Australian Security 
Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill of 2002 and related amendments were passed, 
terrorism itself became an official criminal offense. Related, ASIO’s immediate boss, the 
Attorney General, rather than the judiciary, decided whether or not a group should be 
proscribed under terrorism definitions. Consequently, as Jones and Ungerer aptly 
highlighted, this moved ASIO “into the arena of preemptive policing…[and] eroded the 
rule of law and government openness and accountability.”400  
8. Similarly, in helping to develop legislation and statutory powers, a 
service’s reputation becomes intimately connected with the results of the legislation. 
MI5 and ASIO both provided input and advice to officials responsible for drafting 
counterterrorism legislation, subsequently tying both services to both the policy process 
                                                 
399 Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History of MI5, 782. The conduit was described by 
Andrew as an “intelligence link used for secret communications.” Separate sources have indicated that the 
conduit was likely an MI6 officer (see Peter Taylor and Andrew Williams, Behind the Mask: The IRA and 
Sinn Fein, (U.S.A.: PBS Frontline, 1997), video, 225 minutes, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/etc/script.html). 
400 Jones and Ungerer, “Australia,” 177. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 
“Publications—Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security” (February 
28, 2007), 41. In Australia, the case is similar with counterespionage. The ASIO Act 1979 does not define 
espionage. Therefore, ASIO relies upon criminal code to define its counterespionage parameters. 
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and the resulting statutes. For instance, ASIO’s role in formulating anti-terrorism 
legislation and defining its own enhanced powers after 9/11 uniquely bound its reputation 
to the new legislation, and their restrictions on civil liberties.401 Regardless of the 
necessity of the enhanced authorities, their sharply limited use, and the public approval 
they received, ASIO’s active role in seeking the powers revealed its influence on policy 
and cast doubt on its ability to remain objective in pursuit of targets.402 Similarly, ASIO’s 
participation in the process of proscribing groups harmed its ability to secure the public 
trust. The Organisation’s direct participation in determining the criminality of groups or 
individuals opened the door to a perception that ASIO manipulated the list to justify its 
past or ongoing actions, or as a means to acquire political and financial support for its 
investigations. Although ASIO’s role fell within its official mandate, its direct input to 
such a process—rather than simple submission of intelligence and analysis upon which 
Australia’s lawmakers make their own legal determinations—risked public perception of 
a corruption of the process.403  
9. Despite the popularity of the counterterrorism mission, an intense 
focus on terrorism may hinder other missions. MI5 and ASIO undoubtedly placed 
greatest emphasis on the counterterrorism mission. Yet, they also maintained a focus on 
counterespionage, counterproliferation, and emerging threats.404 Despite success in these 
areas, weaknesses can be identified. MI5 was forced to poach resources and personnel 
from counterespionage and counterproliferation sections in order to meet the demands of 
counterterrorism. The resource drain, however, did not necessarily stem from operational 
matters, given that counterespionage and counterproliferation can overlap with 
                                                 
401 Cain, Terrorism and Intelligence in Australia, 235. A 2003 act that afforded ASIO the power to 
detain and question those with information in support of terrorism investigations—was drafted with heavy 
input from DG Richardson. 
402 Roach, The 9/11 Effect. 
403 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “Publications—Report to Parliament 2011–12,” 16. 
404 Clutterbuck, "The United Kingdom," 115 and 122; Lowenthal, Intelligence, 346. In 2001–2002 
MI5’s most notable operations were in the area of counterespionage (the investigation and arrest of two 
persons with access—one a British Aerospace guard, the other a BAE Systems contractor—for their 
attempts to pass sensitive information to the Russians (Andrew, Defend the Realm: the Authorized History 
of MI5, 813).  
 122 
counterterrorism.405 Rather, the drain on critical resources came from MI5’s presence in 
the courts: the service experienced a marked increase in demand on its resources due to 
the increased legal scrutiny that came with judicial review and police-like investigation 
practices.406  
10. The use of narrow and specific legal definitions, as well as rigorous 
oversight, will enhance effectiveness, the protection of civil liberties, and the 
maintenance of public trust. An intelligence service will, when allowed, use every tool 
in its toolbox to accomplish the mission at hand. Former Director of the CIA Michael 
Hayden once posited the mindset of intelligence services: “[w]e’re going to live on the 
edge…We’re pretty aggressive within the law. As a professional, I’m troubled if I’m not 
using the full authority allowed by law.”407 As evidence of the dangers of nebulous legal 
mandates, without well-defined operational boundaries ASIO extended its mission to 
meet its charter’s intent—security of the Commonwealth—in a manner that addressed 
lawful dissent as a subversive threat. Narrowing definitions for threats such as 
subversion, however, is not a straightforward solution to service overreach. Bloating of 
mission is a danger inherent to the task of acquiring predictive intelligence. For law 
enforcement agencies, a crime such as subversion is predicated upon known activities. In 
contrast, intelligence agencies are tasked to identify patterns of activity and predict 
whether they may, or may not, manifest in criminal undertaking. Contemplation becomes 
cause for investigation, which in turn risks violation of civil liberties in the form of 
premature state action. In this regard, well-defined mandates and definitions should be 
combination with rigorous internal and external oversight.408 Treverton referred to this 
matter:  
                                                 
405 As the service’s assessed, terrorists have a keen interest in weapons proliferation, may be 
supported by hostile foreign powers, and may try to penetrate the service with hostile agents. Hence, a 
service’s attention to areas such as counterespionage and counter-proliferation were symbiotic to its 
broader counterterrorism mission. 
406 U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee, “2010–2011 Intelligence and Security Committee 
Annual Report.” 
407 Famous Quotes, accessed May 30, 2012, http://www.famousquotes.com/author/michael-hayden/. 
408 Dahl, “Domestic Intelligence Today”; Bryant, “America Needs More Spies.” 
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However, effective government organizations are at collecting and using 
domestic intelligence, if they are not specifically tasked and overseen, the 
focus of intelligence activities can drift from a specific threat to broader 
views of what might be destabilizing to the nation. That, in turn, creates a 
risk that individuals will become targets of government attention because 
of mere dissent rather than the potential for violence.409 
Furthermore, if intelligence-led cultures are desired, then provision of guidelines 
from elected officials as to statutory interpretation are also instrumental for the protection 
of civil liberties (e.g., when can the service determine its limits? when does the state?).410 
Some form of discretion, however, must remain for an intelligence service to properly 
function and to avoid undue political influence. As Hocking elaborated, “ministerial 
directions may not in fact be ‘lawful’ and [service mandates] should not be interpreted as 
denying [service] discretion.” Like a soldier, the intelligence officer must be given 
leeway to determine lawful and ethical orders from unlawful and unethical orders.411 
Similarly, those who direct intelligence services must accept that in providing well-
defined boundaries and authorities they too may suffer the pain of attribution and 
political responsibility when the services act at the legal and ethical limits of their 
mandate.  
11. Reorientation of mission should be driven by anticipated need, not 
organization survival, in order to prevent the service from becoming reactive and 
shortsighted. During times of transition (e.g., from counterespionage and counter-
subversion to counterterrorism), the service’s efforts may be driven as much by a desire 
for organizational survival as mission, and that may have negative consequences. For 
example, MI5’s move into counterterrorism was born as much out of need to survive 
post-Cold War budget cuts as it was by national security. Forcing a service to transform 
quickly or face dissolution promotes organizational survival over mission. The service 
then addresses short-term, politically palatable threats with limited-risk methods rather 
than investing in long-term operations necessary to predict and prevent strategic dangers 
                                                 
409 Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence, 11. 
410 Hocking, Terror Laws, 50–51. Concepts drawn from Hocking’s assessment of Justice Hope’s 
commission to investigate ASIO.  
411 Ibid., 52. 
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to the nation. Hence, the service risks becoming reactive and may fight the “last war” not 
the next. The consequences could be grave. If, as Hewitt noted, MI5 had maintained its 
focus on transnational terrorism—in particular after recognizing the rise of Islamic 
extremism in the 1990s—rather than protecting itself by extending into organized crime-
fighting, it may have been in a better position to prevent 7/7. Although Hewitt’s 
comments are subjective and cannot be tested, they speak to the danger of a service 
reorienting its agenda to ensure survival rather than holding steady in the production of 
intelligence that predicts threats.412 
12. Related to the above, rapid transitions in mission can affect the 
service’s ability to meet new expectations. A rapid or aggressive shift in incentives, 
even when based on new threats rather than organizational survival, creates an 
environment where officers hastily leap at new goals instead of systematically building 
lawful and cooperative bridges to accomplish their mission. It can also result in failure 
when new skills are not adopted as quickly as new incentives. When ASIO was drawn 
into criminal proceedings in support of its counterterrorism mission, its officers remained 
unprepared for the courtroom. They lacked the legal knowledge regarding evidence 
chains and due process necessary for successful prosecutions. As a result, terrorist 
prosecution rates were low.413  
13. Compounding the above, fluid political expectations may lead to 
mixed results. A political desire for rapid action and public displays of state power (e.g., 
thwarted terrorist attacks and resulting arrests) corrupt the service’s ability to meet the 
expectation of gathering long ranging predictive intelligence. For example, there were 
indications that a culture of intelligence was, at least initially in the 1990s, incompatible 
with the United Kingdom’s expectations of MI5’s counterterrorism mission. Whereas 
most of the post-9/11 American discourse called for in-depth operations driven by 
intelligence to fight terrorism, British criticism chided MI5 for being too long-term 
focused. Early arrests, critics argued, would have helped save more lives than lengthy 
intelligence operations. The result was the rise of risk-averse methods that relied heavily 
                                                 
412 Hewitt, The British War on Terror. 
413 Cain, Terrorism and Intelligence in Australia, 277. 
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on near-term action and analysis over HUMINT collection.414 Unfortunately, cultures are 
difficult to adjust. As political expectations shifted away from long-term intelligence 
operations toward immediate ones, MI5 lost officers who were frustrated by its inability 
to change culture. According to critics such as Fielding and Hollingsworth, MI5’s origins 
in counterespionage stifled its ability to transition from Cold War-specific management 
methods; MI5 remained tied to bureaucracy, protocol, secrecy, and analysis as opposed 
action. This contributed to an officer attrition rate three times higher than normal, as of 
1997.415  
14. History matters, and a service may benefit from rebranding. Whether 
based in fact or fiction, MI5 and ASIO’s reputations were mixed, in particular with 
regard to protection of civil liberties. When criticism was levied against the services, 
however, it stemmed from transgressions (real or perceived) that occurred during 
counter-subversion investigations of the 1960s–1980s, wherein both were accused of 
being more a tool of the ruling political party than a national security force.416 Officers of 
the modern MI5 and ASIO, therefore, suffer the sins of their predecessors. MI5’s turn 
toward counterterrorism in the late 1980s, however, put it back on stronger footing with 
the public; its successes against the IRA and Islamic terrorists were seen as victories 
against a threat to all citizens, rather than a political party, and helped to increase public 
trust in the service. Nonetheless, as noted above, efforts to recruit minorities and improve 
media image still suffered from previously depleted public trust. In the 2000s when the 
counterterrorism mission called for increased diversification of its officer corps, MI5 
found itself closed off from ethnic and religious groups that shared its desired end state, 
but had little trust in the service. ASIO suffered a similar fate with regard to media image 
and public skepticism over its intentions, despite the popularity of its counterterrorism 
agenda. Britain and Australia, therefore, may have been better served by the rebranding 
                                                 
414 Fielding and Hollingsworth, Defending the Realm,11. 
415 Ibid., 283. 
416 Clutterbuck, "The United Kingdom," 139. For MI5, this period may not be the blemish it is often 
perceived to be. Evidence disclosed during MI5’s file release program and Christopher Andrew’s study of 
MI5 indicated that the UK had legitimate cause for concern from subversives during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Coupled with the threat of IRA terrorism, the government was prudent to investigate potential threats. 
Moreover, investigating these groups was well within MI5's official mandate. 
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of MI5 and ASIO (e.g., full restructure and renaming) or by the creation of a new service 
that was unblemished by the past.417  
15. History has also shown that openness is absolutely essential to earn 
public trust. With the obvious exception of disclosing operational methods and 
information detrimental to security, a service is well served by providing full, unfettered 
access to its leadership. Leadership can contribute to public discourse on the service’s 
mission, strategic vision, and tactics. Of the services studied above, prior to coming “into 
the light,” all falsely held to the mantra of “intelligence successes can rarely be known” 
and the fallacy that explaining how they were successful was tantamount to exposing 
sources and methods. ASIO, for example, peddled the line that as “an organisation 
working in the public interest, for the protection of the public, its successes can rarely be 
published.”418 However, accurate, this position does little to satisfy public skepticism in 
the face of scandal. Left without information, the media and the public will make 
presumptions built upon what they know—and what the public knows can be an 
unrepresentative mosaic of folly and failure. Candor and openness regarding the service’s 
specific agenda, and the authorities it needs to pursue that agenda, are vital to assuage 
cynicism and distrust. 
16. In carrying out a counterterrorism mission, necessity will drive 
collaboration but it may not eliminate cultural differences—and that is okay. By 
most accounts, as of 2012 MI5 and ASIO had an excellent working relationship with 
community counterparts, including law enforcement elements. Although mutually 
beneficial, cooperation and information sharing should not be expected to always 
overcome cultural barriers—nor should these barriers be seen as removing opportunity 
for success. Despite good intentions, operational need, and the general effectiveness of 
coordination efforts, the fundamental differences in culture between intelligence and law 
enforcement personnel will likely persist in the near term. For instance, MI5’s detractors 
                                                 
417 The FBI has been subject to the same historical reputation stains. In its 2004 report the 9/11 
Commission raised anew the FBI’s past transgressions, “[t]he FBI was criticized, rightly, for the 
overzealous domestic intelligence investigations disclosed during the 1970s. The pendulum swung away 
from those types of investigations during the 1980s and 1990s…” (9/11 Commission Report, 423).  
418 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, “Publications—Report to Parliament 2011–12,” 45. 
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argued that any communication rifts between the Service and the police stemmed from 
MI5’s culture of aloofness and secrecy, which they claimed was a natural state of being 
for an intelligence organization. Nonetheless, MI5’s operational relationship with police 
counterparts was generally excellent. Given the perseverance of culture, a service 
originally designed to remain in the shadows, and imbued with an instinctive sense of 
secrecy, may find it markedly difficult to break the binds of its secretive culture. These 
tendencies, however, do not necessarily outweigh an operational imperative to 
communicate. In this regard, the oft-maligned communication gap between the CIA and 
FBI may stem more from barriers erected by disparate mission arenas (i.e., domestic and 
foreign) than culture. 
C. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
“This is not a criticism of the FBI, the world’s premier law enforcement 
agency…The criticism is of those who expect a law enforcement 
organization to transform itself into an intelligence service.”419 
—former Counterterrorism Ambassador Henry Crumpton 
In the preceding pages this thesis sought to reframe the often system-based debate 
on domestic intelligence. The above case study evaluations and resulting lessons are by 
no means inclusive of every factor that determine what a service should do, or how it 
should be employed, to protect the homeland from near and distant threats. This study, 
however, did suggest an important overarching consideration—that the ideal 
characteristics expected in a domestic security service may prove unrealistic. The ideal 
characteristics, however desired or necessary they may be, are not only difficult to 
achieve in the modern counterterrorism milieu, a strict pursuit of them may produce 
counterproductive results.  
A counterterrorism-centered focus and an intelligence-led culture do not rest 
easily together within the contemporary counterterrorism framework for two principal 
reasons. The first problem is that cultures are slow to change, creating a disconnect 
between a well-established intelligence-led culture and the political and legal 
                                                 
419 Crumpton, “Intelligence and Homeland Defense,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, 207. 
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expectations of modern counterterrorism agendas. The second problem is that over time 
these agendas may slowly begin to reshape an intelligence culture into a law enforcement 
culture, contradicting the ideals set out by the post-9/11 discourse. Although MI5 and 
ASIO moved toward a counterterrorism-driven mission and enhanced cooperation with 
counterterrorism counterparts, these moves cost them an intelligence-led focus. Despite 
intent, origin, and mandate, the British and Australian intelligence services were drifting 
toward becoming law enforcement-led models and potential strategic failure (according 
to the post-9/11 discourse). In this vein, modern counterterrorism programs place 
demands on domestic intelligence services—to include supporting criminal prosecutions 
and equating arrests with success—that cause the services to fall short of expectations. 
Counterterrorism as a primary focus may meet national security needs, but unless a 
service and its officers are freed from directly supporting criminal prosecution of 
terrorism cases, and able to avoid related incentives, the move will erode the ideal 
characteristic of an intelligence-led culture—potentially costing a nation the predictive 
intelligence it desperately needs.420 This contradiction in expectations and outcomes 
becomes even more exacerbated when changes are hurried, such as with MI5 and ASIO 
following the 9/11 and Bali 2002 attacks. Cultural persistence may prove detrimental to a 
service’s ability to adapt to new and fluid expectations. Regardless of how justified 
changes may be, when expectations shift quickly, well-established services struggle to 
transform. Their culture lags behind, dragging with it incentives, tradecraft, and officer 
morale. On the positive side, this slow adjustment indicates that a deeply embedded 
intelligence culture is not easily swayed by the winds of change and may endure despite 
erosion under criminal-system pressures.  
For the United States, this assessment suggests three considerations with regard to 
the FBI. First, the FBI’s well-established law enforcement culture and successful history 
of policing will likely continue to hinder it from reforming quickly to meet intelligence-
related expectations. Second, ordering the FBI to reform only puts the Bureau in an 
                                                 
420 This is not to say that a service should not be held to legal standards that protect civil rights, nor 
should an intelligence service’s officers be protected from prosecution if they commit crimes in the name 
of “duty.” Rather, it speaks to participation in formal, criminal, judicial processes as an arm of the state 
(rather than as a “defendant.”) 
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impossible situation—expecting a service to become the nation’s lead provider of 
predictive domestic counterterrorism intelligence while concurrently maintaining 
primacy over federal law enforcement is contradictory. Lastly, if system-induced burdens 
on the intelligence provider (in particular with regard to evidence collection and criminal 
prosecution) are not adjusted, creation of a new, independent, intelligence service would 
be in vain—it would slowly evolve into a law enforcement-led service. 
Additionally, aspirations for an American service to garner public trust and 
protect civil liberties may be smothered by politicized expectations that lead to loosely 
defined mandates and misuse of the service. Intelligence agencies serve at the behest of 
state leadership. MI5 and ASIO lost public trust during years hunting political opposition 
and Communist subversives, but they did so largely by acting at the behest of the 
government in power—not entirely of their own design. Facing political pressure to 
thwart seemingly immediate and dire threats, it is difficult for a service’s internal 
mechanisms to overcome political directives that may be seen as harming liberties and 
therefore damaging trust. Lending credence to the argument that security and liberty exist 
on a “sliding scale,” the state and the service may view the choice as between the lesser 
of two evils—extend the service’s powers, potentially infringing on liberties, or risk 
attack. The balance, however, may not be so difficult. According to the British and 
Australian experiences, openness is the key. The best practice a service (and government) 
can employ to garner trust and help protect itself from misuse is a policy of robust 
openness regarding its mission and agenda, in particular though submission of its legal 
authorities to the public for approval. Much as Britain’s and Australia’s loosely defined, 
secretive, and politicized counter-subversion agendas of the 1960s–1980s led to violation 
of civil liberties and loss of public trust, a lack of refined mission parameters, murky 
legal authorities, and shifting definitions for terrorism-related criminal offenses risks 
thrusting today’s services into a public-trust quagmire of the state’s creation.  
Not all of the post-9/11 expectations proved a bridge too far. Coordination and 
sharing of information with counterparts was driven chiefly by necessity. When need 
demanded, the services actively extended their communication networks, enhanced 
interoperability, and shared information. Interestingly—and although full assessment 
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requires further research—this study did not uncover a vast improvement in coordination 
between security community partners as a result of national-level bureaucratic bodies. 
Rather, prior to, or concurrent with, the formation of national-level coordinating 
elements, services worked together as needed and service-to-service measures alone 
(such as regional centers and internal coordination offices) appeared to meet the post-
9/11 discourse’s expectations. Hence, government time and energy may be better spent 
directing intelligence-related resources, refining legal authorities, and acquiring public 
support for its agenda, than on formation of new, monolithic, national-level coordinating 
bodies. 
The events of September 2001 revealed fragilities in America’s national security, 
and those charged with strengthening it rightfully searched for improvements. In the rush 
to plug perceived holes in defense, however, the resulting debate and amendments 
focused on system-based issues, often leaving detailed assessment of service-specific 
matters for another day. When attention did turn to the services tasked with protecting 
America, the discourse had high expectations. This study’s conclusions do not 
necessarily indicate that the model characteristics desired by the post-9/11 discourse were 
incorrect. Rather, they suggest that, strict adherence to these ideals may result in a service 
that fails to satisfy all of America’s expectations.  
There is a threat hidden in expectations of an “ideal” that may not be achieved 
despite a service’s best efforts—undue reforms to the service and the system. Placing 
demands on a service that ignore the potentially contradictory nature of the expected 
ideal characteristics leads to a pretense of service failure, when in fact the desired 
characteristics may be inherently juxtaposed and counterproductive. Consequently, the 
government may unjustly find the service lacking and unnecessarily seek sweeping 
changes. With a decade of reflection behind us, reframing the debate may help inform 
discussion on counterterrorism intelligence in America, so we may understand not only 
what we lack, but also what we should seek.    
The above findings indicate that further study of expectations, with regard to what 
is desired in a service, would complement efforts to improve the national security 
apparatus and its essential agencies. Given the transnational nature of terrorism 
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subsequent studies may build upon this thesis by assessing services tasked with foreign 
collection (e.g., the CIA, ASIS, and MI6). Related, future studies may benefit from 
isolating sub-state from state-initiated terrorism. Such may help elucidate the advantage 
of different approaches (i.e., are the ideal characteristics and related expectations relevant 
to both sub-state and state-guided actors?). Given that this study found a gap between the 
expectation of an intelligence-led culture and the counterterrorism mission as applied in 
the modern era, further study of police security services—to possibly include the AFP, 
PSNI, Scotland Yard, and SSS—may add value by determining if they suffered similar or 
related frustrations. In addition, given this study observed a trend away from intelligence-
led cultures in response to shifting and increasing counterterrorism responsibilities, it 
would be useful to reassess this trend in MI5 and ASIO in several years’ time. Doing so 
would help illuminate whether this trend is continuing, reversing, or meeting some 
equilibrium. Furthermore, an isolated study on the impact and value of national-level 
coordination bodies in comparison to service-generated coordination mechanisms may 
aid in determining the best role for umbrella organizations such as DHS and the Director 
of National Intelligence. Lastly, and as noted in the introductory chapter, open-source 
information offers only a partial picture. Resolution on the above matters would be aided 
by internal audits and review by officials with access to service activities and 
administration outside of the realm of public discourse. 
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2011 72 15 4 87 
2010–11 72 17 -- 89 
2009–10 74 15 4 89 
2008–09 75 13 3.14 88 
2007–08 67 15 ≈3 82 
2006–07 63 17 3.5 80 
2005–06 53 17 7 70 
2004–05 52 20 10.2 72 
2003–04 42 25 10.7 67 
2002–03 32 29 ≈11–16 61 
2001 25 32 16 57 
2000 -- -- -- -- 
1999 -- -- 20 ≥ 50 
1998 -- -- -- -- 
1997–98 16.4 19.5 -- 35.9 
1996 -- -- -- -- 
1995 -- ≈ 50 -- -- 
Source: U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee, “Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Reports,” 
Cabinet Office, (accessed October 17, 2012) http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/intelligence-
and-security-committee-isc-annual-reports; Data for 2011 is valid through March 2011 and was acquired 
from the MI5 website: MI5--The Security Service, “Major Areas of Work,” (accessed September 29, 2012) 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/major-areas-of-work.html; see also Steve Hewitt, The 
British War on Terror (London, England: Continuum Books, 2008), 94. Chart indicates percentage of 
resources. 
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